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This study investigates the relations between Britain and the United States with 
regard to East Asia at the turn of the twentieth century with a view to establishing 
how far these conformed in practice to the ideal of the ‘great rapprochement’.  It 
makes the case that interaction between the two powers, while generally cordial, 
was not characterised by cooperation or collaboration on a practical level.  Through 
discussion of the issues of foreign investment and encroachment in China, the 
Boxer Rising, the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese immigration to the Pacific Coast of 
North America and the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the study considers why Britain 
and the United States failed to cooperate despite an apparent basis for joint action 
in both shared interests and ideological motivations.  It argues that the community 
of interest of the two powers was generally nullified by the broader concerns of 
each power, principally the dictates of domestic politics for the United States and 
the global policy needs of an already overstretched British Empire.  With regards to 
ideology, the study demonstrates that in spite of a significant body of shared ideas 
regarding race and civilisation, specifically the ideologies of Anglo-Saxonism and the 
Yellow Peril, British and American policymakers did not often employ such ideas or 
make use of ideological language in their interactions.  It suggests that policymakers 
deliberately avoided or downplayed ideological considerations, apparently believing 
that these had the potential to be counterproductive.  The key findings of the study 
are therefore that British and American policymakers were surprisingly sensitive 
and careful in their handling of ideas relating to race and civilisation and that very 
similar, if not identical, interests in a given region were not sufficient to overcome 
the wider limitations on British-American cooperation, bringing into question the 
notion that the ‘great rapprochement’ was effective beyond the level of rhetoric 
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Relations between Britain and the United States between the close of the 
nineteenth century and the outbreak of the First World War are often referred to in 
terms of the ‘great rapprochement’, whereby the two powers put aside the 
animosity which had characterised the preceding decades and laid the groundwork 
for close cooperation throughout the twentieth century.1  Though a marked 
improvement in the relationship undoubtedly did take place, the implication that 
these years witnessed a complete sea-change in British-American relations – from 
outright hostility to nascent ‘special relationship’ – is at risk of oversimplifying a 
complex and contested reality.  In particular, the decidedly less than smooth course 
of interaction between Britain and the United States over East Asia during this 
period complicates the ‘great rapprochement’ narrative somewhat, suggesting that 
even where conditions appeared ripe for transatlantic cooperation the practical 
obstacles to harmonious relations remained formidable. 
This study makes the case that British-American interaction over East Asia 
between 1898 and 1914, though by no means unfriendly, did not live up to the ideal 
of untrammelled closeness and collaboration, with instances of mutual irritation 
considerably more common than examples of successful cooperation.  The chapters 
which follow explore the reasons behind this apparent failure, interrogating both 
the notion that the two powers were drawn together in East Asia by an identity of 
interests and the claim that shared ideology regarding race and civilisation 
predisposed British and American policymakers to pursue a partnership in the 
region.  Though accepting the existence of a substantive basis of shared interests, 
the study argues that this was largely nullified by other concerns, most significantly 
domestic political constraints for the United States and global policy needs for 
                                                           
1 B. Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914 (London, 1969), 
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Britain.  The study also makes the case that the ostensible ideological motivations 
for a cooperative approach in East Asia ultimately played a very limited role in 
interaction between the two powers – to the extent that they were often less 
significant than negative British and American images of each other – in part 
because policymakers deliberately avoided or downplayed ideas that they deemed 
hazardous or potentially counterproductive. 
The majority of the fairly extensive literature on the British-American 
rapprochement at the turn of the twentieth century follows an established 
framework in narrating the story of the transition from hostility to amity.  This 
standard account begins in 1895, with the dispute over the boundary between 
Venezuela and British Guiana acting as a catalyst to bring the United States and 
Britain to a point of recognition that conflict would be irrational and ‘fratricidal’.  
The narrative continues with the Spanish-American War of 1898, wherein the 
British people and Government were afforded an opportunity to demonstrate their 
wholehearted support for the U.S., both in the conflict itself and in the ensuing 
territorial expansion in the Pacific, and dispel any American doubts as to the 
sincerity of the British desire for friendship.  The story then depicts the grateful 
Americans reciprocating by standing by Britain during her calamitous war in South 
Africa, in spite of strong pro-Boer sentiment among the populace.  Finally, with 
close cordiality firmly established, the standard narrative portrays British-American 
relations in the early years of the twentieth century as simply a matter of resolving 
the various niggling questions held over from the days of hostility, concluding in 
1903 with the resolution of the Alaska boundary dispute.2  This picture of the 
                                                           
2 H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1952 
(London, 1954), pp.532, 540, 556, 572, 580-581, 590-592, 596, 614; S. Anderson, Race and 
Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904 (East Brunswick, NJ, 
1981), pp.95, 98, 111, 117-118, 131-132, 169; C.S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement: 
The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900 (New York, 1974), pp.175, 189, 192, 195; E.P. Crapol, 
‘From Anglophobia to Fragile Rapprochement: Anglo-American Relations in the Early Twentieth 
Century’ in H. Schröder (ed.), Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the 
Era of World War I, 1900-1924 (Oxford, 1993), pp.18-20; D. Dimbleby and D. Reynolds, An Ocean 
Apart: The Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (London, 1988), p.28; 
R.B. Mowat, The American Entente (London, 1939), pp.124, 126-128, 136-137, 139-140, 144; S.S. 
Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective (Chapel Hill, NC, 
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rapprochement implies a significant transformation in the nature of relations 
between the United States and Britain in the space of less than a decade.  Though 
few historians would go as far as to suggest that the end result of the 
rapprochement was a concrete understanding or entente, the majority view is that 
some sort of ‘moral alliance’ developed.  This notion, closely resembling the later 
concept of a ‘special relationship’, does not necessarily signify a commitment to 
joint action so much as a recognition that the bond between the two nations 
rendered their relations unlike those with other powers.3 
 There have been some challenges to the standard narrative of the 
rapprochement and to the notion that British-American relations in the early 
twentieth century took on the character of a ‘moral alliance’.  For example, R.G. 
Neale has cast doubt on the theory that the Spanish-American War consolidated 
the emerging cordiality between the two nations, contending that although British 
backing during the conflict softened American opinion in the short term, the longer-
term impact of this support has been significantly exaggerated.4  Neale is not alone 
in suggesting that the notion of the rapprochement inaugurating a period of 
unalloyed harmony and cordiality in the early years of the twentieth century is 
misleading.  A number of historians have noted that Britain and the United States 
continued to find themselves at loggerheads over relatively minor issues well 
beyond the traditional finish line of 1903, and that, regardless of how friendly 
relations may have been on the surface, actual cooperation remained very much an 
unrealised ideal.5  British historians C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill have even suggested 
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pp.209-211; Perkins, The Great Rapprochement, p.83; Tilchin, Theodore Roosevelt and the British 
Empire, pp.241-242. 
4 R.G. Neale, Britain and American Imperialism, 1898-1900 (Brisbane, 1965), pp.125-128, 136, 172-
174. 
5 L.M. Gelber, The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics, 1898-1906 (London, 
1938), pp.75, 85; P. Larsen, ‘Sir Mortimer Durand in Washington: A Study in Anglo-American 
Relations in the Era of Theodore Roosevelt’, Mid-America 66 (1984), p.67; Neale, Britain and 
American Imperialism, pp.129-130, 132-134; H.G. Nicholas, The United States and Great Britain 
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that the rapprochement was, ‘much more apparent than real – a product of myth 
making and wishful thinking’, and although this perhaps overstates the case, it 
would certainly be fair to question just how deeply-rooted the change in British-
American relations was and the extent of its practical impact.6   
Though this study does not attempt to deny the existence or significance of 
the rapprochement entirely, it does take its lead from those more critical studies 
which argue that relations between Britain and the United States during these years 
were characterised not so much by comfortable cooperation as by a frequently 
frustrating process of attempting to bring the realities of diplomacy into line with 
the rhetoric of friendship and harmony.  As the chapters which follow demonstrate, 
this interpretation of British-American relations at the turn of the twentieth century 
is compellingly borne out by interaction between the two powers over East Asia, by 
which term is meant the region traditionally referred to as ‘the Far East’. 
In the period from 1898 to 1914, East Asia underwent a number of 
significant upheavals and came increasingly to play a prominent role on the global 
political scene.  It represents a useful case study because of the wealth of 
opportunities for British-American joint action which these various crises and 
controversies created.  The years surrounding the turn of the twentieth century 
were a time of particular turmoil for China, as the European powers engaged in a 
‘scramble for concessions’ and internal unrest erupted into the full-blown chaos of 
the Boxer Rising.  These incidents, as well as the American attempt to stave off the 
closing of China’s markets by means of the Open Door notes, are the subject of the 
first chapter of this study.  The second chapter addresses the conflict between 
Japan and Russia which exploded into a war of global significance in 1904 and 1905.  
The Russo-Japanese War was a significant turning point in the relations of East and 
West, as Japan’s unexpected triumph raised fears in Europe and the United States 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(Chicago, IL, 1975), pp.56-58; D.C. Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place, 1900-1975 
(Cambridge, 1984), pp.21, 24. 
6 C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power, vol. 1 (London, 1972), p.99. 
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of a future threat from the island nation.  In the years that followed, this threat 
appeared to manifest itself chiefly in the form of immigration.   
In 1906 and 1907, outbursts of anti-Japanese sentiment in California and 
British Columbia spiralled into an international crisis over the immigration question, 
which is dealt with in the third chapter of the study.  The controversy over 
immigration in turn fed rumours of a coming conflict in the Pacific, as it appeared 
increasingly likely that relations between Japan and the United States would break 
down.  The fourth chapter considers these war scares and the various strategies 
Britain and the United States adopted in response, including the world cruise of the 
U.S. fleet and British efforts to modify the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.  In the fifth and 
final chapter of the study, the spotlight returns once again to China, first with the 
reinvigoration of international competition over railway investment caused by 
American ‘Dollar Diplomacy’ in 1909 and 1910, and then with the outbreak of the 
Xinhai Revolution in October 1911.  The overthrow of the Qing Dynasty and the 
establishment in its place of the Republic of China represent the last significant 
episodes in the region prior to the First World War.  The conflict which erupted in 
Europe in 1914 decisively shifted the focus of Britain and the United States away 
from East Asia, and thus marks a useful end-point for this study. 
Despite all that was going on in East Asia during these years, historians of 
the British-American rapprochement have not tended to devote a great deal of 
attention to this part of the world.  A number of accounts work from, and indeed do 
not go much beyond, the premise that a perceived community of interests in the 
region was one of the factors which contributed to Britain and the United States 
coming into more cordial relations around the turn of the twentieth century.7  Some 
historians have taken this line of argument a step further, suggesting not only that 
the potential for joint action in East Asia contributed to burgeoning British-
American closeness, but that this closeness was in turn reflected in practical 
                                                           
7 Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, pp.142, 149; C.S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement, p.199; 
W. LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, NY, 
1963), pp.284-285, 318. 
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collaboration between the two powers in the region.8  There is, however, very little 
evidence to back up claims of British-American cooperation over East Asia in the 
years between 1898 and 1914.  Numerous examples can be cited of the failure of 
the two powers to work together: from the American refusal to back British 
attempts to resist the ‘scramble for concessions’ in China, through British 
reluctance to press the American agenda with their Japanese allies over the Russo-
Japanese War or the question of immigration, to President Woodrow Wilson’s 
rejection of international cooperation in response to the Chinese Revolution.  A 
number of historians have therefore foregrounded the disjuncture between the 
appearance of common goals and the reality of policies which, while rarely in direct 
conflict, were often far from cooperative.9 
Not only did affairs in East Asia fail to draw Britain and the United States into 
joint action, they actually represented a source of tension at times.  The failure of 
the two powers to coordinate their action not infrequently left something of a bitter 
aftertaste, with mutual suspicion and irritation a common feature of British-
American interaction over East Asia.10  A significant contributing factor to the 
frustration felt by policymakers on both sides was a high level of expectation that 
the two powers would be found in harmony in East Asia.  Historians Lionel Gelber 
and A.E. Campbell have both argued that East Asia represented the ‘acid test’ of the 
rapprochement, or in other words the arena where there was the greatest basis for 
                                                           
8 Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, pp.150-154, 171; G.E. Hubbard, British Far Eastern Policy (New York, 
1943), pp.27-28; P. Joseph, Foreign Diplomacy in China, 1894-1900: A Study in Political and Economic 
Relations with China (London, 1928), pp.323, 378, 382-383; Mowat, The American Entente, p.135. 
9 Allen, Great Britain and the United States, p.589; Anderson, Race and Rapprochement, p.151; A.E. 
Campbell, Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903 (London, 1960), pp.157, 159, 185; A.E. 
Campbell, ‘The United States and Great Britain: Uneasy Allies’ in J. Braeman, R.H. Bremner and D. 
Brody (eds.), Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy (Columbus, OH, 1971), p.488; Gelber, The 
Rise of Anglo-American Friendship, pp.84-85; Neale, Britain and American Imperialism, p.171; A. 
Orde, The Eclipse of Great Britain: The United States and British Imperial Decline, 1895-1956 (New 
York, 1996), p.33; R. Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke, 
1998), p.6; B.M. Russett, Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge, MA, 1963), p.6. 
10 Gelber, The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship, pp.214-216, 235; Iriye, From Nationalism to 
Internationalism, p.212; W. LaFeber, The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japan Relations (New York, 1997), 
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British-American cooperation.11  This notion that East Asia was the fertile ground 
from which transatlantic amity could flourish also had some traction at the time and 
may well have influenced policymakers’ views of the situation.  In his 1896 study of 
the Far East, British journalist Valentine Chirol offered this prediction:  
There, if anywhere, might be laid the foundations of that close 
understanding between the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race 
which it must be the object of every far-seeing statesman on both sides of 
the Atlantic to promote and extend.12 
This assertion begs the question of why exactly East Asia appeared so ripe for 
British-American cooperation.  Another contemporary observer, British writer 
Archibald Colquhoun, made the case that the English-speaking nations had ‘an 
obvious community of interest as well as community of sentiment’ in the Far East, 
and this formulation offers a useful way to approach the problem.13  Britain and the 
United States, in theory at least, not only shared the same interests in East Asia, but 
were also drawn together by a shared ideological framework. 
That this apparent coincidence of shared interests and ideological factors did 
not translate into significant cooperation on a practical level is a key point of 
departure for this study.  The chapters which follow will seek to address the 
question of why, if there was a genuine basis for British-American cooperation in 
East Asia in both interests and ideas, the combination proved insufficient to bring 
about joint action.  A useful preliminary to this endeavour is to consider the extent 
of these communities of interest and sentiment and what it was that they 
specifically entailed.  The ideological side will be dealt with in considerably greater 
detail in order to draw on the vast range of literature, both primary and scholarly, 
which touches upon the subject. 
There is some debate among historians as to the extent to which the two 
countries actually had a common set of interests in East Asia.  Anne Orde, for 
example, has suggested that the much-vaunted community of interest was largely 
                                                           
11 A.E. Campbell, Great Britain and the United States, p.156; Gelber, The Rise of Anglo-American 
Friendship, p.75. 
12 V. Chirol, The Far Eastern Question (London, 1896), p.194. 
13 A.R. Colquhoun, China in Transformation (New York, 1904 [1898]), p.ix. 
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illusory.  She has made the case that it was possible for the powers to maintain a 
fiction of common aims and goals precisely because this theory was never put to 
the test in actual collaboration.  This is an interesting claim, and it would not be an 
unfair assumption, given the general lack of cooperation between the powers in 
East Asia, to conclude that the extent of British-American shared interests had been 
somewhat exaggerated.14  Nevertheless, there is a strong case to be made that, 
their failure to pursue them in concert notwithstanding, the two powers did have 
very similar interests in East Asia. 
The primary shared interest of Britain and the United States in the region 
was the maintenance of stability and the status quo.  Both powers were committed 
to the preservation of the Chinese Empire as a sovereign state with full jurisdiction 
over the entirety of its territory, including the outlying region of Manchuria.  In 
pursuance of this broad goal, British and American policymakers looked for a 
balance of power between the various nations involved in East Asian affairs, in the 
hope that this would safeguard Chinese integrity and minimise the potential for 
conflict and instability.15  The common solicitude of Britain and the United States for 
the status quo in East Asia was in part a reflection of the second major shared 
interest of the two powers: open trade throughout the Chinese Empire.  Both 
powers were keen to expand their commerce in East Asia, and although they held 
radically different positions on international trade – the Americans convinced of the 
necessity of protectionism and economic nationalism, the British devoted to the 
Cobdenite gospel of free trade – they found themselves in broad agreement that 
                                                           
14 A.E. Campbell, Great Britain and the United States, p.182; Orde, The Eclipse of Great Britain, p.33. 
15 J.M. Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, 
MA, 1983), p.74; E.W. Edwards, ‘The Japanese Alliance and the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904’, 
History 42 (1957), p.25; N.A. Graebner, ‘The Year of Transition’ in N.A. Graebner (ed.), An Uncertain 
Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1961), p.6; R.J. Moore, 
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Osterhammel, ‘Britain and China, 1842-1914’ in A. Porter (ed.), The Oxford History of the British 
Empire, vol. 3 (Oxford, 1999), pp.157-158; T.G. Otte, The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and 
British Isolation, 1894-1905 (Oxford, 2007), p.84; M.H. Wilgus, Sir Claude MacDonald, the Open Door, 
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19 
 
China’s largely untapped markets should remain freely accessible to all nations.16  
British and American policymakers thus stood in opposition to any sort of 
restrictions on trade and any arrangements which granted individual powers special 
privileges or exclusive ‘spheres of influence’, a position which would come to be 
defined by the concept of the ‘Open Door’.17  Finally, Britain and the United States 
had similar interests with regard to the issue of Japanese immigration.  Neither 
power could cope politically with a large influx of Asian labour into their territory.  
Equally, however, neither of them could afford to disrupt friendly relations with 
Japan, a power still in the midst of a meteoric rise during these years.  London and 
Washington therefore had a common interest in finding a solution to the 
immigration question which would curb the flow of labour from Japan without 
causing offence to the Japanese and souring relations.18 
The ‘community of sentiment’ between Britain and the United States to 
which Colquhoun refers is a somewhat more nebulous notion than that of common 
interests.  This study treats it as a shared basis of ideas which served, or had the 
potential to serve, as an inducement to joint action in East Asia, either by directly 
encouraging British-American cooperation or by pointing towards a particular 
                                                           
16 A. Howe, Free Trade and Liberal England, 1846-1946 (Oxford, 1997), pp.195, 213, 266-267, 297; M-
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18 T.A. Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises (London, 1934), pp.139, 160, 
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course of action with regard to Japan and China.  The term ‘sentiment’, though 
apposite for the period under consideration, is a little imprecise and would tend to 
imply principally an emotional response, so ‘ideology’ will generally be used in 
preference.  Michael Hunt’s attempts to define ‘ideology’ in the context of foreign 
policy and international relations have emphasised that this term does not need to 
refer to a formalised or systematic belief system, but is rather ‘an interrelated set of 
convictions or assumptions’ which serves to make a complex reality more 
comprehensible.19  This study will thus include under the umbrella term ‘ideology’ 
not only logically coherent ways of thinking about a given issue, in other words 
identifiable ‘ideologies’, but also more inchoate ‘ideas’ and ‘images’.  This latter 
term is often employed by International Relations scholars to describe the frames of 
reference through which people perceive and interpret the world around them.  In 
this usage, ‘images’, especially those relating to the character and characteristics of 
other nations and people groups, play an important role in policymaking as they 
enable policymakers to predict and evaluate the behaviour of the various powers 
with which they interact.20  Jean-Pierre Lehmann has suggested that all ‘images’ are 
inherently neither comprehensive nor objective but are rather impressions or even 
                                                           
19 M.H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT, 2009), pp.xi, 12; M.H. Hunt, ‘Ideology’ 
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20 K. Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York, 1979), p.17; K.E. Boulding, ‘National Images and 
International Systems’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 2 (1959), pp.120-121; C.H. Heimsath, ‘The 
American Images of India as Factors in U.S. Foreign Policy Making’, Asian Thought and Society 3 
(1978), pp.272, 281; O. Holsti, ‘Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy’ in J.C. Farrell and A.P. 
Smith (eds.), Image and Reality in World Politics (New York, 1967), p.18; R. Jervis, The Logic of 
Images in International Relations (New York, 1989), pp.4-5; H.C. Kelman, ‘Social-Psychological 
Approaches to the Study of International Relations: Definitions of Scope’ in H.C. Kelman (ed.), 
International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York, 1966), pp.24-25; D.R. Kinder and 
J.A. Weiss, ‘In Lieu of Rationality: Psychological Perspectives on Foreign Policy Decision Making’, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 22 (1978), pp.709, 721; D.G. Pruitt, ‘Definition of the Situation as a 
Determinant of International Action’ in H.C. Kelman (ed.), International Behavior: A Social-
Psychological Analysis (New York, 1966), pp.394-395; R.S. Schwantes, Japanese and Americans: A 
Century of Cultural Relations (Westport, CT, 1955), p.39; G.H. Snyder and P. Diesing, Conflict Among 
Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ, 
1977), p.286; J.C. Thomson, Jr., P.W. Stanley and J.C. Perry, Sentimental Imperialists: The American 
Experience in East Asia (New York, 1981), p.5; Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy, p.3. 
21 
 
caricatures, and for this reason the term ‘image’ is to a large extent used 
interchangeably with ‘stereotype’ throughout the study.21 
The ideological framework which the people, and to a large extent the 
policymakers, of Britain and the United States shared at the turn of the twentieth 
century was overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, centred on notions of race and 
civilisation.  This study therefore focuses primarily on ideas which fall under this 
broad category.  The terms ‘race’ and ‘civilisation’ do not lend themselves to precise 
definition, especially given that both were subject to considerable flexibility and 
ambiguity around the turn of the twentieth century.  On a very basic level, however, 
‘race’ might be said to refer to biological inheritance and divisions of humanity 
based on descent.  In contrast, ‘civilisation’ would refer to cultural inheritance and 
divisions of humanity based on factors such as social systems, religion and 
linguistics.22  This theoretical dichotomy is useful, but there is a significant caveat in 
the high level of overlap in the actual usage of the two terms.  For instance, 
‘civilisation’ was not necessarily innocent of biological connotations, with a number 
of key nineteenth century thinkers, such as Gustave Le Bon, describing different 
types of ‘civilisation’ as mere reflections of inherited ‘racial’ characteristics.23  More 
fundamentally, the term ‘race’ carried an incredibly broad range of possible 
meanings and connotations.  It was often employed in ways which implied no 
biological association, for example as a substitute for the word ‘nation’, but it was 
also used in a catch-all manner to encompass almost all aspects of human character 
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and behaviour under the umbrella of inheritance.24  In consequence of the 
extensive crossover and confusion between the concepts of ‘race’ and ‘civilisation’, 
the two are treated throughout this study not as interchangeable but as inextricably 
connected. 
The very broad scope of what could be considered ‘racial’ in the years 
around the turn of the twentieth contributed to the prominent place of ‘race 
thinking’ in the dominant worldview of the time.  Though there were dissenters, 
such as the influential French theorist Jean Finot, the broad consensus throughout 
the West was that racial difference was the essential driver of history, and that all 
significant characteristics of individuals and groups could be delineated at least 
partially in biological terms.25  In Britain and the United States the major 
manifestation of this saturation of racial thought, and the heart of Colquhoun’s 
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‘community of sentiment’, was the ideology of Ango-Saxonism, which dominated 
the intellectual landscape of both nations.26 
Reduced to its simplest level, Anglo-Saxonism was a broad set of beliefs 
regarding the superiority, world mission and essential brotherhood of the ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ or ‘English-speaking’ peoples.  These two terms were broadly 
interchangeable, though the former was rejected by some proponents of the 
ideology, most notably Theodore Roosevelt, as too narrowly racial.27  Anglo-
Saxonist thinkers, such as James K. Hosmer, ascribed to the English-speaking race a 
position at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of the world’s peoples, often attributing 
this superiority primarily to an unrivalled aptitude for governance.  This quality was 
theoretically rooted in an innate ‘love of liberty’ – a distinctive possession and 
inheritance of the English-speaking peoples – and an unbroken heritage of 
developing and perfecting the institutions of popular self-government.28  Anglo-
Saxonist ideologues claimed that the English-speaking peoples had a duty to impart 
their culture, values and institutions – in other words, their civilisation – to the rest 
of the world by taking a leading role in global affairs and ensuring the ascendancy of 
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liberty, democracy and Protestant Christianity.29  They were uniquely equipped for 
this task not only because of their genius for governance but also as a result of 
various inherent traits – the stereotyped characteristics which composed the image 
of the Anglo-Saxon peoples – such as manly energy, adventurousness and ‘moral 
character’.30   
Anglo-Saxonist thought could take on a number of forms and be put to a 
variety of different uses, and there are notable distinctions between its 
manifestations in Britain and in the United States.  In the latter, for example, Anglo-
Saxonism often assumed a nativist guise, forming the basis of a claim for the 
superiority of white, English-speaking Americans over the new immigrants from 
Eastern Europe and Asia.31  British Anglo-Saxonists, on the other hand, tended to 
apply their ideology to the question of empire, most strikingly in the late-
nineteenth-century movement to promote imperial federation and the somewhat 
nebulous vision of ‘Greater Britain’.32  Many, though by no means all, devotees of 
Anglo-Saxonism on both sides of the Atlantic believed, however, that the supposed 
racial mission or destiny of the English-speaking peoples could be best attained by 
some sort of united front between Britain and the United States, with some even 
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predicting that if the two powers were to make common cause it would effectively 
bring an end to great power conflict and usher in an era of pacific Anglo-Saxon 
hegemony.33 
The question of how significant such Anglo-Saxonist ideas were in drawing 
Britain and the United States together forms a crucial part of the historiography of 
the rapprochement.  Much of the scholarship, particularly that which abides by the 
standard narrative described above, tends to work from the premise that bonds of 
common language, culture, and ‘blood’ were central in drawing Britain and the 
United States into close and friendly relations, in large part because they provided 
the logic that such a development was a natural one.34  This interpretation has been 
given added weight by recent scholarship on the notion of the ‘Anglo world’, in 
particular the work of James Belich and Gary Magee and Andrew Thompson.  These 
historians have made the case that linguistic and cultural ties facilitated social 
networks and economic interdependence amongst the English-speaking nations, 
which in turn reinforced the sense of belonging to a transnational Anglophone 
identity, as distinct from other more ‘foreign’ peoples.35  Stuart Anderson, who has 
dealt explicitly and extensively with the role of ideology in the rapprochement, has 
concluded that Anglo-Saxonist beliefs about racial unity and a shared racial mission 
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were the ‘primary abstract rationale’ for the rapprochement.36  Anderson’s 
contention is that key policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic were firm believers 
in Anglo-Saxonism, and that these ideas, and not merely respective national 
interests, were vital in motivating not only the rapprochement more broadly but 
also the shared desire for cooperation in East Asia.37   
Inevitably, not all historians have accepted Anderson’s thesis, and in 
particular those historians who are sceptical of the traditional picture of the 
rapprochement have tended to doubt the significance of ideological factors.  They 
have generally argued that ideas of racial or cultural affinity only came in to play 
when they chimed with the agendas of the two powers.  In this reading, Anglo-
Saxonist ideology, far from driving the improvement in relations, was at best a 
‘convenient afterthought’, rendering reliance on or deference to the other power 
more palatable.38  This interpretation usefully highlights the potential for ideology 
to function chiefly as rationalisation after the fact rather than as a motivating force, 
but it also underestimates the extent to which British and American policymakers 
were philosophically committed to the tenets of Anglo-Saxonism, a point for which 
Anderson provides ample evidence.  That said, a major weakness of Anderson’s 
study is its overreliance on simply outlining the ideological make-up of key actors 
without actually establishing whether and how their Anglo-Saxonist beliefs 
impacted on policymaking.  It thus remains something of an open question as to 
how far Anglo-Saxonist ideology can be cited as a factor in the British-American 
rapprochement. 
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  Anglo-Saxonism was not the only aspect of the shared British and American 
ideological framework, and indeed it formed only part of a broader worldview 
which dominated popular and elite thinking in the English-speaking nations.  It was 
widely believed that the world would soon witness, and was perhaps already in the 
throes of, a colossal struggle for supremacy between different races or civilisations 
which would determine the course of the future, a contest which might end in 
military combat but would also be played out in economic and demographic 
competition.39  The notion of a coming ‘clash’ took its lead from the Social Darwinist 
theory of a natural ‘struggle for existence’, and was grounded in a key tenet of the 
racial thought of the period: the notion of a fundamental and unbridgeable divide 
between different peoples which rendered antagonism and conflict inevitable.40  
Racial or civilisational conflict was a significant preoccupation of the fin de siècle 
discourse in Britain and the United States, in which confidence in the innate 
superiority of the English-speaking peoples mingled with a strain of anxiety over the 
ultimate outcome of competition between races and civilisations.  This mix of 
arrogance and insecurity was fuelled by widespread fears that ‘inferior’ peoples 
might prove themselves ‘the fittest to survive’ in the coming struggle and displace 
the supposedly decadent and effete white, Western powers.41 
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The notion of a coming contest for global supremacy and this latter concern 
about ‘inferior’ peoples threatening white, Western hegemony were particularly 
pertinent as Britain and the United States looked to affairs in East Asia.  This region 
was slated by many observers to be the decisive factor in the future global struggle 
for dominance because of the vast reservoir of natural resources and people in 
China, the last great expanse of territory as yet unclaimed by a single imperialist 
power.42  Such predictions, especially in the years immediately surrounding the turn 
of the twentieth century, were often grounded in the notion of global rivalry 
between the Anglo-Saxon and Slavic races.43  Increasingly, however, the focus of 
such forecasts shifted to reflect fears of an awakened Orient rising up to challenge 
the West for dominance.  The spectre of an inevitable conflict between East and 
West, or between the white and ‘yellow’ races, was pervasive during these years, 
and such thinking was stoked by figures such as Kaiser Wilhelm II, who was at least 
partially responsible for popularising the term ‘Yellow Peril’.44  This concept was very 
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broad and somewhat vague; the anticipated danger could come either from China 
or Japan singly or from a unified ‘pan-Asian’ conglomerate, and might take the form 
of a military threat, as in ‘Asian invasion’ stories such as M.P. Shiel’s The Yellow 
Danger, but could equally manifest itself in economic competition or even relate 
merely to the inevitable consequences of a vast and ever-expanding Oriental 
population.45  This latter aspect of the Yellow Peril was probably the one foremost in 
the minds of British and American leaders, who were faced, and to some extent 
sympathised, with widespread and fervent opposition to the immigration of Asian 
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labour on the basis that it was believed to represent a menace to the livelihood, 
morals, institutions, and culture of the English-speaking peoples.46 
 Just as Anglo-Saxonism was built on a foundation of positive images of the 
English-speaking peoples, so Yellow Peril ideology relied on, for the most part 
contrasting, images of East Asians.  Though such images did not necessarily have 
any logical consistency – indeed it was common for people to hold entirely 
contradictory images of Asians at the same time – they did form an important facet 
of the shared ideological framework through which British and American people 
and policymakers understood East Asian affairs.47  Moreover, these ‘hetero-
stereotypes’ of the East Asian other were an essential counterpart to British and 
American ‘auto-stereotypes’; the ‘Oriental’, as in many ways the polar opposite of 
the Anglo-Saxon, represented a key foil against which the English-speaking peoples 
could define themselves.48  Most British and American images and stereotypes of 
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Orientals were, unsurprisingly, broadly negative, including stereotyped 
characteristics such as cruelty, dishonesty, xenophobia, arrogance and immorality.49  
There were, however, also a number of more positive characteristics, mostly 
associated specifically with the Japanese, such as industry, resilience, frugality, 
militancy and loyalty.  Though these qualities were at times admired, they were 
also, in the context of Yellow Peril fears, often viewed in a more threatening light as 
enhancing the ability of East Asians to compete with and challenge the Anglo-Saxon 
powers.50 
 Though the above summary is necessarily very broad-brush and neither as 
comprehensive nor as nuanced as such a complex topic deserves, it does not fall 
within the scope of this study to go beyond this brief precis of the shared British-
American ideological framework or ‘community of sentiment’.  In particular, it is not 
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possible, nor indeed wholly desirable, to examine in detail the individual ideological 
leanings of the various key policymakers discussed in the chapters which follow.  
Not only have scholars already undertaken this task for a number of the major 
figures but, as suggested above with regard to Stuart Anderson’s work on Anglo-
Saxonism, this approach does not in itself necessarily offer useful insights into the 
influence of ideology on policy and international interaction.51  Moreover, the 
intention of this study is not simply to assess the significance of ideological factors 
in British-American interaction over East Asia, either in isolation or in comparison to 
more tangible interests.  Rather, the aim is to consider these two aspects of the 
question in tandem, with a view to a more holistic understanding of relations 
between the two powers. 
 By giving roughly equal weight to both interests and ideology and dealing 
with the two alongside one another, it is hoped that this study avoids the pitfalls 
either of relegating ideology to the status of simple irrationality or mere mask for 
concrete interests, or of reifying ideology so that it is treated as significant in and of 
itself regardless of its actual influence on policy and decision-making.52  Moreover, 
there is a strong case to be made that it is not fruitful to consider ideas and 
interests as separate or competing factors because of the importance of the way 
they impact on each other, in other words the interplay between the two.53  
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Numerous historians and theorists have argued that ideology plays an essential role 
in the process by which policymakers assess and define national interests, 
contending that far from being self-evident these interests are the product of 
judgements which are inevitably coloured by perceptions, assumptions and 
beliefs.54  For example, Thomas Otte has suggested that Anglo-Saxonist ideology, 
though perhaps not a causal factor in itself, served to reinforce the ‘cooler 
calculations of British interests’ in the formulation of policy towards the United 
States.55  The other side of the coin is that tangible interests can have an influence 
on ideology, most obviously in the realm of national images.  During the period with 
which this study is concerned, British and American images of and attitudes towards 
other nations shifted in line with changes in the international situation.  So, when 
Japan became primarily a competitor rather than a partner in East Asia, positive 
images of the Japanese faded into the background as negative ones emerged and 
came to the fore.56 
 The approach of addressing interests and ideology together does not require 
any great methodological innovation.  As Marc Frey has pointed out, one of the 
peccadillos of many historians who work with ideas and images is to foreground 
theory and methodology, implying that their scholarship represents a new 
departure, before going on to undertake traditional diplomatic history anyway.57  
With that critique in mind, this study unabashedly follows a fairly standard 
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framework for diplomatic history, relying primarily on the official and personal 
source material generated by the policymaking elite of Britain and the United States 
to investigate the decision-making process behind each power’s policy in East Asia 
and the direct interaction between the two powers with regard to the various issues 
and crises that arose in the region. 
 Specifically, the raw material in which the study is grounded is the 
documentary record of the major actors in both governments – presidents and 
secretaries of state on the American side, prime ministers and foreign secretaries 
on the British – as well as some of the subordinate figures within each country’s 
foreign policy establishment, such as diplomats in East Asian nations and key 
officials in the Foreign Office and State Department.  In light of the particular focus 
on the interaction and communication between Britain and the United States, the 
study also draws heavily on the papers of various men who served as ambassador in 
Washington or London during this period, most prominently Whitelaw Reid and 
James Bryce.  These sources are very much the stuff of high policymaking, and 
although the study does draw on a broad pool of sources relating to the cultural 
background of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century – as in the above 
survey of the British-American ‘community of sentiment’ – it follows the lead of 
Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher in considering these primarily through the 
prism of the ‘official mind’.  This entails focusing chiefly on how the ideas and 
images contained within such sources were mediated in the deliberations of 
policymakers, rather than attempting to ascribe significance or influence to them 
independently of their role in informing how policy was made and communicated 
between the two powers.  This approach also informs the emphasis throughout the 
study on internal discussions of policy and the actual interaction between British 
and American policymakers, as opposed to the broader political record or the public 
pronouncements of the major actors.  As Robinson and Gallagher have persuasively 
argued, the former categories of sources offer a much more direct insight into the 
motivations and priorities of policymakers as well as the ideological and material 
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influences on the policymaking process, and it is with questions relating to these 
issues which this study is primarily concerned.58 
 Though the major focus of the study is thus on the official side of British-
American relations, the chapters which follow also draw on private correspondence 
to reflect the fact that a vital element of interaction between the two powers 
during this period was the employment of personal diplomacy and informal 
channels.  Regardless of how far one accepts the notion of a ‘special relationship’ at 
the level of practical politics, there is no question that the years between 1898 and 
1914 represent a high watermark in personal relationships and correspondence 
between significant figures in the two nations.  During the presidency of Theodore 
Roosevelt in particular, informal and semi-official envoys acted as an essential 
supplement to British-American communication at the official level.59  A variety of 
figures, including U.S. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Conservative MP Arthur Lee and 
Canadian politician William Lyon Mackenzie King, acted as intermediaries between 
the two powers, and it is often in these more off-the-record interactions that the 
greatest degree of openness and candour is to be found.  The wealth of personal 
and informal correspondence in British-American interaction during these years is 
particularly useful from the point of view of exploring the influence of shared 
ideology.  Communication in such contexts was generally less constrained by 
formality than the official dialogue, not least because both powers published the 
majority of their formal diplomatic exchanges and were thus understandably 
circumspect about the contents of, and the terminology used in, these messages. 
In order to assess the role of ideas and images in British-American 
interaction, the study pays particular attention to the language which policymakers 
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and other actors employed.  This is not simply a matter of identifying ideological 
content or terminology relating to race and civilisation in communications, as it is 
also necessary to delve into questions of why and how such language was used.  It is 
incredibly difficult, if not impossible in many cases, for the historian to delineate 
where ideology acted as a motivating factor in a given policymaker’s decisions and 
where it served primarily as justification or rationalisation of choices made on 
entirely separate grounds.  To put it another way, there is no reliable means to 
determine whether an actor’s employment of ideological language was 
‘representational’, in that it expressed genuine personal beliefs, or ‘instrumental’, in 
that it was intended to achieve a particular impact.60  In consequence, this study 
does not dwell at any length on efforts to assess how sincere British and American 
policymakers were in their expression of ideas relating to race and civilisation, but 
focuses rather on the issue of what precise ‘function’ these ideas performed in 
interaction between the two powers.61  An understanding of how and to what end 
key actors engaged with ideology is essential to addressing the question of to what 
extent the ‘community of sentiment’ played a role in facilitating cooperation 
between Britain and the United States in East Asia. 
This question is significant because, as indicated above, the central 
contention of this study is that in spite of a reasonably substantial basis both in 
shared ideology and shared interests, Britain and the United States did not 
ultimately cooperate in East Asia on any significant scale.  It is worth noting that the 
term ‘cooperation’ is used throughout the study to refer specifically to active and, 
usually though not necessarily, overt coordinated activity, whereby either the two 
powers agreed on a common policy or one power acted on the request of the other.  
This definition of cooperation does not include instances where the two powers 
arrived independently at similar or parallel policies, nor does it include the sharing 
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of information between the powers in the course of ordinary diplomatic 
interchange, though both of these represent important steps in the direction of a 
cooperative approach.  With this in mind, the major preoccupation of the chapters 
which follow is to explain why joint action between the powers for the most part 
failed to materialise despite the apparently propitious conditions.  The remainder of 
this introduction lays the groundwork for this enquiry, setting out the key trends 
which the study identifies and the lines of argument it will trace. 
With regard to common interests, the major finding of the study is that 
Britain and the United States were each subject to an overarching concern which 
they tended to prioritise over the interests which they shared in East Asia.  In other 
words, though a community of interests did exist, it was often more or less nullified 
by one or both of the powers deferring to other pressures and constraints on their 
policymaking.  On the American side, the key consideration for policymakers was 
the domestic political situation, which imposed a number of limitations on their 
freedom of action.  In consequence of the nature of the American political system 
and the role of Congress in particular, U.S. foreign policy was necessarily more 
responsive to popular opinion than that of the other great powers, including Britain.  
Policymakers were not always in a position to act on perceived national interests in 
peripheral areas such as East Asia to the extent, or in the manner, they wished for 
fear of exciting popular hostility and thereby risking electoral defeat or being 
hamstrung by Congressional objections.  In particular, reflexive Anglophobia 
remained a potent, if gradually declining, force in the U.S. political scene.  For 
example, Marc-William Palen’s recent work on the transatlantic debate over tariff 
policy has demonstrated the extent to which American economic nationalists 
mistrusted London’s intentions, even denouncing British advocacy of free trade as a 
‘conspiracy’ designed to undermine the fast-growing economy of the United States 
and render the nation subordinate to Britain.62  In view of the persistence of such 
ingrained suspicion and hostility towards the British, American policymakers were 
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disposed to be wary of overtly aligning themselves with Britain, even if this was 
desirable or necessary for attaining their goals in East Asia.63 
Whereas the American perspective was thus somewhat parochial, the British 
outlook was decidedly global in scope.  In addition to relying heavily on worldwide 
commerce for its prosperity, Britain’s fortunes were intrinsically linked to the 
welfare and integrity of the Empire.  British policy in East Asia was therefore to a 
large extent subordinate to the broader imperatives of imperial and global policy, 
and policymakers consistently viewed events in the region through this lens rather 
than in isolation.64  This consideration was particularly significant during the period 
covered by this study because Britain was subject to acute ‘overstretch’, attempting 
to balance limited resources with an expansive catalogue of demands throughout 
the world.  In consequence, British policymakers were forced to carefully prioritise, 
with East Asia generally relegated to a position of lesser importance in their 
calculations, and to rely increasingly heavily on relationships with other powers in 
order to maintain the requisite global reach.65 
In addition to directly impacting on the extent to which Britain and the 
United States were able to freely pursue their common interests, these two 
overarching considerations – domestic politics for the Americans and global policy 
needs for the British – also contributed to several discernible trends which further 
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limited the potential for joint action between the two powers in East Asia.  The first 
of these is a shared preference for passivity in East Asian affairs, with both Britain 
and the United States exhibiting a pronounced tendency to eschew an active role in 
the region as far as possible.  A.E. Campbell has gone as far as to suggest that the 
limited cooperation between Britain and the United States in East Asia resulted not 
so much from an aversion to joint action specifically, but from a mutual rejection of 
active involvement more generally: ‘Britain and the United States shared not only 
the same interests, but the same reluctance to defend them.’66  This common 
predisposition towards passivity was not the product of any coordination or 
agreement between the two powers, but rather flowed, at least in part, from their 
separate overarching concerns.  British policymakers favoured a policy of minimal 
commitment in East Asia chiefly because they were otherwise occupied with a 
number of crises elsewhere in the world and already working under the constraints 
of limited resources.67  Likewise, U.S. activism in East Asia was effectively precluded 
by popular apathy and the political risks of becoming embroiled in a region which 
was not, to all appearances, in any way vital to the national interest.68   
The second ancillary trend which the study highlights is a distinct mismatch 
in the two powers’ hopes and expectations for cooperation.  It was not simply that 
one power consistently sought cooperation while the other was averse to it, though 
the British were admittedly much more positive about the general principle of a 
transatlantic partnership, but rather that the two were often at odds over the kind 
of joint action they sought to orchestrate.  American policymakers, guided by a 
tradition of isolationism and wary of the deep popular mistrust of ‘foreign 
entanglements’, almost exclusively favoured  short-term, limited cooperation 
directed at very specific objectives.  British policymakers, by contrast, hoped to 
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secure a longer-term and more comprehensive united front in East Asia, in line with 
their broader objective of sharing the load of their global responsibilities.69  This 
disjuncture represented a consistent barrier to cooperation, as the British tended to 
judge American proposals for joint action to be too narrow, while the Americans 
shied away from what they saw as overly extensive British schemes.  The 
incompatible approaches and expectations of the two powers also account for 
much of the friction which developed between them with regard to East Asia. 
A final trend which runs through the study is the difference in the extent of 
the two powers’ investment in East Asia.  The British were responsible for the vast 
majority of the commerce in China and, though the region was never especially high 
on the Foreign Office’s list of priorities, Britain therefore had a significant amount to 
lose in East Asia.  The Americans, on the other hand, had very little at stake in 
practical terms, their interest in the markets of East Asia being largely a matter of 
future possibilities rather than immediate, tangible realities.70  The significant gap in 
the respective stakes of the two powers did not negate the essential similarity of 
their interests, but the disparity often engendered a difference in perspective which 
could present a barrier to effective cooperation.  The British, driven in part by their 
reliance on global trade, were keen to ensure that broader regional goals were 
achieved in a way that did not overly disadvantage their commercial interests.  The 
Americans had no such concerns, and were thus inclined to emphasise abstract 
principles at the expense of practical details, not least because this approach played 
better from a domestic political point of view. 
While the overarching concerns of British global policy needs and American 
domestic political constraints, along with the attendant trends described above, go 
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some way towards accounting for the failure of the two powers to cooperate in East 
Asia, further investigation is required to explain why the shared British-American 
ideological framework proved ineffective in motivating the powers to overcome 
obstacles to joint action.  The various ideological constructs which have already 
been detailed – not only Anglo-Saxonism but also the Yellow Peril and other 
stereotyped images of East Asian peoples – were not only hugely significant in the 
popular discourse over events and issues relating to East Asia, but also undoubtedly 
influential, at least on some level, among the key policymakers of both countries.  
The reality, however, is that this kind of thinking does not appear to have played a 
significant role in British-American interaction over East Asia; there is an 
overwhelming lack of evidence in the documentary record for the influence of ideas 
of race and civilisation.  The sparsity of ideological content in communication 
between the two powers and in their internal policy discussions, though certainly a 
compelling explanation for the failure of the ‘community of sentiment’ to bring 
about cooperation in East Asia, is very surprising given the broader context in which 
British-American interaction took place, and thus bears further examination.   
The study puts forward several key contentions regarding the lack of shared 
racial or civilisational ideology in British-American interaction.  The first is that 
ideological motivations for joint action in East Asia were not only in short supply, 
but were actually less prominent in British and American policymakers’ thinking 
than negative images of one another’s national character which, if anything, worked 
to the detriment of the cause of cooperation.  On the American side, the basic 
image of the British as an opponent of liberty had never completely faded, and 
although popular Anglophobia did not permeate official circles to any great extent, 
there remained among American policymakers a definite suspicion of Britain as at 
heart self-interested, imperialistic and thoroughly ‘old world’.  Another aspect of 
the American image of British character was the notion that the people of Britain 
were irresolute and ‘flabby’, lacking the backbone to take action and get their hands 
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dirty.71  Interestingly, this latter aspersion was actually reflected back to some 
extent in British images of the Americans and their conduct of foreign policy.  A 
common belief among British policymakers and officials was that the Americans 
were prone to manoeuvring other powers into doing their dirty work whilst 
hypocritically claiming the moral high-ground.  The British also had a somewhat 
condescending image of the upstart Americans as vain, brash and impulsive, and 
they thus held their approach to foreign policy in disdain as unreliable and 
fundamentally half-baked.72  Such images, while not exactly conflicting with or 
cancelling out shared ideas which were conducive to partnership in East Asia, 
undoubtedly complicated the ideological picture with regard to cooperation and 
occasionally contributed to the development of friction between the powers. 
The other contentions which the study sets out represent an attempt to 
account for the dearth of ideas of race and civilisation in British-American 
interaction.  There are obvious limitations as to how far it is possible to draw 
definite inferences from an absence of evidence, and so the conclusions of the 
study on this point are necessarily somewhat tentative, but the sporadic instances 
where shared ideology does make an appearance point towards two significant 
lines of argument.  The first is that British and American policymakers were in the 
habit of deliberately avoiding or downplaying ideas relating to race and civilisation.  
Though it is of course impossible to prove with any consistency that the absence of 
ideology was a product of conscious decisions to avoid referring to it, there is 
certainly evidence to suggest that in some instances policymakers opted to steer 
clear of ideological arguments for tactical reasons.  The notion of tactical 
                                                           
71 C.S. Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, p.1; W. Clark, Less Than Kin: A Study of Anglo-
American Relations (London, 1957), pp.48, 59, 71; J.G. Cook, Anglophobia: An Analysis of Anti-British 
Prejudice in the United States (Boston, MA, 1919), pp.81, 88; E.P. Crapol, America for Americans: 
Economic Nationalism and Anglophobia in the Late Nineteenth Century (Westport, CT, 1973), pp.14-
16, 222, 226; Perkins, The Great Rapprochement, p.270; A.C. Turner, The Unique Partnership: Britain 
and the United States (New York, 1971), pp.38, 47. 
72 H.M. Durand to Lord Lansdowne, January 8th 1904, FO 800/144, The National Archives, Kew 
[hereafter TNA]; H.M. Durand to E. Grey, December 28th 1906, FO 371/357/874, TNA; Beloff, 
Britain’s Liberal Empire, p.169; A.E. Campbell, Great Britain and the United States, pp.193-194; 
Crapol, America for Americans, p.192; M.H. Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in 
Chinese-American Relations, 1895-1911 (New Haven, CT, 1973), p.142; Otte, The Foreign Office 
Mind, p.273; Turner, The Unique Partnership, pp.44-45; Watt, Succeeding John Bull, p.27. 
43 
 
employment and avoidance of ideology has been discussed by Fabian Hilfrich in 
relation to the American imperialism debate of the late nineteenth century.  He 
makes the case that campaigners on both sides of this dispute utilised racial 
rhetoric when it appeared to serve their agenda, but were quick to abandon it if it 
seemed to in any way undermine their claims or play into the hands of their 
opponents.73  A similar dynamic appears to have been at work in British-American 
interaction over East Asia.  Key actors very occasionally employed ideological 
arguments with a view to achieving a particular impact or purpose, but far more 
often they shied away from overtly ideological reasoning and language – usually by 
emphasising more ideologically-neutral aspects of the issue or openly rejecting a 
given idea – because they deemed it unwise or inappropriate. 
A prime example of policymakers tactically playing down ideological 
influences during this period is the deliberate soft-pedalling, by the British in 
particular, of Anglo-Saxonist ideas of British-American unity and shared destiny.  
Arthur Lee, in correspondence with Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge in 
July 1900, expressed his strong desire to assist in the cultivation of good relations 
between Britain and the United States for the sake of the future of the Anglo-Saxon 
race, but also acknowledged that this required a ‘silent-working and tactful’ 
approach and could not be done through ‘brass-band methods’.74  Roosevelt 
appears to have shared these sentiments, commenting in a letter to Lee shortly 
after he became Vice-President, in March 1901, on the desirability of growing 
closeness between the nations and the inadvisability of adopting ‘hothouse 
methods’ in order to bring this about.75  A more explicit expression of this kind of 
thinking is found in a letter of 1905 from British Prime Minister Arthur Balfour to 
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the departing American Ambassador, Joseph Choate, which also offers an indication 
of the reasoning behind this preference for a more subtle handling of the issue of 
British-American closeness: 
I have always been careful to make my words, strong though they have 
been, less strong than my convictions, for (as it seems to me) the feeling 
that the two great co-heirs of Anglo-Saxon freedom and civilisation have a 
common mission, has more quickly developed on this side of the Atlantic 
than on the other, - at least, among the general mass of the population, and 
that there is therefore some danger lest phrases which are suitable enough 
in Great Britain may seem excessive in America, and may excite, not 
sympathy, but suspicion or ridicule.  There is, in truth, an element of 
sentiment in the views which I, and many others, hold on this subject which 
supplies an easy mark for criticism.76 
Balfour’s admission of deliberately understating his Anglo-Saxonist beliefs indicates 
a recognition on his part that it was the overtly ideological nature of such opinions, 
the ‘element of sentiment’, which made them potentially dangerous and likely to 
provoke hostility in the United States.77  The approach taken by Balfour, and also by 
Lee and Roosevelt, thus represents striking evidence for the tactical avoidance of 
ideology; Anglo-Saxonist ideas were handled with care on the basis that they had 
the potential to be counterproductive if utilised too freely. 
 Balfour’s letter to Choate is, quite evidently, a very candid discussion of 
Anglo-Saxonist thinking, which obviously demonstrates that such ideas were not 
entirely taboo in British-American interaction.  The context of these comments is 
significant, however, as not only was Choate about to leave his post as Ambassador 
but Balfour’s letter was also predominantly personal and written with no particular 
political agenda in mind.  The letter is in this way indicative of the kind of context in 
which, this study argues, the relatively rare examples of racial or civilisational 
ideology tend to be found.  When such ideas do crop up, it is usually in 
communications which are outside of the mainstream of official or even semi-
official interaction between the two governments, such as personal correspondence 
between policymakers and more peripheral figures.  Moreover, while there are 
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some examples of the employment of ideology in more abstract or speculative 
exchanges about East Asia or British-American relations in general, they are 
incredibly uncommon in direct discussions of opportunities for joint action in the 
region.  The final contention of this study with regard to the absence of ideology in 
British-American interaction over East Asia is thus that policymakers recognised a 
distinction between more official and functional contexts, in which ideological 
language was generally avoided, and more informal and abstract contexts, in which 
it was more acceptable. 
 The various arguments and trends outlined above are explored in more 
detail, and with reference to concrete examples, in the chapters which follow.  
Taken together they represent a multi-faceted, though not necessarily 
comprehensive, answer to the overarching question of why Britain and the United 
States failed to cooperate in East Asia in spite of communities both of interest and 
of ideology.  In this way, the study contributes to the broader debate over the 
nature of the British-American rapprochement, complicating the simplistic narrative 






China under Siege, 1898-1901 
 
 
The years immediately surrounding the turn of the twentieth century witnessed the 
blossoming of cordiality between Britain and the United States; in 1898 the British 
people celebrated the 4th of July as a show of solidarity with the United States, then 
at war with Spain, and on both sides of the Atlantic there appeared societies 
promoting more intimate friendship between the nations.1  During these same 
years, China was undergoing a time of serious turmoil in consequence of imperialist 
encroachments from outside and anti-foreign rebellion from within.  In theory, the 
unprecedented degree of goodwill in British-American relations should have been 
reflected in a cooperative approach to these problems, but the two powers’ 
interaction over East Asia at this point signally failed to live up to this ideal.  Instead, 
Britain and the United States pursued at best parallel policies, and occasionally even 
found themselves at odds over the best approach to take to the China question. 
This chapter makes the case that the major obstacle to cooperation 
between Britain and the United States through the key events of this period – the 
scramble for concessions, the Open Door notes and the Boxer Rising – was the 
constraint placed on American policymakers by domestic politics.  Popular 
Anglophobia, not to mention an aversion to collaboration with other powers more 
generally, not only discouraged American policymakers from joint action with 
Britain in pursuit of common goals but actually incentivised them to artificially 
distance their policy from that of the British.  British policymakers were far more 
open to working with the United States in East Asia but were at times constrained 
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by the need to preserve their substantial commercial stake in China.  This 
consideration would occasionally put them at cross purposes with the Americans, 
who had very little to lose commercially, even though their broader interests were 
very similar. 
The British-American community of interests in East Asia was bolstered by 
an ideological case for joint action; China was viewed by some as the prime spot for 
the development of a united front of the Anglo-Saxon nations against the 
advancement of Slavic power.  This chapter demonstrates, however, that ideas such 
as this were almost entirely absent from the interaction between London and 
Washington.  Similarly, popular stereotypes of the Chinese were markedly rare in 
official discourse and appear to have been less influential amongst British and 
American policymakers than negative images of one another, which tended to 
emerge in moments of friction between the powers.  Though the reasons behind 
the comparative lack of shared ideology relating to race and civilisation in British-
American interaction are not entirely clear, this chapter contends that a key factor 
was policymakers’ deliberate avoidance of ideas which had the potential to court 
controversy either at home or in East Asia. 
 Though the focus of this chapter is on the years from 1898 onwards, 
arguably the more significant turning point for East Asian affairs was actually the 
denouement of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895.  This conflict had launched the 
Japanese onto the world stage and demonstrated the extent of their progress, 
dramatically dispelling any doubt as to whether the ‘backwards’ nations of the East 
could successfully adopt the technology and methods of modern civilisation.  
Japan’s victory spelled disaster for China, however, as the fragility of the Imperial 
Government and the inability of the Chinese to back up their territorial claims were 
starkly revealed.2  China’s weakened position caught the attention of the various 
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Western powers with commercial interests in the Empire, with several among them, 
most notably Russia, seeking to exploit the frailty of the Manchu dynasty in the 
hope of gaining commercial advantages and even territorial concessions.  Though 
such encroachments on Chinese sovereignty would have been minor in themselves, 
they foreboded the incremental parcelling out of the country amongst the 
imperialist powers, either informally by means of exclusive ‘spheres of interest’ or 
more terminally in a partition along colonial lines.3  The apparently imminent 
possibility of the break-up of the vast expanse of the Chinese Empire provided a rich 
vein of material for prophets of a coming clash of civilisations, with numerous 
writers in the years prior to the turn of the twentieth century warning that on the 
fate of China could hang the entire course of the world’s future.  Specifically, British 
and American observers not infrequently portrayed the competition for markets 
and influence in essentially racial terms as a pivotal face-off in the global-historical 
conflict of Anglo-Saxon against Slav.4 
 In this precarious situation, Britain and the United States found their 
interests more or less aligned as they shared the same fundamental aims of 
preserving the regional status quo and averting partition.  Both powers stood to 
gain more commercially by open competition for trade throughout China – a 
situation summed up by the commonly-used phrase, ‘a fair field and no favour’ – 
than by an arrangement predicated on distinct spheres of interest.  They therefore 
stood for the maintenance of all entitlements gained by treaty and in opposition to 
the assumption by the other powers of any special privileges, particularly such as 
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might allow an individual power to exert excessive influence in or monopolise the 
trade of a given locality.5 
 Though British and American interests were, in this sense, identical, there 
was one key difference in the basis of these interests.  Britain was at this point the 
dominant force in Chinese commerce, holding the vast majority of the trade 
throughout the Empire, and benefitted from the status quo because free 
competition maximised opportunities for the further expansion of trade.  The 
British had a potential sphere of interest in the Yangtze Valley, but were able to 
monopolise trade in this vital region without having to resort to exclusionary tactics, 
and there was therefore nothing to be gained from a portioning-off of the Chinese 
Empire which limited British trade to this one area.6  By contrast, the United States 
was as yet a fairly minor factor in Chinese commerce, with nothing even resembling 
a sphere of interest and very little chance of acquiring one.  Open trade throughout 
China was therefore imperative for an expansion of American commerce; partition 
or exclusion from the other powers’ spheres would have been a terminal blow.7   
 The vast difference in the extent to which the two powers were invested in 
China created potential for division between them, not so much with regard to 
broad goals but in terms of the specifics of policy.  With their solid base of economic 
interests the British had a great deal more to lose from an adverse turn of events in 
China, whereas what was at stake for the United States was largely a matter of 
future opportunities.  In practice this difference was not quite as significant as it 
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might seem, however, as the hypothetical nature of American interests in China was 
to a large extent elided by a firm belief amongst opinion leaders in the U.S. that the 
expansion of trade in China was a fundamental national interest.  The assumption 
that future American prosperity, and perhaps even the survival of the nation, was 
dependent on commercial expansion and success in East Asia stemmed from 
widely-discussed theories regarding the dangers of ‘overproduction’ and the 
limitless potential of the China market.  Influential writers such as Charles Conant 
warned that the American economy was at risk of stagnation and ultimate collapse 
on account of a ‘glut’ of products.  They promoted the idea that the only solution to 
this threat was for American businessmen to secure their share of China’s trade and 
tap into the unbridled consuming power of her ‘four hundred million customers’.8 
 In spite of their common interest in ensuring the widest possible field for the 
expansion of commerce in China, prior to 1898 neither Britain nor the United States 
were prepared to take an active role in East Asia.  Each power exhibited during this 
period a strong preference for passivity which can be accounted for by reference to 
the overarching concerns which set the parameters for their respective policies in 
China.  These were domestic political considerations on the part of the United 
States and the demands of global policy for the British. 
Throughout the latter part of the 19th century, American statesmen had 
cultivated the notion that the United States, in contrast to the European powers, 
was entirely innocent of ulterior motives in its policy towards China.  They 
attempted to project an image of the United States as China’s friend and protector, 
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remaining aloof from and even resisting the selfish designs of the imperialists.9  
Arguably American policy failed to live up to this ideal in practice as, by virtue of the 
treaty system and a process which has been described as ‘hitchhiking imperialism’, 
the U.S. was able to glean the advantages which the more aggressive powers wrung 
out of China while maintaining, at least in theory, Chinese goodwill.10  Nevertheless, 
the principle that American policy was fundamentally altruistic was an important 
one, and popular devotion to this ideal, combined with the habitual American 
suspicion of interventionist foreign policy outside of the Western Hemisphere, 
acted as significant brake on the actions of American policymakers with regard to 
China.  The broad goal of preserving the status quo and the freedom of commerce 
was uncontroversial, but any means of achieving this outcome which appeared to 
represent coercion of China or, crucially, which aligned the United States with any 
of the imperialist powers was politically very risky.  This effectively compelled 
American policymakers to limit themselves to a detached and passive approach to 
the situation or, in the eyes of the other powers, a policy of pious words but 
precious few deeds.11 
The British Government was not subject to the same domestic political 
limitations as the United States – indeed, if anything, British public opinion favoured 
a more definite and aggressive policy in East Asia – but policymakers were very 
conscious of the wider global situation and the limited nature of British power.  
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British resources were thinly-stretched across the Empire at this point and 
policymakers faced a number of challenging situations in various other parts of the 
world, including brewing crises in South Africa and the Near East.  Britain was 
therefore fundamentally ill-equipped to embark on a policy of active involvement in 
the China question.12  Furthermore, as significant as British commercial interests in 
China were, London’s priority in Asia was unquestionably the Empire in India.  
Preoccupied with the danger of Russian advances in central Asia which could 
threaten the Indian frontier, policymakers were prepared to concede a degree of 
latitude for Russia to expand in East Asia instead.  A passive policy in China was thus 
desirable not only for reasons of economy, but also as a means of securing more 
significant interests elsewhere.13 
Matters came to a head in China in the winter of 1897-1898, as the 
European powers embarked on a series of land grabs which would become known 
as the ‘scramble for concessions’.  Germany set the ball rolling by demanding the 
lease of the port of Jiaozhou (Kiaochow) on the pretext of compensation for the 
murder of missionaries, and this in turn prompted the Russian Government to stake 
a claim to Port Arthur and Talienwan in the region of Manchuria.14  This latter 
development in particular was a serious cause for concern amongst British 
policymakers, who feared that the Russians might utilise these concessions to place 
limitations on the trade of other nations and limit the freedom of action of the 
Chinese Government, triggering an inexorable march towards partition.15  In the 
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early months of 1898, the British Government thus wrestled with the dilemma of 
whether to take a stand against the actions of Russia and Germany in the hope that 
forceful action would convince them to back down, or instead to acquiesce in the 
seizure of Chinese territory and claim a compensatory concession so as to avoid 
being left behind by the more aggressive powers.16 
The British preference for a passive policy in China strongly inclined them 
against actively opposing Russian and German encroachments, but they were 
almost equally hesitant about contributing to the slide towards spheres of interest 
by further chipping away at Chinese territorial integrity.  Policymakers in London 
identified one potential means of escaping from the bind which the scramble for 
concessions had created in joint action with the United States.  British leaders had 
for some time looked for greater American involvement in East Asia, hoping that 
this would bolster their position and facilitate the maintenance of Chinese 
sovereignty and open trade.  Though they had tended to limit their ambitions for a 
common British-American approach to the China question to parallel policies as 
opposed to actual cooperation, the exigencies of the situation in early 1898 
encouraged them to seek direct American assistance.17  In early March, the British 
Ambassador at Washington, Sir Julian Pauncefote, communicated an official 
overture to the U.S. Government, essentially proposing that the two powers pledge 
to come out jointly against any alterations to the status quo in China which 
represented a threat to their shared interests.  Lord Salisbury, who at this stage was 
fulfilling the roles of both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, wrote of the 
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‘anxiety’ which the British Government felt as to whether they could count on 
American cooperation in opposing action ‘tending to restrict the opening of China 
to the commerce of all nations’.18  Pauncefote met with President McKinley on a 
number of occasions and attempted to convince him to assent to the British 
proposal by dwelling on, ‘the identity of British and American interests in China, and 
the great importance of presenting a united front to the designs of certain Powers 
which menaced the freedom of trade with that vast Empire.’19 
Undergirding this official British overture was an informal dialogue which 
had been going on in London in the early months of 1898 on the subject of China 
and the possibility of British-American cooperation, centred around the Secretary of 
the U.S. Embassy, Henry White.  White, who was personally in favour of some form 
of joint action in China, had a number of private conversations with various figures 
within the British Government which laid the groundwork for the March 1898 
proposal.  These meetings, the details of which White shared with all the major 
players in American foreign policy, offer a considerably more candid insight into the 
British desire for cooperation than Pauncefote’s official communications with 
McKinley.  The British participants in these conversations did not, however, make 
any reference to a racial or other ideological basis for British-American joint action, 
sticking firmly, as in the official interaction, to the language of shared interests.20  
For example, Arthur Balfour, Salisbury’s deputy, emphasised the common desire of 
Britain and the United States to keep Chinese trade open, making the case that if 
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the two powers were to combine their strength behind this proposition it would 
effectively ‘settle the question’.21 
The absence of the language of ideology in these meetings is chiefly notable 
because White’s letters back to his friends and superiors in Washington imply that 
his conversations with key British figures more generally did touch upon racial 
themes, and Anglo-Saxonist ideas specifically.  On more than one occasion, White 
referred to Balfour’s deeply-held desire that ‘the two great branches of our race 
should be brought together’ in some sort of joint action that would be of benefit to 
the world.22  There is no question that White understood British hopes for 
cooperation in China to be at least partially based on Anglo-Saxonist notions of the 
desirability of British-American unity and partnership, and so it is somewhat 
surprising that this side of the question was apparently not broached in discussions 
of the British overture.  This omission would tend to suggest that policymakers 
understood the kind of ideological language which not infrequently appeared in the 
context of abstract discussion about British-American relations to be somewhat less 
suitable in reference to specific practical questions. 
The Americans took their time in giving an answer to the British overture, 
much to the discomfiture of Salisbury and the Foreign Office, and when McKinley 
did eventually respond it was in a decidedly cagey fashion.23  Though he expressed 
‘sympathy’ with the British position on the maintenance of open trade in China, the 
President was careful to emphasise the impossibility of the administration 
committing the U.S. Government to anything without Congressional sanction.  
Tellingly, McKinley concluded by making reference to one of the standard tropes of 
American diplomacy:  
He does not see any present reason for the departure of the United States 
from its traditional policy respecting foreign alliances, and, as far as 
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practicable, avoiding any interference in the connection of European 
complications.24   
The President’s rebuff was supplemented by a somewhat apologetic explanation 
from Assistant Secretary of State William R. Day, who emphasised the concurrence 
of the U.S. Government with the British policy of upholding open trade in China, but 
pointed out that the rapidly escalating friction with Spain was a significant limiting 
factor on American action.  Day also reiterated, however, McKinley’s comments 
about avoiding involvement in European affairs, referring to, ‘the settled policy of 
the United States, which is opposed to “entangling alliances”’.25 
McKinley’s rejection of the British overture does not indicate that American 
policymakers failed to grasp the potential value of working with Britain in East Asia 
in pursuit of shared goals.  Rather, as Day had explained to Pauncefote, American 
eyes were firmly fixed on the Cuban situation, which was soon to explode into overt 
hostilities, and China was therefore simply not a priority at this point.26  There was 
also a more fundamental reason behind the American demurral, however, which 
would continue to limit the potential for joint action long after the conclusion of the 
Spanish-American War.  The references in the responses of both Day and McKinley 
to the traditional American policy of avoiding foreign entanglements suggest that 
the domestic political objections to cooperation with Britain weighed heavily on the 
administration’s thinking.  American policymakers were acutely aware of popular 
hostility towards any sort of collaboration with the imperialist powers and 
especially, due to the strong undercurrent of Anglophobia in the American political 
scene, a policy of working hand-in-hand with the British.27 
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British policymakers appear to have grasped the American position, and 
although White’s correspondence in the latter part of 1898 indicates that they had 
by no means abandoned the conviction that British-American cooperation was the 
best approach to the China question, there was no further official correspondence 
on the subject.28  Thus resigned to the reality that no American support was 
forthcoming, the British Government registered a token protest against the 
appropriation of Chinese territory, before reluctantly following suit and demanding 
the lease of the port of Wei Hai Wei.  The theory was that this concession would 
counterbalance those taken by Russia and Germany, but in reality the acquisition of 
Wei Hai Wei was primarily a sop to public opinion and a prime example of the 
British following the path of least resistance in order to avoid a confrontation.29  In 
the months that followed, British China policy began to lean increasingly towards 
the more aggressive approach favoured by the other European powers.  Unable to 
rely on the support of the United States, British policymakers instead sought to 
safeguard their position in the Yangtze Valley so that they would have something to 
fall back on in the event of the division of China into spheres of interest.30  In 
particular, an agreement with Russia entailing the mutual recognition of spheres 
became a key goal of British policy, on the basis that this would postpone a conflict 
of interests with the Russians and the risky business of further concession-grabbing 
while protecting the most vital of Britain’s commercial interests.  The resulting 
Scott-Muraviev agreement of April 1899, though in theory confined to the issue of 
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railway construction, marked a significant shift in the direction of the policy of 
spheres.31   
British accommodation with the erosion of China’s territorial integrity and 
the development of exclusive preserves left the United States, now an Asiatic power 
in its own right following the acquisition of the Philippines from Spain, somewhat 
isolated in its defence of completely open trade.  Unable to retreat to entrenching a 
sphere of their own, American policymakers had to find an alternative way to 
ensure that they were not excluded from the commerce of the Chinese Empire.  The 
means they opted for was a diplomatic initiative for the preservation of the ‘Open 
Door’ – the principle that all powers should have equal access to the markets of 
China, unhindered by exclusive arrangements or special privileges – enshrined in a 
duo of circular notes issued in September 1899 and July 1900. 
Secretary of State John Hay’s first Open Door note set out American 
expectations as to what commerce in China should look like and invited the other 
powers to adhere to these.  The conditions which Hay specified were not extensive: 
existing treaty ports should remain open to the trade of all, the customs tariff 
should continue to be administered by the Chinese and applied equally for all 
nations and there should be no differentiation in dues for harbours or railways.32  
Not only were these provisions far from comprehensive, but the wording of the 
note implicitly acknowledged the existence of spheres of interest as something of a 
fait accompli.  Consequently, although Hay did emphasise that the United States did 
not accept the validity of any claims to special rights or privileges conferred by such 
spheres, the note represented a grudging accommodation with rather than a 
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challenge to the general principle of powers marking out zones in which they 
intended to be predominant.33  
The limited scope of the note has led some historians to suggest that the 
Open Door policy was little more than an exercise in appeasing public opinion at 
home, designed only to give the impression that the U.S. Government supported its 
businessmen in China and stood with the Chinese in opposition to the 
encroachments of the imperialist powers.34  By contrast, another group of 
historians, most prominently William Appleman Williams, have developed an 
interpretation of the Open Door policy which portrays it as an activist programme of 
economic imperialism, designed to pave the way for American commercial 
dominance in East Asia.35  Neither of these readings of Hay’s intervention in the 
China question is entirely satisfactory; the former underestimates the extent to 
which policymakers hoped the note would have a practical impact, while the latter 
gives too much credit to the mythology which grew up surrounding the Open Door 
notes and conflates later expansions of the policy with the more limited original 
proposition.  Neither a public relations gimmick nor an active new departure, the 
first Open Door note was rather a formalised expression of the established, and 
essentially passive, American policy in China.  Though it was unequivocal as to 
American expectations for the continuance of open trade, the note entailed no 
actual commitment on the part of the United States, relying entirely on the willing 
assent of the other powers without even the slightest hint of recourse if the 
conditions were violated.  The Open Door policy was thus a defensive response to 
the deteriorating situation in China; it was the strongest course at Hay’s disposal 
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given that any sort of active intervention was effectively ruled out by insufficient 
popular backing.36 
The Open Door policy is sometimes cited by historians as an example of 
British-American cooperation in East Asia, precisely the kind of occurrence which 
this study argues was so rare in this period.  These scholars treat Hay’s note of 
September 1899 as a collaborative venture on the basis that it was essentially a 
belated acceptance by the U.S. of the British suggestion for a joint guarantee of 
open trade in China.37  There are a number of problems with this interpretation, not 
least its somewhat broad definition of collaboration, but the main issue is that it is 
built on decidedly shaky foundations in terms of evidence.  A key element of the 
claim that the Open Door note represented British-American cooperation is the 
central role played by Alfred Hippisley, a British employee of the Chinese Customs 
Service, in the formulation of the policy.  Hippisley corresponded extensively with 
Hay and William Rockhill, the State Department’s Far Eastern expert, and his 
suggestions regarding the protection of the Open Door were incorporated by 
Rockhill into the memorandum which formed the basis of the final circular note.38  
Crucially, however, Hippisley’s intervention with the U.S. Government was not 
driven by the goal of bringing about British-American joint action.  Hippisley did not 
have particularly strong connections with the British Government, and his 
overriding concern was not for British interests per se but for the stability of China 
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and the preservation of the Customs Service, which he feared might not survive 
another round of concession-grabbing.39  Moreover, he was actually fairly critical of 
British policy, and his proposal that the powers should give additional guarantees 
that they would respect the Open Door was in large part prompted by the perceived 
capitulation of the British to the policy of spheres, not least in the aforementioned 
deal with Russia.40   
Hippisley’s disapproval of British policy in China following the scramble for 
concessions was shared by Rockhill, who took the view that Britain had shown 
herself no more altruistic than the other imperialist powers and, far from deserving 
American support, ought to be held to account for deviating from the principle of 
free and fair trade.  Rockhill’s opinions – most notably his assurance to Hay that the 
Open Door policy was, ‘not a British one, for Great Britain is as great an offender in 
China as Russia itself’ – cast serious doubt on any suggestion that the Open Door 
note was conceived as a cooperative British-American project.41  Such comments 
should be taken with a pinch of salt, however, in light of the context surrounding 
these formative discussions of the Open Door policy.  One of the primary themes of 
the Rockhill-Hippisley correspondence is the concern that too close an association 
with Britain had the potential to derail the whole venture.  Both men were adamant 
that for the Open Door policy to succeed it would require the United States to be 
seen to take the initiative and Britain merely to follow, both because the Chinese 
would be suspicious of any European-led arrangement and, more significantly, 
because it would be politically impossible for the United States to pursue a policy 
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which the public regarded as British in origin.42  It was this concern, rather than 
rancour towards Britain, which led Rockhill to emphasise that the Open Door policy 
was not in line with the British stance towards China, even to the point of 
exaggerating the extent of the conflict between the policy and the British position. 
The whole process of formulating the Open Door note was carefully handled 
so as to ensure that it recommended itself to the Senate and the public as a 
distinctly American policy.  Hippisley fretted in particular about the issue of timing, 
worrying that the visit to the U.S. by Lord Charles Beresford, who was engaged in 
promoting the cause of British-American intervention on behalf of China, or a move 
by the British Government in the direction of the Open Door might effectively force 
the American Government into inaction, at least until after the elections in 1900.43  
Rockhill shared his friend’s anxiety on this point, commenting with regard to 
Beresford’s visit that they, ‘must act with great care, so as not to convey to this 
country the impression that we are simply falling in line with British views.’44  With 
this in mind, Rockhill went to some effort to obscure the fact that the bulk of the 
ideas behind the Open Door policy, and even much of the wording of the circular 
itself, were Hippisley’s.  Rockhill had initially intended to publish Hippisley’s ideas in 
the hope of marshalling support for the Open Door policy, but for ‘obvious reasons’ 
he judged that it was preferable for them to be under his name rather than that of 
his British friend.  The same reasoning determined that when, instead of publishing 
them, Rockhill submitted the suggestions to Hay for the perusal of the President, 
Hippisley’s name was not mentioned at all.45  The extent of this preoccupation with 
presenting the Open Door policy as distinctly American indicates that the overriding 
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consideration for American policymakers was the domestic political repercussions 
of any action taken in East Asia.  Hay was all too aware of the limitations imposed 
upon his action by what he referred to as ‘the senseless prejudices’ of the people 
and the Senate, and understood that however desirable a cooperative approach 
might have been it was simply not a feasible option due to the persistent power of 
Anglophobia in U.S. politics.46 
For all the effort to portray the Open Door note as a thoroughly 
independent initiative which was not especially in line with British policy, it is clear 
that American policymakers believed the circular to be at the very least compatible 
with British interests.47  Though the version of Hay’s note which the British 
Government received was substantially identical to those which were sent to the 
other powers, certainly offering no hint of particular closeness between the two 
nations, its presentation by the American Ambassador, Joseph Choate, did to some 
extent imply that the policy had been conceived with Britain at least partly in mind.  
Choate expressed President McKinley’s belief that the Open Door was a matter, ‘in 
which the interest of the two nations differs, not in character, but in degree only’, 
and embellished the note with the comment that the American proposal appeared 
to be in ‘exact accord’ and ‘entire harmony’ with British policy and interests.48  This 
sort of language is fairly unremarkable in itself, and certainly did not represent an 
attempt by the Americans to make an ideological case for British support, but after 
Rockhill’s endeavours to portray the Open Door policy as a purely American 
initiative it is perhaps surprising that Choate elected to highlight the extent to which 
the note reflected common British and American interests.   
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Choate’s comments were probably in large part a reflection of the 
confidence among American policymakers that the British would be thoroughly on 
board with the principles set out in the note and the policy of the Open Door more 
generally.  This confidence was not entirely well-founded, however, and the British 
response to Hay’s circular was actually rather tentative and equivocal.  When, after 
a delay of several weeks, Salisbury did respond to Choate’s representation, it was 
not to confirm British adherence but to raise an objection to the American 
formulation.  The British concern was with the inclusion, under the header of 
‘leased territory’, of the Kowloon extension to Hong Kong, in which the customs 
system was tied not to the rest of China but to the Crown Colony.  Perhaps worse 
than this specific objection, which the State Department was perfectly willing to 
accommodate, was Salisbury’s suggestion that ‘leased territory’ might be best left 
out of the declaration altogether, a proposition which implied that the British 
Government was reluctant to commit to anything specific or binding.49 
The relatively unenthusiastic response of the British Government to the 
Open Door note should not be taken to indicate any significant divergence between 
Britain and the United States on the broad principle of preserving equality of 
commercial opportunity throughout China, though it does offer ample evidence 
that the policy was not a collaborative one in any meaningful sense.  The point of 
difference between the two powers was one of methods, not of goals, and was 
largely a reflection of the widely differing extent of investment of the two powers in 
China.  The United States had, in practical terms, nothing substantial to lose from 
the failure of the enterprise, and American policymakers were therefore in a 
position to attach relatively little significance to the specifics of the arrangement.  
The British, on the other hand, had to bear in mind their considerable commercial 
stake in China, and were therefore far more cautious about committing themselves 
even to the fairly limited provisions set out in the Open Door note.  Salisbury’s 
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major concern was that Germany and Russia would not abide by the American 
proposition, and he was understandably extremely loath to agree to anything which 
might put Britain at a disadvantage to its rivals.50 
The difference between Britain and the U.S. over the Open Door note was 
short-lived, as the two governments swiftly worked out a form of wording which 
suited British needs but did not leave the way open for the other powers to 
emasculate the declaration with their own exceptions and caveats.  By the end of 
November 1899, the British Government had pledged to uphold the principles of 
the Open Door in Wei Hai Wei specifically and in any future British territory or 
spheres of interest in China.51  This outcome was satisfactory from the point of view 
of both powers, and it would be fair to say that with regard to the overall thrust of 
the Open Door policy Britain and the United States were very much on the same 
page by the end of 1899.  This point had been reached, however, with minimal 
direct interaction between the two powers over the issue, owing to the extreme 
care which American policymakers had taken to ensure that the Open Door 
initiative was not tainted in the mind of the American people by any suggestion of 
British inspiration.  Given these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that there was 
no place in what limited conversation there was between the two powers for ideas 
regarding the unity of the English-speaking peoples and their shared mission in Asia.  
Though such notions would have had clear utility to American policymakers in 
encouraging the British to get behind the Open Door initiative, the vagaries of U.S. 
domestic politics rendered even the more neutral language of shared interests a 
risky prospect. 
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 With the Open Door policy in place, Britain and the United States were in a 
position to continue their broadly passive policies in China.  This approach would 
become increasingly untenable, however, through the spring and summer of 1900, 
as sporadic anti-foreign violence in China coalesced into a serious threat to Western 
interests.  The Boxer movement had been brewing since the previous year – Edwin 
Conger, the American Minister to China, sent the first report of Boxer activity on a 
significant scale to the State Department in December 1899 – as tensions over 
foreign encroachments and missionary activity reached a crescendo and combined 
with the long-standing Chinese tradition of secret societies.52  Despite awareness of 
the rising tide of violence, the Western powers were slow to recognise the 
significance of the threat, and were thus taken by surprise when, rather than fizzling 
out, the Boxer movement received support and encouragement from China’s rulers 
and culminated in a widespread outbreak which, in June 1900, cut Beijing (Peking) 
off from external access and communication.53 
With their diplomatic representatives besieged in the Chinese capital, Britain 
and the United States, along with Japan and the other European powers, were 
forced to increase their military presence in China and coordinate their forces to put 
down the rising.  Then, once the siege of the legations was lifted and the Boxers 
defeated, this uneasy conglomeration of powers had to work together to negotiate 
a settlement with what remained of the Chinese Government.  The Boxer Rising and 
its aftermath presented a natural opportunity for British-American cooperation, not 
least because a degree of joint action was necessitated by the situation in any case.  
The two governments had very similar interests, with both working for the 
minimisation of the conflict and the preservation, as far as possible, of the 
sovereignty of China and the Open Door for trade.  As things developed, however, 
this community of interest was largely outweighed by the different priorities which 
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guided British and American policymakers in their responses to the crisis, meaning 
that interaction between the powers was considerably less harmonious than they 
might have hoped or expected. 
Initially, British and American policymakers had very similar views on the 
Boxer Rising, partly in consequence of the external constraints on their decision-
making.  The British Government, preoccupied with the conflict in South Africa and 
feeling the pinch of global overstretch, was averse to committing the nation’s 
increasingly scarce resources to an uncertain situation in China.  American 
policymakers, with at least one eye on the coming elections, were likewise keen to 
avoid becoming embroiled in East Asia for fear of the damage this might do to 
McKinley’s campaign.54  Both powers thus attempted to minimise their involvement 
and sought out the most passive response available to them.  Though it was vital for 
both governments to be seen to be sufficiently attentive to protecting the lives and 
property of their nationals, they were equally determined to avert a major foreign 
intervention, both to avoid having to intervene themselves and because such an 
incursion would provide the more aggressive powers with opportunities for self-
aggrandisement and greatly increase the danger of partition.55  In consequence, 
both powers maintained the slightly obtuse position that the Boxer crisis did not 
constitute a state of war between the powers and the Chinese Government, the 
hope being that this would limit the scale of foreign intervention and ease the 
restoration of order.56  Furthermore, British and American policymakers were slow 
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to agree to the expansion of combined military action and, initially at least, 
interposed objections to the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief to coordinate 
the activity of the coalition forces.57 
American policymakers had the added incentive for limiting foreign 
intervention that overt collaboration with the imperialist powers was distinctly 
undesirable from a political point of view, especially at a time when the Republican 
Party was attempting to make the case to the American people that U.S. rule in the 
Philippines was of an entirely different character to the grasping colonialism of the 
European powers.  Thus, as the situation deteriorated in early 1900, Hay 
consistently emphasised in his instructions to Conger that the United States must 
act ‘singly and without the cooperation of other powers’.58  As the violence of the 
Boxers intensified, however, some degree of concerted action became essential if 
American lives and property were to be protected and Beijing relieved, and so in 
early June 1900 Hay shifted ground and accepted that concurrent action with the 
other powers was acceptable in certain situations.59  Nevertheless, American 
policymakers and officials remained deeply dubious of a cooperative approach, 
fearing that it would compromise their all-important freedom of action.  They were 
particularly concerned about the possibility of being drawn into, or at least 
appearing complicit in, the ‘selfish designs’ and ‘hidden schemes’ which they 
suspected other powers to be devising to take advantage of the fragile state of 
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China.60  Hay consequently made the American position abundantly clear to Conger: 
‘There must be nothing done which would commit us to future action inconsistent 
with your standing instructions. There must be no alliances.’61  Washington’s 
strictures against concerted action applied equally strongly to the British as they did 
to the other imperialist powers.  This was a result not only of political concerns, but 
also of the influence of an image of British policy as fundamentally self-serving and 
‘old world’, in contrast to the more altruistic approach of the United States.  
American policymakers were doubtful of British intentions with regard to China and 
wary lest the crisis should lead them to follow through on their earlier dalliance 
with the policy of spheres by attempting to consolidate their ‘ear mark’ in the 
Yangtze Valley.62 
These suspicions aside, American and British policymakers did recognise that 
their interests were aligned to a greater degree than with any other power and 
consequently engaged in very full communication and information sharing 
throughout the crisis.63  Though this represented a significant advance, indicating 
that American policymakers were now open to some level of coordination with the 
British in the pursuit of shared goals, it was by no means a guarantee of joint action.  
In fact, the behind-the-scenes nature of this activity was crucial to its feasibility 
from the point of view of the United States.  American domestic politics continued 
to act as a limiting factor on overt British-American consultation, a point rather 
aptly illustrated by the communication between the two governments over the 
second Open Door note. 
In early July 1900, the U.S. issued another circular note, this one designed to 
explain the American position on the Boxer crisis and reiterate the principles of the 
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Open Door policy.  In addition to the conditions laid out in the note of September 
1899 – the maintenance of treaty rights and ‘the principle of equal and impartial 
trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire’ – the second Open Door note also 
included a further goal: the preservation of ‘Chinese territorial and administrative 
entity’.64  This addition did make the second Open Door note somewhat broader in 
scope than the first, but historians have still tended to characterise it as an 
essentially passive approach to the China question.65  The July note, in practical 
terms at least, asked very little of the powers, as unlike the first Open Door note it 
did not invite any kind of response.  This omission was useful from the British point 
of view, as it allowed Salisbury to express his thorough concurrence with the 
American position without having to scruple over the form of wording as he had the 
previous autumn.66   
Indications of British agreement with and appreciation of the position set 
out in the circular were undoubtedly welcome in Washington, but an intriguing 
series of communications regarding the note demonstrates that the U.S. 
Government remained intent on distancing the policy of the Open Door from the 
British.  In communicating the circular to Lord Salisbury, Choate had added a final 
sentence of his own, commenting that the policy set out, ‘seems to me substantially 
identical with that which your Lordship has from time to time indicated to me as 
that of Her Majesty’s Government’.67  This innocuous phrase, much to Choate’s 
surprise, was the cause of significant anxiety at the State Department.  Hay’s 
concern, as he explained to the Ambassador in a private letter, was that, ‘the note 
presented by you to England conveys an impression of unity of action with that 
country differentiating our relations with England from those we hold with other 
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Powers.’68  He consequently instructed Choate to request that the record be altered 
so that the note received by the Foreign Office would be identical to that sent to 
the other powers. 69  This incident throws into sharp relief the continuing hold of 
domestic political concerns over American policymakers.  As Choate quite correctly 
noted, his addition did not necessarily imply any kind of advance consultation with 
Britain.  Nevertheless, it was sufficient to rattle the State Department; even the 
merest suggestion of coordination with Britain or deference to British interests was 
potentially toxic in advance of November’s election.70  Thus, despite the 
concurrence of Britain and the United States on all major points during the Boxer 
Rising, overt collaboration evidently remained several steps too far in consequence 
of the constraints imposed by American domestic politics. 
These constraints also continue to offer a plausible explanation for the 
complete absence of Anglo-Saxonist ideology in interaction between Britain and the 
United States at this point.  Such was American diligence in avoiding even the 
slightest indication of British-American intimacy that policymakers in London can 
hardly have been left in any doubt that such ideas would have been ill-received in 
Washington.  Anglo-Saxonist ideas were not the only relevant ideological factor in 
the situation, however, as notions of a Yellow Peril threat and stereotypes of 
Chinese character were also broadly influential at the popular level.  The Boxer 
Rising represented a definite high-point for negative images of the Chinese in the 
West, and there was no shortage of racialised portrayals of the violence in print.  
Stories of cruel and bloodthirsty mobs driven by an unreasoning hatred of 
Westerners resounded around the world, confirming the very worst Oriental 
stereotypes and providing fodder for Yellow Peril fiction for decades to come.71  
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Despite the ubiquity of this sort of ideology there are precious few examples of the 
employment of racial stereotypes or Yellow Peril ideas by British and American 
policymakers and officials.  President McKinley did imply in his Annual Message of 
December 1900 that the source of the Boxers’ anti-foreignism was to be found 
‘deep in the character of the Chinese race’, but beyond this, evidence that these 
ideas penetrated official discourse is distinctly limited.72 
One possible reason for the sparseness of stereotypes and racial 
terminology is that they were deliberately avoided as potentially inflammatory, a 
significant consideration given that both Britain and the United States wished to 
avoid exacerbating the situation in China or supplying any further excuses for the 
other powers to seek retribution.  There is evidence that American policymakers 
took a certain amount of care over the terms in which the crisis was discussed.  For 
example, when Conger used anti-Chinese language and alluded to racial stereotypes 
in a report in the immediate aftermath of the siege of the legations it caused 
something of a stir in the State Department.  Conger’s statements apparently raised 
questions in the minds of his superiors as to his fitness to carry out his duties in 
China, and the offending section of the report was swiftly excised from the official 
record.73  In light of the lack of further evidence of racial ideas being used or 
suppressed in this way, it is not possible to categorically put the absence of such 
ideas at the official level down to the tactical avoidance of ideas which policymakers 
deemed dangerous.  The aforementioned example is certainly suggestive, however, 
and it seems reasonable to infer that there was a degree of conscious censorship of 
negative images of the Chinese by British and American policymakers, on the basis 
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that such images did not sit comfortably with their agenda of limiting the scale of 
the conflict in China. 
As long as the siege of the legations continued there was little to divide the 
positions of Britain and the United States, but the situation became more 
complicated once international forces relieved Beijing and brought the uprising to 
an end.  Harmony between British and American policies was almost immediately 
disrupted following the end of the siege, after the Russian Government suggested 
that the powers should withdraw their troops and representatives from the Chinese 
capital.  American policymakers, though recognising that this approach had 
significant drawbacks, were above all keen to get U.S. troops out of China as quickly 
as possible with an eye to the impending election and therefore came out in 
support of the Russian proposal.74  In contrast, the British Government, after a 
period of hesitation, declared strongly against a hasty withdrawal on the grounds 
that it meant relinquishing a major bargaining chip with the Chinese, potentially 
making it much more difficult to secure a suitable, lasting settlement.75 
This disagreement over the question of withdrawal from Beijing offers an 
interesting insight into the mutual images the two nations held of one another.  
Though admittedly not a reflection of official views as such, the response of 
influential Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to the British position on withdrawal is 
indicative of a common American image of British foreign policy.  In a letter of 
September 1900 to Henry White, Lodge vented his frustration with the ‘helpless’ 
approach of the British Government: ‘instead of drawing toward us they are 
drawing away and leaving us to unite with others, for we know exactly what we are 
about and propose to put it through if it can possibly be done.’76  In a later letter, he 
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reiterated his critique of the ‘vacillation and uncertainty’ of policymakers in London: 
‘The impression here is not that England is unfriendly but that she is incompetent 
and neither sees her true policy nor follows it out boldly after the start’.77  Though 
Lodge represents just one, admittedly somewhat anti-British, viewpoint, the image 
he conjures of the British as bumbling, irresolute and generally lacking in backbone 
is one which many American policymakers and officials at this point would have 
recognised. 
Ironically, many British policymakers held a not too dissimilar image of 
American foreign policy, believing the U.S. to be somewhat fickle and unreliable 
when it came to actually getting things done.  A Cabinet memorandum on the 
withdrawal question written by Joseph Chamberlain indicates the low expectations 
which British policymakers had as to the prospect of American assistance in 
resolving the Boxer crisis.  Despite expressing his confidence that Britain’s ‘natural 
allies’ genuinely shared the same goals in China, Chamberlain was entirely 
unconvinced that the McKinley administration would actually work towards the 
attainment of these goals.  He concluded that Britain simply could not count on 
American support owing to the slavishness of the U.S. Government to the ‘wire-
pullers and bosses’ who dominated the political scene and effectively dictated 
foreign policy.78  Chamberlain’s views are fairly representative of elite British 
disdain for the overly-democratic nature of the American political system, which 
made even the most important matters subject to popular whims, and no doubt 
many of his colleagues held similar images of U.S. foreign policy as inherently weak-
willed and erratic.79 
The disagreement between the two powers over the withdrawal question 
was neither serious nor protracted – American policymakers swiftly recognised the 
danger of being left isolated and gave up on the notion of leaving Beijing – but it 
was not entirely without significance.  In the initial stages of the negotiations, 
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though, Britain and the United States were broadly on the same wavelength, 
working above all for the goals laid down in the American circular of July 1900: 
Chinese territorial integrity and the Open Door for commerce throughout the 
Empire.80  This basic community of interest between the two powers in the Boxer 
negotiations was not lost on policymakers on either side but, as had been the case 
throughout this period, an openly cooperative approach to achieving shared goals 
remained unattainable.  The major obstacle was, as John Hay observed in 
September 1900, the usual limitation on British-American collaboration: ‘If it were 
not for our domestic politics we could, and should, join with England, whose 
interests are identical with ours and make our ideas prevail.’81  As the Boxer 
negotiations progressed, however, Britain and the United States not only failed to 
cooperate but actually found themselves, more often than not, on opposite sides of 
disputed questions, which occasioned a certain amount of strain in the 
relationship.82  The divergence in the attitudes of the two powers towards the 
withdrawal question to a large extent set the tone for the rest of the negotiations.  
The desirability of a swift settlement from a domestic political point of view would 
dominate American thinking throughout the negotiations, even once the election 
had been and gone, meaning that policymakers in Washington tended to look for 
quick fixes and ways to minimise complications.83  On the British side, policymakers 
were mindful of the nation’s considerable commercial stake in China, and therefore 
tended to favour those positions which appeared most likely to ensure a stable field 
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for future trade, whilst opposing those which would be detrimental to established 
interests.84 
One of the most contentious points of the negotiations was the question of 
what degree of retribution the powers should demand against the responsible 
individuals.  The American position was that an overly harsh stance on punishments 
might be counterproductive, and that the powers should therefore err on the side 
of moderation.  Policymakers in Washington favoured a less severe settlement 
overall, in part because they hoped this would make for easier negotiations with the 
Chinese, but also because punitive measures had the potential to weaken the 
Imperial Government still further and leave it vulnerable to foreign exploitation.85  
Though the British concurred to some extent on this latter point, they were 
unwilling to water down demands for strict punishment purely for the sake of 
expediency, and Lord Lansdowne, the recently-appointed Foreign Secretary, 
disparaged the American preference for leniency as ‘weak kneed’.86  In general, the 
greater attentiveness of the British to the details of the settlement meant that they 
judged the American approach of pressing for moderation and a speedy resolution, 
regardless of the specifics of the issue, to be short-sighted.  In January 1901, 
Lansdowne expressed his concerns on this point to Salisbury, pointedly 
commenting, ‘we ought not to allow the general desire to be quit of a cumbersome 
job to render us too easy going’.87 
Criticisms such as this were fairly common in British assessments of 
American conduct during the negotiations, and the frustration expressed by 
policymakers and officials gives a further insight into the prevalent image of U.S. 
                                                           
84 J. Chamberlain Memo, September 10th 1900, CAB 37/53/65, TNA. 
85 W. Rockhill to J. Hay, February 4th 1901, Reel 9, Hay MS; W. Rockhill Report, December 12th 1901, 
FRUS 1901 (Appendix 1);  Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p.659; Gould, The Presidency of 
William McKinley, p.233; McCormick, China Market, p.179; Miller, ‘The United States during the 
Boxer Rebellion’, p.141. 
86 Lord Lansdowne to J. Pauncefote, November 28th 1900, FO 405/97, TNA; J. Choate to J. Hay, 
December 8th 1900, Box 17, Choate MS; W. Rockhill to J. Hay, February 4th 1901, Reel 9, Hay MS; E. 
Satow to Lord Lansdowne, March 14th 1901, FO 800/119, TNA; Lord Lansdowne to C. MacDonald, 
April 4th 1901, FO 800/134, TNA. 
87 Lord Lansdowne to Lord Salisbury, January 6th 1901, FO 800/144, TNA. 
78 
 
foreign policy.  As suggested above, the British tended to view the Americans as 
somewhat unreliable, and had limited faith in their assistance on a practical level.  
This image is reflected to some extent in Lansdowne’s ‘weak kneed’ comment, but 
the Foreign Secretary’s jibe also draws on another significant image which was the 
basis of many of the complaints regarding the line taken by the U.S. in the 
negotiations.  British officials were scathing about the tendency of the Americans 
‘to pose as the friend of Asiatic races oppressed by Europe’, seeing this as nothing 
but a ploy to win special favour from the Chinese while still benefitting from the 
efforts of those powers who were willing to get their hands dirty.88  It was the 
perceived duplicity of American attempts to affect the role of China’s beneficent 
protector during the negotiations that prompted British official Francis Bertie to 
accuse the Americans of ‘playing a shabby game in China’.89 
 British frustration over the American approach to in the Boxer negotiations 
had its counterpart in the frequent complaints of American policymakers and 
officials over the failure of the British to adequately support them in their efforts to 
bring about a resolution.  The main example of this perceived deficiency on the part 
of the British was in relation to the question of the indemnity which was to be 
demanded from China in reparation for the outrages committed by the Boxers.  The 
American Government sought to avoid both an excessive indemnity, which had the 
potential to destabilise the Empire and invite further foreign intervention, and a 
protracted process of haggling over the specifics of the bill, which would scupper 
any hope of a prompt settlement.  From the beginning of the negotiations the 
United States proposed that a lump sum of money should be agreed upon, based 
on what China was capable of paying rather than on the powers’ demands.  The 
exact shares each power would receive could then be decided at a later date, 
removing much of the involved and technical discussion from the negotiations with 
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the Chinese and allowing for a reasonably fast settlement.90  The American plan was 
not well received by the rest of the powers, however, and Rockhill, who had been 
appointed U.S. Commissioner to China for the negotiations, struggled to get a 
hearing for the idea.91   
 The British, sharing the same motivation as the Americans for wishing to 
minimise the detrimental impact of the indemnity on China, were initially amenable 
to the principle of capping the sum according to Chinese means.92  As the 
negotiations dragged on, however, they moved increasingly away from the 
American line and towards the position of those powers demanding a more 
extensive indemnity.  This was probably a matter of simple pragmatism, an effort to 
move things along by finding a middle ground, but to Rockhill it represented a 
betrayal with its roots firmly in the intrigues of European power politics and not the 
actual exigencies of the Chinese situation.93  Rockhill judged the British to have 
been guilty throughout the negotiations of playing politics and compromising with 
rather than opposing the imperialist powers in their exploitation of China, and he 
generally drew little distinction between Britain and the more aggressive nations in 
his reports.  This critique of British conduct reflected a clear image of the British as 
self-serving and imperialistic, not sharing the commitment of the United States to 
the welfare and protection of China.94 
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 American frustration with the British peaked in the summer of 1901, when 
British stubbornness over the apparently insignificant issue of the Chinese customs 
tariff constituted the only obstacle in the way of concluding a settlement which 
was, in American eyes at least, already long overdue.95  The problem was a proposal 
to increase the tariff as a means of ensuring that the Chinese would have sufficient 
revenue to cover the indemnity payments, an arrangement which would have 
disproportionately disadvantaged the British as the major importer of goods into 
China.  British policymakers were only prepared to accept the tariff increase if 
additional commercial reforms were agreed upon, a trade-off which would have 
extended the process of negotiations still further.96  Britain and the United States 
thus arrived at the denouement of the Boxer negotiations at odds on account of 
their differing priorities.  The Americans, still looking for the fastest possible way 
out of the politically undesirable concert with the imperialist powers, chafed at the 
seemingly unnecessary delay, while the British, with considerably more at stake in 
terms of commerce than the other powers, doggedly refused to sacrifice their 
interests for the sake of an easy settlement. 
Though it took several months more to iron out the final details, the 
negotiations did eventually come to a conclusion in the latter half of 1901.  With the 
end of the Boxer affair, Western attention began to shift away from China proper 
and towards Manchuria, which within a few years was to become a battleground of 
global significance.  The Chinese Empire thus survived one of its most testing times, 
intact though hardly unscathed, and Britain and the Unites States were able to 
claim, for the moment at least, that the Open Door and the integrity of China had 
been secured against the greed of the imperialist powers and the ravages of 
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internal conflict.  As this chapter has demonstrated, however, this outcome was not 
to any significant degree a result of joint action by the two powers. 
A community of interest based on the maintenance of the status quo and 
free commerce throughout China proved insufficient to overcome the central 
barrier to British-American cooperation: the domestic political constraints on the 
United States Government.  Popular opposition to the U.S. becoming entangled in 
the affairs of the imperialist powers dictated an independent and essentially passive 
course for American policymakers.  Moreover, so severe was the political risk to the 
McKinley administration of appearing to pander to London that American 
policymakers endeavoured to portray the Open Door policy as a decidedly un-
British, if not actually anti-British, response to the situation in China.  The British 
Government, precluded from an interventionist approach to the China question by 
the pressing nature of other global concerns, deviated somewhat from the path of 
free and fair trade when American support did not materialise.  Though this 
concession to the preservation of Britain’s substantial commercial interests did not 
cause any significant friction or division in itself, it did portend further differences 
between the two powers when it came to resolving the various problems presented 
by the Boxer Rising. 
The friction and mutual irritation which came to the surface during the 
Boxer negotiations was influenced by, and in turn reinforced, certain negative 
images which the two powers held of one another.  American officials interpreted 
British actions through the lens of ‘old world’ imperialism and accounted for 
divergence between the two powers with reference to the British tendency towards 
vacillation.  The British, for their part, viewed American policy as a cynical attempt 
to have their cake and eat it in China or, perhaps even worse, merely a submissive 
reflection of the currents of popular opinion.  These images, though not quite as 
prominent during these years as they would become over the following decade, 
were more in evidence amongst policymakers and officials of both countries than 
negative stereotypes of the Chinese, in spite of the currency of these latter ideas in 
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popular culture.  The surprising paucity of racial ideas in discussion of the Boxer 
Rising is consistent, however, with the lack of ideological content more generally in 
British-American interaction during this period.  Though Anglo-Saxonist ideas did 
make an appearance in abstract discussions of relations between the powers, such 
as in conversations between Henry White and British policymakers in early 1898, 
the absence of such ideology in practical communication over East Asia is 
pronounced.  This chapter has suggested that this omission was in part a deliberate, 
tactical move on the part of British and American policymakers, who were 
concerned that ideological arguments represented a risky prospect with the 
potential to hinder rather than advance their respective agendas. 
A further reason for the general absence of ideological content in British-
American interaction during these years may have been the somewhat 
circumscribed nature of communication between the two powers.  Though there 
were no real problems at the official level, informal channels, where more candid 
expressions were likely to be voiced, were either underutilised or lacking altogether.  
Neither McKinley nor Salisbury was particularly interested in cultivating 
opportunities for informal interaction, and the personal factor was thus largely 
absent from the transatlantic relationship during these years.  This state of affairs 
would be dramatically altered following McKinley’s death in 1901, however, as the 
arrival of Theodore Roosevelt at the White House heralded an era in which personal 





‘A Yellow Peril or a Slav Peril’: The Russo-Japanese War 
 
 
The war that broke out between Japan and Russia in February 1904 was a pivotal 
point in the history of the relations of East and West.  After the peace of 
Portsmouth at the end of August 1905, and in fact to a great extent after the first 
Japanese victories, long-standing assumptions about the natural relations between 
Occidental and Oriental nations ceased to be tenable.1  The conflict was also 
significant in terms of its impact on relations between Britain and the United States, 
providing a number of opportunities for the deepening of the nations’ relationship 
through informal and personal interactions between the two governments.  Such 
progress was marred, however, by the distinct friction which resulted from the 
failure of ostensibly identical interests to be realised in the form of practical 
cooperation. 
In contrast to British-American interaction over China at the turn of the 
twentieth century, the main pressure for cooperation during the Russo-Japanese 
War came not from Britain but from the United States.  The major barrier to joint 
action in this instance was therefore not American domestic politics but, this 
chapter contends, the British need to defer to global priorities over regional 
interests.  Not only did British policymakers have a slightly different perspective on 
the conflict in consequence of their global concerns, they were also firmly opposed 
to intervening in any way which risked undermining their Alliance with the 
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Japanese.  The failure of the two powers to cooperate was not simply a product of 
British stubbornness on this point, however, and this chapter also makes the case 
that the mismatch in British and American conceptions of desirable cooperation had 
a significant part to play in the tension which developed between them.  The British 
were eager to arrange for joint action with the United States, but they insisted that 
this should take the form of a broad understanding or commitment, whereas the 
Americans were only interested in working in tandem on a very limited scale. 
As suggested above, the Russo-Japanese War was a hugely significant 
moment in terms of ideology, as it dramatised the theory that East Asia would form 
the crux of a coming conflict for the future of civilisation.  The outcome of the war 
was discussed by numerous observers in terms of its meaning for the destiny of the 
English-speaking peoples.  On the one hand, the possibility of a Russian victory 
intensified existing speculation about a global conflict between Anglo-Saxon and 
Slav.2  On the other, Japan’s unprecedented success ignited fears of a future Asian 
challenge to the West, and by the end of the war predictions of a coming Yellow 
Peril focused almost exclusively on the triumphant Japanese.3  Though such ideas 
had a slightly greater influence on British-American interaction than they had done 
in previous years, largely on account of the significant increase in personal contacts 
and informal diplomacy, they were still not nearly as prominent as might be 
expected.  This chapter suggests that the paucity of this kind of ideology in 
communication between the powers was at least in part down to the conscious 
avoidance and suppression of potentially problematic ideas on the part of British 
and American policymakers. 
The roots of the Russo-Japanese War lie in the region of Manchuria, which 
was still officially an integral part of the Chinese Empire but had been partially 
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occupied by the Russians since the Boxer Rising.  Russian attempts to establish 
predominance in Manchuria had been a source of contention with the other powers 
throughout 1901 and 1902, but the question came to a head in a more serious way 
in 1903 following numerous missed deadlines for the evacuation of Russian troops.4  
The Japanese Government became increasingly impatient at Russian prevarication, 
and the two powers entered into an extended and strained process of negotiation 
in an attempt to demarcate their lines of interest and avoid conflict.  It was the 
breakdown of these negotiations, chiefly owing to Russian unwillingness to give any 
ground in relation to Manchuria, which ultimately led to the outbreak of war in 
early 1904.5  Though the Japanese did have the backing of Britain and the United 
States in pressing for the preservation of the Open Door in Manchuria, when it 
came to actively contesting Russian abuses they were left somewhat isolated.  
Neither Britain nor the United States was willing to go out on a limb over the 
controversy in spite of the shared desire of policymakers to limit Russian 
expansionism and keep the region open for trade.  London and Washington did 
protest violations of Open Door principles and the prolongation of the Russian 
occupation but without the slightest implication that they would back up their 
position with force.6 
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From the British point of view, this policy of reserve over Manchuria was 
largely determined by the broader imperative of avoiding conflict with Russia due to 
the danger a breakdown in relations could pose to vital British interests elsewhere 
in the world.  The disastrous conflict in South Africa, though by this point 
successfully concluded, had stretched British resources and revealed the limitations 
of the nation’s power.  Policymakers were therefore in no mood to put other more 
vital areas of the Empire, such as India, in jeopardy by antagonising their primary 
rival over issues of peripheral concern.7  In April 1903, the Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Lansdowne, explained to Michael Herbert, the British Ambassador in Washington, 
the Government’s ‘inner mind’ on the Manchuria question: 
The Cabinet while objecting most strongly to the action of Russia would 
probably refuse to go to war either alone or with Japan only as an ally to 
prevent the absorption of Manchuria and Mongolia.8   
The phrase ‘with Japan only’ is key, as Lansdowne and his colleagues retained the 
hope that they could be saved from their East Asian dilemma by the deus ex 
machina of joint action with the United States, which would either serve to frighten 
the Russians into retreat or, if it came to it, make war a more feasible prospect.  
British policymakers consequently encouraged Washington to take the lead in 
defending the Open Door in Manchuria so that they might follow, effectively taking 
the line that the attitude of the United States would determine the British position 
on Manchuria.  If the Americans took a strong stance they could count on British 
support, but if they allowed their claim to equal commercial treatment to be 
trampled on, Britain would almost certainly follow suit.9 
The admittedly fairly faint British hope that the United States would take the 
initiative and opt for a more assertive role in East Asia did have some basis, as 
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American policymakers recognised the potential commercial value of Manchuria 
and the desirability of upholding the Open Door and China’s integrity as fully as 
possible.10  The region was not, however, a vital national interest by any means and 
public opinion was broadly apathetic towards the Far East at this point.  There was 
no popular appetite for any further adventures on the other side of the Pacific, and 
so Secretary of State John Hay and President Theodore Roosevelt, despite 
fantasising about ‘going to “extremes” with Russia’, resigned themselves to the role 
of spectators in the Manchurian controversy.11  The problem of domestic politics 
thus remained a crucial one in determining American policy in East Asia; widespread 
hostility to even the merest whiff of ‘foreign entanglement’ persisted and was a 
crucial limiting factor on American action.  In order to stave off domestic criticism, 
Hay had to ensure that the very modest action which the United States did take, in 
the form of protests over Russian conduct, could not be construed as anything 
other than wholly independent, a limitation which applied particularly strongly with 
regard to coordinated action with Britain.12   
The passive stance which Britain and the United States observed in relation 
to the Manchuria question was called into question in late 1903 as the negotiations 
between Russia and Japan stalled and overt hostilities became an increasingly likely 
prospect.  Faced with the immediate possibility of war in East Asia, policymakers in 
London and Washington were forced to consider whether they should seek to avert 
a conflict and, if war did break out, whether they should intervene to ensure that 
the Russo-Japanese clash would not endanger their interests in the region.  For the 
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British, these decisions were complicated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, signed in 
1902, which to some extent tied their fortunes to those of the Japanese but did not 
require them to come to Japan’s aid unless a third power were to intervene on the 
side of Russia.13 
 American policymakers, who had considerably less at stake in the conflict, 
had more or less established their position prior to the breakdown in negotiations 
between Japan and Russia.  As early as the beginning of September 1903, Hay had 
informed the Japanese that he did not consider the Russian failure to evacuate 
Manchuria sufficient cause for American action and, furthermore, that if war did 
come the United States would look purely to its own interests.14  Though the 
Roosevelt administration did, in early 1904, give some thought to the possibility of 
mediation, this idea appears to have fallen by the wayside fairly quickly in light of 
Japanese objections.15  American willingness to allow the conflict to play out was 
probably influenced by a feeling in Washington that it would be no bad thing for the 
Japanese to call the Russian bluff by taking up arms over Manchuria; Hay had 
spoken almost wistfully on a number of occasions of the prospect that Japan might 
‘fly at the throat’ of Russia.16  Moreover, American policymakers took the view that 
the Japanese were effectively fighting on the side of the Open Door and the 
integrity of China, and that any success they had would also redound to the benefit 
of the United States.  Roosevelt confided to his son Ted in February 1904, ‘Japan is 
playing our game’, and there was a great deal of optimism in the U.S. that the Asian 
nation would prove themselves superior in this particular contest.17 
With one vital exception, British policymakers were unable to share 
American hopes that a war might prove a mixed blessing rather than simply a curse.  
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There was an ingrained pessimism in the British Government as to the capacity of 
the Japanese to wage war against the Russians, and the Cabinet discussion of the 
looming war in December 1903 was grounded in the assumption that Japan would 
be ‘crushed’.18  The only dissenter to this gloomy view was the Prime Minister, 
Arthur Balfour.  Admittedly, Balfour did not have particularly high hopes for the 
Japanese either, but he argued that there was no chance that the nation could be 
wiped out as a force in East Asia without Russia being exhausted as well.19  Rather 
less sanguine, Lansdowne and the rest of the Cabinet fretted over the possible 
consequences of a Japanese defeat for Britain’s interests in East Asia and her 
prestige more generally.  They were also alive to the danger that they might be 
dragged into the conflict, either through the mechanism of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance or because British public opinion would force the Government to intervene 
to rescue their allies from destruction.20  Balfour, however, chose to dwell on the 
potential bright side of the Russo-Japanese conflict, and his line of thinking 
exemplifies the global perspective with which British policymakers approached the 
war.  The Prime Minister was preoccupied with the Russian threat to British 
interests elsewhere in the world, particularly in India and Persia, and believed that if 
Russia’s energies could be diverted to East Asia by constant danger from Japan – 
who even in defeat would be her ‘unsleeping and implacable enemy’ – then Britain 
would be able to rest easier in those more significant arenas.21 
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 Thus, although British pessimism initially inclined some key figures to back 
intervention of one kind or another, Britain ultimately followed the example of the 
United States in adopting a passive policy of simply watching the conflict unfold.  
What difference there was between the two powers was largely a matter of 
expectations, the British assuming that Japan would be defeated and the Americans 
projecting a more positive outcome.  A further aspect of the difference between 
Britain and the U.S. was that, because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the British 
were much more invested in the outcome of the conflict than the Americans.  It was 
somewhat inevitable that the United States would take a hands-off approach to 
conflict in East Asia, whereas for Britain the decision to do so was a considerably 
weightier one.  British passivity during the build-up and at the outbreak of war was 
thus a very deliberate choice to leave Japan to, in Balfour’s words, ‘work out her 
own salvation in her own way’.22  In addition to the potential benefits which were 
foreseen from Russia being drawn into conflict with Japan, this decision was 
motivated by the belief that it would be unwise to try to influence Japanese policy 
in one direction or another.  Balfour and Lansdowne established a clear line which 
would shape British policy for the entire course of the war: given the potential for 
unwelcome suggestions to sour relations between the allies, no pressure was to be 
put on Japan to compromise in the hope of peace and no ‘unpalatable advice’ of 
any kind was to be proffered.23 
With the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in February 1904, Britain and 
the United States began to consider not only what attitude they would take to the 
developing conflict but also what they hoped to gain, and what they wished to 
avoid, in its outcome.  American policymakers identified early on that the most 
                                                                                                                                                                      
P.P. O’Brien (ed.), The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922 (London, 2004), p.56; J. Tomes, Balfour 
and Foreign Policy: The International Thought of a Conservative Statesman (Cambridge, 1997), 
pp.122-123. 
22 A. Balfour to Lord Lansdowne, December 22nd 1903, Add MS 88906/17/5, Lansdowne MS. 
23 A. Balfour to Lord Lansdowne, December 22nd 1903, Add MS, 49728, Balfour MS; A. Balfour to Lord 
Lansdowne, December 22nd 1903, Add MS88906/17/5, Lansdowne MS; Lord Selborne to Lord 
Lansdowne, December 29th 1903, Add MS88906/17/1, Lansdowne MS; Lord Lansdowne to H.M. 
Durand, February 5th 1904, FO 5/2551, TNA; B.E.C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour: First Earl of 
Balfour, vol. 1 (London 1936), p.377; Lowe, Britain in the Far East, p.77. 
91 
 
desirable result from the point of view of maintaining the regional status quo and 
the Open Door in China would be a rough balance of power between Russia and 
Japan.  They reasoned that if the two powers fought it out to a point where both 
remained intact but unable to wage further war they would effectively cancel one 
another other out, leaving the disputed region of Manchuria open for the 
commerce of all.24  The British, with those same ultimate goals of the Open Door 
and the preservation of the territorial status quo in mind, took a fairly similar view – 
indeed, the concept of a balance of power had been floated in the Foreign Office as 
a promising solution to the Manchuria question as early as 1901 – but with a couple 
of significant caveats.25  In the first place, as indicated above, British policymakers 
were considerably more pessimistic about Japan’s prospects, and so although they 
recognised the desirability of a balance of power they were more concerned with 
ensuring that in the event of a Russian victory there were contingencies in place to 
preserve the Open Door and some semblance of Chinese sovereignty in 
Manchuria.26  More fundamentally, the British Government had a much more global 
perspective on the consequences of the conflict in contrast to the narrower outlook 
of the Americans, who were chiefly preoccupied with the war’s regional impact.  
Policymakers in London therefore worried about not only a Russian threat to 
Manchuria and the Open Door but also the potential for Russia to strike at British 
interests in other parts of the world, either off the back of success against the 
Japanese or by way of compensation for a set-back in East Asia.  A comprehensive 
Japanese victory, though in their view highly unlikely, thus had definite appeal from 
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the point of view of British policymakers, as it would render the Russians unable to 
menace their interests either in China or globally.27 
The broad goals of Britain and the United States during the Russo-Japanese 
War were very similar, if not identical, as they retained their shared solicitude for 
the East Asian status quo and the Open Door for trade throughout the Chinese 
Empire.  Where they differed was in their perspectives on the war, and although 
they assumed to all intents and purposes the same basic position during the conflict 
– tacit support for Japan with a view to an ultimate balance of power in East Asia – 
this difference played a significant role in the development of friction between 
London and Washington as the Russo-Japanese War unfolded.  Policymakers, in 
Washington especially, expected that the two nations would be found together in 
light of their common interests and were thus apt to be frustrated when their 
respective approaches to the various issues thrown up by the war did not 
consistently match up.  Further fuel for mutual irritation arose from the mismatch in 
British and Americans views as to what sort of cooperation was desirable; both 
powers emphasised closeness, harmony and their hopes for working together but 
each meant something different by this, inevitably generating a degree of tension.  
This dynamic became evident in the initial stages of the war, as the two powers 
attempted to navigate the tricky issue of Chinese neutrality.   
In early February 1904, the U.S. Government proposed to Britain, along with 
the other European powers, that their combined good offices should be used to try 
to ensure that Russia and Japan respected the neutrality of China.  American 
policymakers hoped to contain the conflict in the smallest area possible and confine 
it to the two original combatants, thus minimising the threat to Chinese integrity 
and the danger of escalation into a global clash.  In order to gain the assent of the 
various powers, Hay deliberately kept the suggestion vague and refrained from 
addressing the vexed question of how Manchuria, where much of the fighting 
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would inevitably take place, fitted in to the picture.28  British policymakers, though 
thoroughly in agreement with the objective of securing Chinese neutrality and 
limiting the scope of the conflict, had their doubts about the American suggestion, 
questioning the practical utility of such an ambiguous proposal.  They were keen, 
however, to show willingness to cooperate, and so the Foreign Office acted upon 
the American request, but at the same time attempted to formulate a more 
watertight and efficacious solution to the problem the U.S. initiative had 
highlighted.29 
Balfour in particular was adamant that a half-baked guarantee of Chinese 
neutrality which did not include Manchuria and which lacked any real force behind 
it would be unfit for purpose, leaving far too much leeway for the Russians to use 
the war as a springboard for aggressive expansion.  What the Prime Minister really 
wanted was a much more sweeping joint British-American guarantee of the 
‘administrative entity’ of China, or, as he put it in a private letter to Lansdowne: 
If the Americans would so far violate their traditions as to make any 
suggestion of an alliance for the purpose of preserving by arms, if necessary, 
the integrity of China, it would open a new era in the history of the world.30   
British policymakers did not attempt to sell this grandiose vision to the Americans at 
this point, presumably recognising that those ‘traditions’ still held an awful lot of 
weight, but they did look to lay the groundwork for future regional cooperation 
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between the two powers.31  Unfortunately, they did so in the context of discussing 
Hay’s more limited proposal, giving American policymakers the erroneous 
impression that the British Government somehow objected to the neutrality 
scheme.  Thus mistaking an admittedly fairly subtle British overture for a refusal to 
support the American position, Roosevelt and Hay privately vented their irritation at 
the ‘dull’ and ‘thick-headed’ response of British policymakers and their apparent 
readiness to undermine a project which was so clearly in line with their ostensible 
policy and interests.32  American frustration over the neutrality issue died away 
almost as soon as it became clear that the British had in fact already acted positively 
on Hay’s suggestion, but this incident is indicative of the facility with which 
American policymakers reverted to images of the British as stolid and vacillating.  
Furthermore, the misunderstanding over the question of Chinese neutrality 
highlights the potential for friction created by the disjuncture in the two powers’ 
hopes and expectations for joint action, as the British desire for a more sweeping 
understanding came up against an American proposal which was much more 
limited and specific. 
More significant tension and differences of opinion would not really surface 
until the closing stages of the war, however, and the keynote of the latter part of 
1904 and early 1905 was rather the growing closeness and intimacy of the two 
powers.  This increasing cordiality was facilitated in large part by the blossoming of 
informal relationships, and in particular by the friendship between British diplomat 
Cecil Spring Rice and President Roosevelt.  Spring Rice, who was Secretary of the 
British Embassy at St Petersburg during the war, wrote frequently and at length to 
Roosevelt and other significant actors such as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and John 
Hay.  Though he wrote primarily as a private individual, his close friendships and 
regular correspondence with key figures in the Foreign Office and the Conservative 
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leadership afforded him something of a unique position.  In spite of his somewhat 
idiosyncratic outlook, Spring Rice’s American correspondents took his views 
seriously, both in terms of his insight into the British official mind and his analysis of 
the situation in Russia and throughout the world.33 
The correspondence between Spring Rice and his American friends during 
1904 offers a unique and very candid glimpse into the thinking of the two powers 
regarding the Russo-Japanese War, particularly in terms of the role played by 
ideology in shaping their attitudes towards the conflict.  For example, in a letter of 
March 1904, Roosevelt offered an insight into his preference for a balance of power 
steeped in a racialised understanding of the war: 
It may be that the two powers will fight until both are fairly well exhausted, 
and that then peace will come on terms which will not mean the creation of 
either a yellow peril or a Slav peril.34   
The representation of the conflict as a sort of preliminary bout in the coming clash 
of civilisations and the treatment of its consequences in terms of racial threat were 
both common features of this correspondence, distinguishing it significantly from 
the official British-American dialogue, which was devoid of such ideological content.  
Spring Rice and Roosevelt in particular appear to have shared this basic ideological 
grounding, and were in broad agreement that the Japanese fought on the side of 
civilisation and the interests of the English-speaking powers while Russia, an enemy 
of the Open Door and Chinese territorial integrity, represented a ‘menace to the 
higher life of the world’.35  There are crucial differences, however, in the manner in 
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which the two men employed the same ideological framework, reflecting the 
differing British and American perspectives and agendas with regard to the war. 
Though he not infrequently denied harbouring any concerns regarding 
future danger from Japan, there is no question that Roosevelt was preoccupied 
principally with the first half of his ‘yellow peril’ or ‘Slav peril’ formulation.36  In part, 
this was simply a reflection of his greater confidence in the ability of the Japanese 
to successfully prosecute the war, but his letters to Spring Rice also dwelt at length 
on the problem of racial difference in relation to Japan’s success.  Roosevelt mused 
early on in the war that a Japanese victory would mean the rise of ‘a great new 
force in eastern Asia’ and, in consequence, ‘a real shifting of the center of 
equilibrium as far as the white races are concerned’.37  The President’s words of 
caution to Spring Rice about Japan became increasingly pointed as the conflict 
progressed, and in a letter of December 1904 – in the wake of unprecedented 
Japanese military success and some disturbing reports from American observers – 
he offered his direst prediction yet.  Roosevelt lamented that he could not be 
confident that the Japanese did not see all Westerners ‘simply as white devils 
inferior to themselves’, who were to be ‘treated politely only so long as would 
enable the Japanese to take advantage of our various national jalousies, and beat us 
in turn’.38  Roosevelt’s warnings about the possibility that a victorious Japan would 
become a ‘yellow peril’ and threaten the English-speaking peoples, though 
undoubtedly an indication of his own personal anxieties to some extent, had a clear 
purpose in the interchange with Spring Rice.  Future danger from Japan was the 
crux of the argument for promoting a balance of power in East Asia, and Roosevelt 
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was tapping into the rich ideological vein of civilisational conflict to add weight to 
his position. 
Spring Rice’s take on the unfolding conflict was somewhat different to his 
American friend’s, primarily because he subscribed to the more pessimistic British 
view that Russian victory was the most likely outcome and therefore the chief 
danger to be contended with.39  Just as Roosevelt raised the spectre of a racial or 
civilisational threat from Japan, Spring Rice postulated Slavic hegemony over China 
and ‘a life and death struggle in Asia’ for the English-speaking peoples should Russia 
prove to be the stronger of the two powers.40  Spring Rice shared Balfour’s hope 
that the U.S. would commit to working with Britain to oppose Russian schemes for 
dominance in China, and his portrayal of future danger from Russia in terms of an 
ultimate conflict between Slav and Anglo-Saxon was designed to bolster his 
arguments regarding the need for a united front in East Asia.41  The British diplomat 
evidently deemed it necessary, with this purpose in mind, to counter Roosevelt’s 
predictions of danger from Japan and emphasise instead the Russian threat.  To do 
this he also drew on Yellow Peril ideology, but a particular strand of it which located 
the real ‘yellow danger’ in Slavic supremacy over the innumerable masses of the 
Chinese.42  Spring Rice employed this idea in several letters to Roosevelt, but his 
most emphatic use of it was in a letter to Hay of August 1904: ‘The Russian and the 
Chinaman together are the two most malleable instruments of despotism which it is 
possible to find on this degenerate earth.  I think this is the real yellow peril.’43 
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The fairly liberal employment by Spring Rice and Roosevelt of ideas of race 
and civilisation to further their respective agendas offers a striking demonstration 
of the potential utility of such ideas in promoting British-American cooperation.  
This kind of interaction is only found, however, in the entirely informal and largely 
speculative correspondence of 1904.  By early 1905, the communication between 
Roosevelt and Spring Rice had begun a transition into the mainstream of British-
American interaction, during which it would lose much of its ideological character.   
The major reason behind this shift was Roosevelt’s dissatisfaction with the 
British Ambassador at Washington, Mortimer Durand, through whom the President 
did not feel he could communicate as openly and effectively as he wished, 
especially with regard to the East Asian situation.44  Roosevelt put the problem to 
Spring Rice in a letter of late December 1904, along with a suggestion as to how the 
two governments might overcome this difficulty in communication: 
Unfortunately there is no one in your embassy here to whom I can speak 
with even reasonable fullness.  I wish to Heaven you could come over, if only 
for a week or two; and I think it would be very important for your 
Government that you should come over.45   
Roosevelt’s concerns were not merely the product of a breakdown in 
communication, although this does appear to have been the catalyst for his action, 
but also a reflection of the continued influence of a negative image of the British 
which had been prevalent among American policymakers during the Boxer Rising.  
The President expressed doubts in particular about Britain’s ‘tenacity of purpose’, 
essentially accusing British policymakers of being irresolute or, as he put it to 
American Ambassador to Russia George Meyer, ‘flabby’.46 
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At the same time as he wrote to Spring Rice, Roosevelt also primed the 
American Secretary of the Embassy in London, Henry White, to suggest that the 
Foreign Office might arrange for Spring Rice to go to Washington so that together 
they could ‘try to get a clear idea of the respective mental attitudes of the two 
governments.’ 47  Though not entirely comfortable with the unconventional 
approach to communication Roosevelt was proposing, British policymakers were 
eager to grasp the opportunity presented by Spring Rice’s friendship with the 
President to advance the cause of closer British-American relations.48  Their 
enthusiasm was based in part, however, on a misreading of Roosevelt’s intentions.  
Projecting onto the President their own hopes for British-American partnership in 
East Asia, they detected in his suggestion, ‘a proposal for joint action at the end of 
the war, in connection with possible terms of peace’.49  With this understanding of 
the enterprise in mind, Balfour sought to send Spring Rice off on his visit to the 
White House armed with a strong case for a collaborative British-American solution 
to the problems of East Asia.  Initially he had hoped that the delicate matter of 
communicating the official mind to his unofficial envoy could be dealt with by 
means of a private letter, but in the end a more discreet approach was adopted and 
the relevant information conveyed indirectly.  Nevertheless, Balfour’s draft letter 
offers a fascinating insight into British hopes for the Spring Rice mission and 
approach to promoting their agenda.50 
Balfour’s instructions to Spring Rice raised the possibility, hinted at but not 
followed up during the discussions over Chinese neutrality, of a treaty between 
Britain and the United States to counteract any steps towards the dismemberment 
of China.  Though acknowledging the political obstacles to such an undertaking, the 
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Prime Minister took the line that if Britain and the United States were to stand 
together against any violations of China’s integrity, the other powers would be 
compelled to fall in line.  Specifically, Balfour urged: 
It might be well worth while for the United States and Britain to consider 
what terms of peace they would regard as inimical to their interests, and 
how they can best prevent Russia indemnifying herself for the moral and 
material cost of the war by appropriating a large slice of Chinese territory.51 
British concerns, and by extension their proposals for joint action with the United 
States, were thus focused not on the immediate questions of the war but on the 
broader issue of the future of China, with Russia still very much singled out as the 
likely villain of the piece.52 
 In order to press this latter point home, Balfour evidently felt that it was also 
necessary to counteract the anxiety Roosevelt had expressed in his earlier 
correspondence regarding a future threat from Japan.  His letter to Spring Rice thus 
began with this striking declaration: ‘I am completely sceptical about the ‘Yellow 
Peril’.  The idea of Japan leading an Eastern crusade on Western civilisation seems 
to me altogether chimerical.’53  Balfour’s use of the specific terminology of ‘Yellow 
Peril’ is interesting, as it suggests a deliberate attempt to tar the notion of potential 
danger from Japan with the brush of racist scare-mongering.  The impression that 
the Prime Minister’s engagement, albeit in a negative sense, with racial ideology in 
this instance was a deliberate tactic designed to discredit anxiety over a future 
Japanese threat is reinforced by a further comment in Spring Rice’s draft 
instructions: 
The real danger is not the remote and fantastic dream of a victory of East 
over West, but the very near and imminent peril of important fragments of 
China being dominated by more warlike and aggressive Powers.54   
This dichotomy implied that fear of danger from Japan was unfounded and 
irrational anxiety while, on the contrary, danger from Russia was a very real and 
practical concern.  Balfour thus overtly rejected an ideological interpretation of the 
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Russo-Japanese conflict as a means to bolster his argument for British-American 
cooperation to preserve Chinese territorial integrity in the aftermath of the war. 
Equipped with his instructions, Spring Rice arrived in Washington in late 
January 1905 and stayed until early February.  In addition to meeting directly with 
Roosevelt and Hay, Spring Rice also facilitated much more candid conversations 
between the President and the British Ambassador, the lack of which had initially 
prompted his mission.55  This breakthrough in communication at Washington was a 
source of great satisfaction for British policymakers, especially as Durand repeatedly 
emphasised in his reports the growing intimacy in British-American relations and 
the strong sense of goodwill that the Spring Rice mission had brought to the 
surface.  For example, he dwelt on comments Roosevelt had made as to the 
community of interest of the two powers in East Asia and, more promising still, his 
assertion that ‘England and the United States must stand together’ in that region. 56  
Encouraged by Durand’s glowing assessments of the prospects for British-American 
collaboration, Lansdowne and Balfour stressed the desirability of the two powers 
staying in line and even engaging in ‘concerted action’ where appropriate, evidently 
hoping for some sort of commitment from Roosevelt with regard to securing China 
against Russian aggression at the end of the war.57  Though acknowledging the 
continued limitations on U.S. action imposed by popular suspicion of ‘entangling 
alliances’, Durand was hopeful as to the potential for a cooperative venture in East 
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Asia, and appears to have believed that joint action short of a formal understanding 
was eminently achievable.58 
This conclusion was, as the somewhat more realistic Spring Rice was only 
too aware, distinctly optimistic, as it significantly underestimated the continued 
influence of popular prejudice against working with Britain on Washington’s 
calculations.  As Spring Rice explained in his report to Lansdowne, though American 
policymakers most certainly recognised the identity of interests in East Asia, what 
they desired was not concerted but, at best, ‘parallel’ action.  It had become clear in 
his discussions with Roosevelt and Hay that even the merest hint of an actual 
agreement would need to be avoided for the sake of the Roosevelt administration’s 
domestic political needs.59  Roosevelt’s comments on the subject in a letter to 
Meyer are particularly telling, as the President explained that with nothing to 
separate the interests of Britain and the U.S. in the Far East there should be a 
‘thorough understanding’ between them, but also, crucially, emphasised that this 
could only be achieved, ‘without any talk whatever being made of it’.60 
Though Roosevelt had no interest in grand schemes for future joint action 
with Britain in East Asia, he did want to ensure that the two nations remained on 
the same page with regard to the developing situation in the Russo-Japanese War.  
In particular, he was beginning to look towards the possibility of a peace settlement 
and wished to establish that the British attitude towards such a venture was 
consonant with his own.61  In the course of the discussions between Roosevelt and 
Durand it became apparent that Britain and the United States were in broad 
agreement on the major points of possible contention in the settlement, in 
particular the question of Manchuria.  Both governments, in line with their shared 
commitment to Chinese territorial integrity and preference for preserving the 
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regional status quo, wished to see Manchuria fully returned to Chinese rule at the 
end of the war.62  These conversations also indicate, however, the beginnings of a 
divergence in the views of the two powers on the question of peace, though again 
this difference was not so much a matter of ultimate goals as of methods and, to a 
large extent, timing. 
There was in Washington, in the early months of 1905, a considerably 
greater sense of urgency about bringing the war to a relatively swift conclusion.  
Roosevelt, though aware that it was not an immediate possibility, was in favour of 
initiating mediation between Russia and Japan at the earliest realistic opportunity.63  
This was by no means solely driven by concerns about Japan, but as that power’s 
victories stacked up it appeared increasingly important to the President and his 
advisors that peace should not be delayed for too much longer.  Roosevelt explicitly 
set out his preferred outcome for the conflict to Durand in January 1905: 
He said he wanted Japan to win in the war, but not too decisively.  “It is 
better that after the war they should remain face to face”, otherwise he 
feared Japan might get too strong and perhaps become dangerous.64   
This is essentially the position Roosevelt had been espousing for almost a year, but 
where his earlier correspondence with Spring Rice had referred overtly to the 
possibility of Japan becoming a ‘yellow peril’, the President’s statement to Durand 
was a considerably more ideologically-neutral exposition of the balance of power 
principle. 
British policymakers still did not share Roosevelt’s anxiety on this point, 
however, and in consequence had nothing like the same enthusiasm for the 
prospect of mediation, or even really for a peace settlement in the immediate 
future.  Though they worked hard to conceal their dissent from the President’s 
position, presumably on the basis that it had the potential to undermine their 
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project for British-American collaboration, policymakers in London were sceptical of 
the value of an attempt to bring the contending parties to terms.  One reason for 
this was that, with Britain’s global policy needs in mind, an immediate end to the 
war was not entirely attractive; Britain would reap far greater benefits from a more 
drawn-out affair which would leave Russia too weak to cause significant problems 
elsewhere in the world.  Balfour noted during the process of drafting instructions to 
Durand: 
I am, on broad moral grounds, very anxious that we should do everything we 
can to put an end to the war.  But I have to admit that, from a narrowly 
national point of view, the balance of advantage, I suspect, is on the side of 
continued hostilities.65   
The other side of British diffidence regarding moves towards peace was the largely 
practical point that an offer of mediation seemed unlikely to be acceptable to both 
powers.  During Spring Rice’s visit to Washington it was the Russians who appeared 
implacably opposed to talk of peace, while when the question of mediation arose 
again in March 1905, British policymakers learned confidentially that the Japanese 
were determined to prosecute the war until they were in a position to dictate the 
terms of the peace, and therefore wanted no interference.  In these circumstances, 
the Foreign Office was particularly keen to avoid being in a position of taking an 
offer of mediation to their allies, believing as they had from the beginning of the 
conflict that unwanted advice had the potential to damage the British relationship 
with Japan.66 
In spite of these reservations as to the desirability and feasibility of 
mediation, Lansdowne did his best to meet in a cooperative spirit suggestions 
Roosevelt made in late January 1905 regarding testing the waters for peace 
negotiations.  The Foreign Secretary raised, albeit somewhat obliquely, the question 
of likely peace terms with the Japanese and communicated their response to the 
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U.S., leaving Roosevelt none the wiser that policymakers in London considered his 
plans for mediation something of a fool’s errand.67  Lansdowne even instructed 
Durand to say that if an opportunity for peace talks were to arise, the British 
Government, ‘should do our best to secure from Japan a favourable reception of 
President’s proposals’.68  Meanwhile, however, he also wrote to Claude MacDonald, 
the British Minister at Tokyo, reassuring him that, ‘Nothing is, of course, further 
from our thoughts than to put pressure on the Japanese Government.’ 69  Though 
perhaps not wholly insincere, the British response to Roosevelt’s suggestions 
regarding a peace settlement was at least in part an exercise in telling the President 
what he wanted to hear, and certainly exaggerated the extent to which the two 
governments shared the same view of the situation. 
The main impact of the Spring Rice mission was thus very much at the 
surface level of British-American relations; the diplomat’s visit had cemented a 
sense of shared interests and harmony without actually addressing the underlying 
differences in the two powers’ views on the ongoing conflict.  The significance of 
the mission from the point of view of communication between the powers should 
not be underrated, however, and Spring Rice himself identified the marked 
improvement in the relationship between the President and the British Ambassador 
as the most important effect of his visit.  This development laid a vital foundation 
for ‘a close and frank interchange of views’ between Britain and the United States, 
but Spring Rice urged his superiors not to let matters rest where they were and to 
further enhance communication by making use of other unofficial or semi-official 
channels.70  British policymakers, who had tended in the past to shy away from 
informal diplomacy for reasons of propriety, took up this suggestion, and over the 
following months figures such as Senator Lodge and William Rockhill, now American 
Minister to China, came to play an important role in British-American interaction.  
Thus, as Howard Beale has argued, the need to supplement official channels due to 
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failures in communication, while not actually securing a cooperative approach, did 
ultimately lead to a significant deepening of the interaction between the two 
powers.71 
By far the most interesting of the extra-official interactions which arose from 
Spring Rice’s visit to Washington was the correspondence between King Edward VII 
and President Roosevelt.  The King wrote to Roosevelt in February 1905, ostensibly 
to offer his congratulations on Roosevelt’s inauguration but, as Spring Rice later 
explained to Hay, also with the intention of bringing about closer relations between 
the two powers and building upon the Spring Rice mission.72  The letter represents 
perhaps one of the most overt examples of the employment of Anglo-Saxonist 
rhetoric in British-American interaction during these years, as the King declared: 
You, Mr President, and I have been called upon to superintend the destinies 
of the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, and this fact should, in 
my opinion, alone suffice to bring us together.73   
It should be noted, however, that this bold expression did not refer specifically to 
the situation in East Asia, but rather to British-American unity in an abstract sense.  
There is evidence to suggest that the King had intended to go even further, perhaps 
by making the direct link between racial affinity and practical cooperation, but had 
been discouraged from doing so by his ministers.  Spring Rice’s admission in letters 
to Hay and to Roosevelt’s wife, Edith, that British policymakers had felt the need to 
curb the enthusiasm of the King, who had ‘wanted to say much more than he did’, 
indicates that even with the signal improvement in communication a degree of 
caution persisted regarding the free expression of such ideas.74 
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The King’s letter prompted an equally effusive response from the American 
side, in which Roosevelt firmly assented to the King’s call for unity between the 
nations:  
I absolutely agree with you as to the importance, not merely to ourselves 
but to all the free peoples of the civilized world, of a constantly growing 
friendship and understanding between the English-speaking peoples.75   
Though Roosevelt, as was his habit, shied away from the term ‘Anglo-Saxon’ itself, 
this statement is very much reflective of the ideology of Anglo-Saxonism, 
particularly in the allusion to British-American closeness representing a bulwark of 
civilisation and liberty.76  Indeed, Roosevelt explicitly affirmed later in the same 
letter that intimacy between the two powers had a sentimental as well as a 
pragmatic basis: ‘The larger interests of the two nations are the same; and the 
fundamental, underlying traits of their characters are also the same.’77  As with the 
King’s letter, however, these robust expressions of ideological commitment to 
British-American closeness were reserved to abstract discussion of the relationship 
between the powers and not applied specifically to East Asian affairs. 
Interestingly, while Spring Rice’s visit to Washington had paved the way for 
more open employment of ideology in certain aspects of British-American 
interaction, his own correspondence with Roosevelt conversely became increasingly 
less steeped in ideological rhetoric.  Roosevelt seems to have become more 
circumspect about the language he used in letters to his British friend, refraining 
from talking in terms of a Yellow Peril in particular.  Likewise, though Spring Rice still 
discoursed on the possible threat from Russia at the end of the war, by the summer 
of 1905 he no longer did so with even the slightest undertone of racial or 
civilisational conflict.  This shift appears to be largely down to the development of 
the correspondence from a private dialogue between friends into an indispensable 
element of the interaction between London and Washington, in which the Foreign 
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Office and State Department took a very close and direct interest.78  Indeed, this 
particular back channel became increasingly significant as 1905 progressed, in part 
because Durand again fell short of Roosevelt’s expectations as a medium for the 
frank exchange of views, but also because of the President’s growing preoccupation 
with the possibility of bringing about peace between Russia and Japan with British 
aid.79 
As the conflict progressed, Japanese triumphs continued to mount while the 
Russian cause appeared ever more bankrupt; Port Arthur had been taken in early 
January 1905, and at the beginning of March Russian forces were forced to retreat 
from their erstwhile base in the Manchurian city of Mukden.  The American goal of 
an eventual balance of power appeared to be distinctly at risk by this point, in light 
of the extent of Japanese success and the internal strife which threatened to bring 
the Russian Empire to its knees.80  Roosevelt consequently sought to expedite the 
peace settlement so as to bring the conflict to a close before it brought about a 
Russian collapse or, even worse from the American point of view, the intervention 
of other powers seeking to dictate the terms of the peace.81  There was also in 
Roosevelt’s project for peace an element of the pursuit of personal glory, but it 
would seem that the President embarked on the course of arranging a peace 
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settlement at least as much out of national policy considerations as a desire to 
make his own individual mark on world history.82 
Up until the end of May 1905, negotiations for peace remained, as the 
British had earlier suspected, a remote prospect, with neither Russia nor Japan 
showing any inclination towards coming to terms.  With the decisive Japanese 
victory in the naval battle of Tsushima Strait, however, the situation was 
dramatically altered and peace talks became, rather suddenly, a realistic 
possibility.83  It was at this point, too, that the slight divergence between Britain and 
the United States began to come to light, as Roosevelt looked to secure British 
backing for his efforts to bring about a peace conference.  The President formally 
proposed talks to the two combatants in early June 1905, and within days Durand 
was reporting Roosevelt’s desire for the Japanese to understand the vital 
importance of moderate peace terms, and his apparent belief that the British were 
in a position to use their influence with Japan to ensure that this message got across 
as clearly as possible.84  Durand’s response to this suggestion – which no doubt 
contributed to Roosevelt’s exasperation with the Ambassador – was to studiously 
avoid making any comment on the matter, in which course of action he was 
strongly backed up by the Foreign Secretary.85  Not only did British policymakers still 
hold very firmly to the principle of refraining from offering potentially unwelcome 
advice to the Japanese, they were also somewhat appalled at the idea of urging 
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moderation on their allies, as this appeared to imply an expectation that the as yet 
unknown Japanese peace terms would be somehow harsh or extreme.86 
British reticence in response to the suggestion that they might use their 
influence with Japan did little to deter Roosevelt, and he launched something of a 
campaign through the summer of 1905 to secure British backing for his peace 
schemes in the form of intervention with the Japanese.  The President was intent on 
convincing British policymakers of the merits of his balance of power solution to the 
questions raised by the Russo-Japanese War, stressing in particular the dangers 
inherent in an outcome whereby Russia was ‘driven out of East Asia’ or ‘completely 
crushed’ in the region.87  Evidently suspecting that there remained a degree of 
anxiety in Britain regarding Russian intentions, Roosevelt emphasised that Russia 
was no longer in any position to ‘conquer the world’ but that her continued regional 
presence would be a force for stability and peace in East Asia.  In letters to Spring 
Rice and to Lodge, who met with British policymakers in July 1905 as a sort of 
informal envoy from the White House, Roosevelt repeated his prediction that if 
Russia and Japan were left ‘face to face’ in East Asia it would have a ‘moderative’ 
effect on the behaviour of both powers, who would each act as ‘the guarantor of 
the other’s good conduct’.88 
Roosevelt used a number of ploys in an attempt to get across his message of 
the desirability of peace and the need for British pressure on Japan in the name of 
moderation, not least a studied emphasis on the intimate nature of the friendship 
between Britain and the United States.  Roosevelt appealed to the frequently-
expressed desire of British policymakers for close consultation between the two 
governments by keeping Durand minutely informed of the confidential details of 
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the peace process.89  Moreover, in the instructions he drew up prior to Lodge’s visit 
to Britain, Roosevelt proposed that the Senator should stress the good working 
relationship of Britain and the United States in the Far East and make it clear that 
this should continue in future.90  The new American Ambassador to Britain, 
Whitelaw Reid, was probably under similar instructions, and he too worked hard to 
give the impression that the President placed great value on the new intimacy in 
British-American relations.  He also emphasised Roosevelt’s personal friendship 
with Durand, which was somewhat disingenuous given Roosevelt’s ever-growing 
dissatisfaction with the Ambassador as a medium of communication and desire to 
have him replaced.91  Such assurances of American goodwill and desire for 
cooperation were no doubt intended to encourage the British to support 
Roosevelt’s peace initiative and overcome their reservations about putting pressure 
on the Japanese.  It is worth noting that, overblown as they occasionally were, these 
expressions of amity at no point strayed into Anglo-Saxonist territory in the way 
that the correspondence between Roosevelt and the King earlier in the year had.  
Roosevelt could very easily, and perhaps even quite effectively,  have made an 
ideological case for British assistance, but it would appear that he eschewed this 
approach, perhaps judging it to be imprudent given the continued limitations on 
British-American intimacy imposed by the U.S. political scene. 
Though Roosevelt consciously utilised the notion of British-American 
closeness in an attempt to further his peace project, it would not be fair to assume 
that he did not mean what he said, or encouraged others to say, regarding the 
nature of the relationship between the powers.  Roosevelt was confident that 
Britain and the United States would be found in harmony in East Asia, and this 
belief naturally heightened his expectations that British policymakers would fall in 
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line with his suggestions.  Consequently, when British cooperation was not 
forthcoming he was more than a little put out and began to question whether there 
was not some ulterior purpose behind the reluctance of British policymakers to act 
on his request that they make use of their influence with the Japanese.92  He 
expressed these suspicions to Reid in early July 1905: ‘the English, as I think rather 
short-sightedly, are entirely willing, and perhaps a trifle more than willing, to have 
the war go on.’93 
The President aired his concerns on this point to Spring Rice fairly early on in 
the process of soliciting British assistance, offering this admonition in mid-June 
1905: 
I earnestly hope that your people take the same view, and that they will not 
permit any feeling that they would like to see both combatants exhausted to 
prevent them doing all they can to bring about peace.94   
At around the same time, Acting Secretary of State Francis B. Loomis instructed Reid 
to ascertain ‘whether the English Government really does wish peace or not’, 
explaining that there was potential for the British to be of great assistance to the 
American peace initiative, assuming of course that they actually wanted to.95  As 
time went on, Roosevelt’s doubts crystallised into distinct irritation at what he saw 
as the failure of the British to live up to their professed desire to work with the 
United States, or even to act in accordance with their own real interests.  By early 
August, the President was therefore somewhat blunter in approach, telling Durand 
that if the British genuinely wanted peace then they would not scruple about telling 
the Japanese to come to reasonable terms.96 
Roosevelt’s frustration at British inaction probably influenced one of the 
other strategies he employed in his campaign to win their cooperation: making 
                                                           
92 Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, p.305; Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, pp.45, 210; 
Gelber, The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship, p.203; Morris, Theodore Rex, p.396; R.B. Mowat, The 
Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States (London, 1925), p.296; Nish, The Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, p.296; Perkins, The Great Rapprochement, p.223. 
93 T. Roosevelt to W. Reid, July 7th 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, pp.1265-1266. 
94 T. Roosevelt to C. Spring Rice, June 16th 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, pp.1233-1234. 
95 F. Loomis to W. Reid, June 15th 1905, M77/94, RG-59, NARA. 
96 T. Roosevelt to W. Reid, August 1st 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, pp.1297-1298. 
113 
 
capital out of German contributions to his peace efforts.  British policymakers and 
officials were, Roosevelt discovered, anxious about the relationship between the 
President and Kaiser Wilhelm II, and the detrimental impact this might have on 
British-American relations.97  Roosevelt’s initial response to this concern was to 
distance himself from the German Emperor, but in light of British intransigence in 
the matter of pressing Japan to make peace he began to exploit the anxiety for all it 
was worth, rarely missing an opportunity to mention just how helpful the Kaiser had 
been in his endeavours towards peace.98  Roosevelt judged Spring Rice to be 
particularly guilty of fretting over the influence of the Kaiser, and it was in 
correspondence with him that this ploy came most strikingly into play.  In one 
letter, Roosevelt made an apparently casual reference to the German contribution 
to his efforts for peace, before proceeding to hammer his point home in the very 
next breath:  
I am bound to say that the Kaiser has behaved admirably and has really 
helped me.  I hope that your people are sincerely desirous of peace and will 
use their influence at the proper time to prevent their asking impossible 
terms.99   
The implicit, and occasionally explicit, comparison between German eagerness and 
British reluctance to offer assistance in the cause of peace would remain a favourite 
theme of Roosevelt’s communications throughout the remainder of the war. 
The downside of this gambit of attempting to encourage British compliance 
by hinting at the blossoming of German-American friendship was that it firmly 
reinforced the British belief that Roosevelt was acting ‘with the advice and 
encouragement of the Kaiser’.100  Moreover, in addition to fearing that Roosevelt 
might be coming under the Kaiser’s political influence, British policymakers and 
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officials were also beginning to doubt the President’s judgement more generally 
and to suspect that he had fallen victim to the German Emperor’s well-known 
hysteria about the Yellow Peril.  This possibility had been discussed as early as 
February 1905, when Lansdowne had confessed his misgivings about Roosevelt to 
Durand: ‘He seems to be, like the German Emperor, with whom he has something in 
common, impressed with the possibility of a Yellow Peril.  I cannot myself see the 
danger.’101  Roosevelt’s consistent praise for the Kaiser can only have contributed to 
British concerns about both the motives behind the President’s desire to mediate 
and his potential to sabotage his own peace schemes by ‘exuberant diplomacy’, if 
anything increasing the reluctance of British policymakers to involve themselves in 
the enterprise.102 
Roosevelt does appear to have recognised the danger that being associated 
with irrational Yellow Peril fears might somewhat discredit his case for a balance of 
power in East Asia, and he did make some effort to distance himself from such 
ideas.  For example, in a letter to Spring Rice he dismissed Kaiser Wilhelm’s views on 
the Yellow Peril as ‘worthy of any fool congressman’ – a fairly damning indictment 
given the President’s severe disdain for Capitol Hill demagoguery – and he pointedly 
ridiculed the Russian claim to be ‘fighting the battles of the white race’ in his 
instructions to Lodge.103  Moreover, in his attempts to convince the British of the 
need for a peace which left both powers intact, Roosevelt avoided language which 
might have been taken to indicate Yellow Peril fears, even downplaying the very 
notion, so prominent in his earlier communications, that Japan might in future pose 
a threat.104   
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Despite Roosevelt’s best efforts, British policymakers would not assent to 
the proposition that they should put pressure on the Japanese with a view to 
facilitating a peace settlement.  This stance was not a reflection of a desire for the 
war to continue until Russia was destroyed – though, as suggested above, British 
policymakers did not exactly share the American sense of urgency about bringing 
hostilities to a close – but rather stemmed from the determination to avoid 
jeopardising relations with Japan.105  By mid-July 1905 Spring Rice had become 
increasingly concerned that the Americans had failed to grasp this basic principle 
behind British inaction, and he urged policymakers in London to do something to 
counter the impression that they were comfortable with the prolongation of the 
war and perhaps even encouraging the Japanese to fight on.106  In response, 
Lansdowne attempted to clarify the British position, explaining to both Reid and 
Durand that although the British Government desired peace for ‘reasons of 
humanity’, it would have been inappropriate to have ‘lectured the Japanese or 
preached to them the virtues of moderation’.107  Spring Rice supplemented these 
efforts with a letter of his own arguing that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, far from 
placing the British in an ideal position to press the Japanese to make peace, all but 
prohibited them from offering unsolicited advice to Japan.  Seeking to couch his 
contention in terms which he felt would best appeal to Roosevelt’s sense of honour 
and duty, he claimed that Britain must adhere to the spirit as well of the letter of 
the Alliance; if they were to be ‘absolutely and resolutely true to our plighted word’, 
British policymakers could not attempt to exert any influence over the Japanese.108  
These efforts to justify British reluctance to cooperate do not appear to have been 
especially successful.  Roosevelt, unimpressed with Spring Rice’s appeal to moral 
principles, jovially chided ‘Springy’ for going ‘a little needlessly into heroics’, and his 
image of the British as ‘flabby’ and lacking in resolve can only have been reinforced 
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by Lansdowne’s insistence that it was ‘in better taste’ for the British Government to 
refrain from advising the Japanese in the direction of peace.109 
In spite of the lack of British assistance, Roosevelt managed to convince the 
two combatants to come to the negotiating table, and on August 6th 1905 the peace 
negotiations at Portsmouth, New Hampshire began.  The successful arrangement of 
the peace conference did nothing to dampen the President’s desire to secure British 
cooperation, however, and in late July and early August he redoubled his efforts to 
solicit British assistance in convincing the Japanese to make peace on reasonable 
terms.  Roosevelt’s major line of argument shifted at this point from the desirability 
of a balance of power to the necessity of a quick settlement from Japan’s point of 
view.  The burden of Roosevelt’s argument was that the Japanese were at a point of 
exhaustion financially, and although they could carry on the conflict in the hope of 
coercing an indemnity from the Russians, the costs of such an endeavour would 
almost certainly outweigh any gain.  He emphasised repeatedly that it had been the 
Japanese who had requested peace talks in the first instance and that they would 
therefore have no objection to friendly advice from Britain.110  Moreover, he 
admonished Durand in early August: 
The greatest act of friendship which the friends of Japan can at this time 
show her is to do as I have already done, and urge her in her own interest 
not to follow a course which might do her real damage, and can do her no 
real benefit.111   
In placing emphasis on this side of the question, Roosevelt was not only seeking to 
undercut British claims to be doing the right thing by their allies by withholding 
advice, but was also continuing the trend of shying away from any suggestion that 
he was anxious about the future conduct of the Japanese. 
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It was on the point of Japan’s demand for an indemnity in particular that 
Roosevelt hoped for British help, as this was the key stumbling block to the 
negotiations at Portsmouth.  British policymakers continued to hesitate, however, 
maintaining that it had not yet reached the point that Japan’s demands were 
actually obstructing peace and that they were still not in a position to offer 
advice.112  Lansdowne had become even more unyielding on this point following an 
incident in which an apparently casual conversation on the peace negotiations with 
the Japanese Minister in London had been met with an official communication from 
the Japanese Government reminding the Foreign Secretary of Tokyo’s desire to 
avoid foreign interference.  The Japanese were, Lansdowne assured Durand, 
‘extraordinarily sensitive’ on this point and would no doubt resent even the most 
well-intentioned British attempt to offer guidance.113 
London and Washington thus found themselves somewhat at loggerheads 
during the Portsmouth peace conference, with the British adamant that their 
intercession with Japan was out of the question and the Americans insistent that 
such action was both entirely justified and potentially decisive.  Roosevelt’s 
frustration with British inaction appears to have mounted in tandem with his 
anxiety over the possible failure of the peace conference, which would have been a 
personal defeat as much as a blow to American policy, and in late August he 
grumbled to Henry White that the British Government had been ‘foolishly reluctant 
to advise Japan to be reasonable’.114  Spring Rice, always more attuned to the 
President’s thinking than Durand, picked up on this growing sense of exasperation 
and again warned policymakers in London that the British refusal to put pressure on 
Japan risked not only alienating Roosevelt but perhaps even pushing him into the 
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arms of the Kaiser.  He was somewhat pessimistic about the outcome of the peace 
negotiations and fretted that the Americans, influenced by German intrigues, would 
attribute their ultimate collapse to British equivocation.115 
As a complete impasse in the negotiations loomed in late August 1905, 
British policymakers finally conceded that it might be necessary to make some sort 
of gesture in the direction of appeasing Roosevelt.  Rather than themselves offering 
advice to the Japanese, however, they opted to pass on without comment a letter 
from Roosevelt to Durand laying out the case for Japan to give up the claim to an 
indemnity.  They held back from making this move until they had confirmed that 
the Japanese had already received an almost identical letter which Roosevelt had 
sent to Japan’s special envoy, Baron Kaneko Kentaro, presumably hoping to 
minimise any impression that they were applying pressure on their allies on behalf 
of the United States.116  It is doubtful that this gesture had any impact in the way of 
facilitating peace, but within a few days it would cease to matter; with the 
negotiations about to collapse, the Japanese unexpectedly conceded their deal-
breaking claim to an indemnity and forced the Russians into the position of having 
to accept the settlement.117 
The British reaction to the peace, though certainly tempered by feelings of 
relief, was largely one of surprise.  Most British policymakers had not expected the 
Japanese to back down, and there was a distinct feeling that they had given up 
more than they really needed to.118  The Foreign Office was quick, however, to try 
to demonstrate British gratification and to emphasise to the Americans that they 
had been fully behind Roosevelt in his endeavours for peace.  Lansdowne wrote to 
Durand asking him to express to the President how much the British Government 
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had appreciated the work he had done for peace and to attempt to relieve any 
‘disappointment’ he might feel, indicating some lingering anxiety amongst 
policymakers that American goodwill had been strained by the British refusal to 
cooperate.119  British policymakers were not, however, contrite or particularly 
apologetic, and Lansdowne still maintained that advice to Japan would have been 
poorly received and thus unwise from the British point of view.  Instead, he argued, 
the British Government had contributed to the peace process in its own way by 
simultaneously negotiating for the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.  The 
Foreign Secretary made the case that the knowledge that this arrangement would 
continue for another ten years had, ‘rendered it much easier for Japan to moderate 
her demands’.120 
 There is certainly some truth in British claims as to the impact of the renewal 
of the Alliance, as even Roosevelt somewhat grudgingly conceded.  It would thus be 
fair to conclude that Britain and the United States, though failing to work directly in 
tandem, had ultimately followed broadly parallel lines in pursuit of peace.121  Even 
so, there was a degree of uncertainty as to the state of British-American relations in 
the immediate aftermath of the war, which was not helped by Roosevelt’s 
continued emphasis on the help he had received from Kaiser Wilhelm in bringing 
about the peace.  Almost as soon as the Portsmouth treaty had been signed, the 
President had written to Spring Rice detailing the process by which this had come 
about and, as in earlier letters, expressing his appreciation for the efforts of the 
Kaiser: ‘he has acted like a trump.  He has done everything that he could to make 
the Czar yield and has backed me up in every way’.122  Although the failure of the 
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British, in Roosevelt’s eyes, to live up to this standard was left unsaid, the 
implication was clear.   
The apparent persistence of the American sense of pique over British 
conduct led British policymakers to give greater credence than they might 
otherwise have done to rumours that Roosevelt was suspicious of and ill-disposed 
towards the renewed Anglo-Japanese Alliance.123  Though there was no basis to 
such claims – Roosevelt had been consistently supportive of the arrangement prior 
to its publication and did not hesitate to express his approval when asked – there 
was evidently a feeling in London that some further effort was required to get 
British-American relations back on an even keel.124  Spring Rice took it upon himself 
to counteract any residual irritation, principally by massaging the President’s ego.  
In a series of letters to Edith Roosevelt, Spring Rice lauded without restraint 
Roosevelt’s personal role in bringing an end to the hostilities, concluding: ‘So you 
see that it is a fact beyond any question that the President single-handed effected 
the peace’.125  Whether this exercise in flattery had the desired impact is not 
entirely clear, but, in any case, Roosevelt did not dwell for long on the unwillingness 
of the British Government to work with him in securing peace.  In November 1905, 
the President assured Spring Rice that no hard feelings remained: ‘As to your own 
country I have never wavered.  I feel that England and the United States, beyond 
any other two powers, should be friendly with one another’.126 
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It would thus seem that in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War 
relations between London and Washington were in a markedly good way.  As Lionel 
Gelber has argued, in spite of friction in the build-up to the peace settlement, the 
British-American relationship emerged from the conflict stronger and more cordial 
than ever before.127  This was in large part because the war had facilitated a 
breakthrough, epitomised and furthered by the Spring Rice mission, in 
communication between the two powers.  Where previously the potential for frank 
exchanges of views had been somewhat circumscribed by the limitations of the 
official channels, now not only was communication through the embassies in 
London and Washington more candid but there was a range of informal outlets 
open to the two governments. 
On one level, this opening up of communication between the two powers 
allowed for greater freedom in the expression of ideological arguments, for 
example the references to Anglo-Saxon unity in correspondence between Roosevelt 
and King Edward VII.  Such ideas remained, however, limited to abstract discussion 
of the relationship between the powers, and did not creep into the dialogue over 
cooperation in East Asia.  Even more strikingly, the correspondence between Spring 
Rice and Roosevelt lost the ideological content which had previously characterised 
it as it made the transition from an informal exchange between friends to a 
supplementary, though essential, part of the official interaction between the two 
powers.  Overall, then, despite the significant increase in personal diplomacy and 
candid communication, ideas regarding race and civilisation remained markedly 
uncommon in British-American interaction over the Russo-Japanese War.  As this 
chapter has demonstrated, this can be partially accounted for by policymakers’ 
tactical engagement with ideology.  British policymakers explicitly dismissed 
interpretations of the war grounded in Yellow Peril thought, not least because such 
ideas conflicted with their agenda of highlighting Russia as the real danger.  The 
overt British scepticism regarding the Yellow Peril and ideological readings of the 
conflict in turn encouraged American policymakers to downplay this side of the 
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picture and distance their case for a swift end to the war and a balance of power 
from racial ideas. 
While the most significant development in British-American relations may 
have been an increase in intimacy due to improved communication, it is important 
to note that this change was not accompanied by practical cooperation with regard 
to East Asian affairs.  In the years prior to the Russo-Japanese War, Britain and the 
United States had refrained from working together, or indeed from intervening at 
all, in the Manchuria controversy, continuing the pre-established pattern of shared 
passivity in deference to global overstretch and domestic political needs 
respectively.  With the outbreak of hostilities in early 1904, the two powers 
assumed very similar positions, reflecting their shared interests, but did differ with 
regard to their perspectives on the unfolding conflict.  Both powers were broadly 
supportive of the Japanese, hoping that their victory might curtail Russian 
expansion and facilitate the return of Manchuria to Chinese sovereignty, but 
whereas the Americans expected Japan to triumph and feared the possible 
consequences of too comprehensive a victory, the British assumed that the 
Japanese would be defeated and thus worried chiefly about Russia’s future policy.   
This divergence did not disappear even once it became clear that Japan was 
the dominant power, and in fact it was compounded by the different visions which 
the two powers had for what cooperation between them should look like.  The 
British, desiring a more long-term and comprehensive approach to the problems of 
East Asia, sought a commitment from the United States to work together to defend 
Chinese integrity from the Russian threat at the end of the war.  Their efforts were 
unavailing, not because American policymakers were averse to cooperation per se, 
but because such an overt understanding would not have been acceptable from a 
domestic political point of view.  Instead, American policymakers looked for more 
limited and specific assistance from the British Government, requesting their 
intercession with Japan to facilitate peace talks and ensure the success of the 
resulting conference.  The British spurned American advances because to have 
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intervened in the manner suggested by Roosevelt might have jeopardised their 
relationship with the Japanese, thus undermining a global policy which was 
increasingly dependent on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 
As suggested above, in spite of this failure to cooperate, relations between 
Britain and the United States were decidedly healthy at the close of 1905, and the 
two powers were in a position to communicate with ease and frankness.  This 
strong foundation would be important in the years that followed, as East Asian 
affairs became a much more immediate concern in the United States with the 
advent of a string of immigration crises and Japanese-American war scares.  The 
various informal channels which were now available to policymakers and the 
experience of failed attempts to arrange cooperation would prove invaluable in 











The conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War went some way towards stabilising the 
situation in East Asia, but for the United States and Britain the respite was short-
lived.  The two powers were almost immediately confronted with a new problem 
with serious implications much closer to home in the form of a backlash against 
Japanese immigration to the Pacific Coast of North America.  This chapter charts the 
course of the Japanese immigration question from its beginnings as a local 
controversy over school segregation in San Francisco, through its evolution into an 
international crisis and spread to British Columbia, to the efforts to find a resolution 
through so-called ‘gentlemen’s agreements’.  It demonstrates that in spite of similar 
interests and attitudes towards the issue, Britain and the United States did not 
coordinate their responses to any significant degree.   
 This lack of a unified strategy was not for want of trying, as American 
policymakers were persistent in their efforts to arrange for a united front on the 
issue of immigration.  As had been the case during the Russo-Japanese War, 
however, British concern for the preservation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
represented a significant obstacle to British-American collaboration.  Another 
aspect of British global policy was also significant in the immigration crisis, however, 
as the opposition to Japanese immigration was located not in Britain itself but in the 
Dominions, and specifically Canada.  The British Government was intent on 
maintaining strong ties within the Empire, a concern which American policymakers 
hoped to exploit in order to win British support.  Ultimately, however, the Canadian 
connection would prove equally as ineffectual as direct American pressure in 
bringing about cooperation between Britain and the United States. 
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 A major part of the reason that Japanese immigration was such an emotive 
and difficult problem for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic to deal with was 
its inextricable connection to the issue of race.  Not only was the immigration issue 
bound up with notions of Yellow Peril and stereotyped images of East Asians, but 
Anglo-Saxonism also fed in to the debate, with a transnational campaign for the 
preservation of ‘white men’s countries’ emerging throughout the English-speaking 
world.  This chapter makes the case that such ideas played a considerably less 
significant role in British-American interaction than might be expected, due in part 
to the pronounced reluctance of policymakers to engage overtly with the ideology 
of exclusionism.  As a number of historians have suggested, awareness of Japanese 
power and military clout encouraged statesmen to employ more moderate 
language than they might otherwise have done in discussing the immigration issue, 
and the tendency to avoid or minimise the racial aspect of the question is certainly 
in evidence in American attempts to secure British backing for a common approach 
to Japanese immigration.1  This chapter will also highlight, however, the important 
role played by context and audience in policymakers’ tactical calculations, as 
American interactions with Canadian figures differed markedly from those with the 
British in terms of engagement with racial ideology. 
 In addition to being racially-charged, the Japanese immigration question was 
an especially explosive one on account of its potentially serious implications on the 
international stage.  The possibility of conflict arising from the immigration crisis, 
which fuelled the perennial ‘war scares’ of the years between 1905 and 1914, will 
be dealt with in a separate chapter, however, the focus here being purely on the 
question of immigration itself.  Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind 
throughout that this was a controversy fraught with the direst of repercussions, 
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which had to be handled with great urgency but also with the utmost care; there 
was no room for mistakes. 
Pacific Coast opposition to Japanese immigration was not simply a by-
product of the Russo-Japanese War, though Japan’s victories in the conflict 
undoubtedly served to intensify and awaken latent popular anxieties.  The 
movement for the exclusion of the Japanese had deep roots in the tradition of 
agitation against the Chinese, and its central pillar was the oft-heard cry of ‘unfair 
competition’.  Since Oriental labourers were supposed, on account of their inherent 
inferiority, to subsist at a level which was intolerable to white men, exclusionists 
claimed that their presence would inevitably drive down wages and diminish the 
standard of living.2  Alongside this objection on grounds of inferiority, the Japanese 
were also contradictorily singled out as a menace to white workers on the basis that 
they were in certain respects superior, or at least better equipped for economic 
competition, on account of racial characteristics such as industry, thrift and 
discipline.3  This latter aspect of exclusionist rhetoric posited Japanese immigrants 
as a threat not only to the labouring classes with whom they were in direct 
competition but to the entire structure of white social and economic dominance.  
The ambitious and capable Japanese, in contrast to the docile ‘Chinaman’, would 
not long be content to remain a subject population and would ultimately mount a 
challenge for control of the land itself.4   
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Anxiety over the ‘colonisation’ of territory in the United States and the 
British Dominions by Asian immigrants came together with Anglo-Saxonist notions 
of unity and superiority in the rhetoric of ‘white men’s countries’.  Proponents of 
this ideology throughout the English-speaking world were driven by the conviction 
that the exclusion of all non-white peoples was essential to the preservation not 
only of white dominance in the particular areas at risk, but ultimately of Anglo-
Saxon or Western civilisation throughout the globe.5  They drew on the principles of 
Social Darwinism, which posited a basic struggle for existence between diverse 
peoples, and the theory that racial homogeneity was a prerequisite for democratic 
institutions, an important tenet of Progressive social thought.6  The most basic 
premise of the ideology, however, was a fundamental piece of racial common sense 
shared throughout the English-speaking world: the assumption that it was 
impossible for Asians to assimilate and become part of a majority white society.7  It 
was this widely-held conviction that Japanese immigrants were fundamentally 
unassimilable which prompted the incident which would propel anti-Japanese 
exclusionism from a regional phenomenon to a problem of international 
significance: the San Francisco school segregation crisis. 
San Francisco was the initial epicentre of Pacific Coast anti-Japanese feeling, 
owing in large part to a sustained newspaper campaign for exclusion, beginning in 
early 1905, and the tensions unleashed by an earthquake which swept through the 
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city in April 1906.8  In October of the same year, the San Francisco School Board 
passed a ruling that Japanese children were to be taught separately from white 
children, in line with the regulations already in place for the Chinese and other 
theoretically unassimilable ‘Mongolian’ peoples.  This move provoked an outcry in 
Japan and prompted the Japanese Government to raise an official protest against 
the segregation order on the basis that it violated the treaty rights of their citizens, 
singling them out for unequal treatment on the basis of race.9  President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s initial response was to attempt to mollify the Japanese, meanwhile 
sending his Secretary of Commerce and Labour, Victor Metcalf, to California to 
ascertain the facts and communicate directly Roosevelt’s deep disapproval of the 
discrimination and ‘discourtesy’.10  Roosevelt also combined appeasement of the 
Japanese with chastisement of the Californians in his December 1906 Message to 
Congress, in which he sang the praises of the Japanese people, referred to the 
school segregation order as a ‘wicked absurdity’ and even went so far as to 
recommend legislation allowing for the naturalisation of Japanese residents of the 
United States.11 
 Roosevelt’s efforts to conciliate the Japanese do appear to have paid 
dividends on a diplomatic level, but the more marked effect of his intervention was 
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to deeply antagonise the Californians, which was unfortunate given that their 
cooperation would be essential to the resolution of the crisis.12  American officials 
were forced to admit that school segregation was not a black-and-white violation of 
treaty rights and that a legal case was therefore likely to rest on rather shaky 
ground.13  Thus unable to simply force a reversal of the segregation order, 
Roosevelt was compelled to come up with an alternative plan of action which would 
put an end to the overt discrimination whilst at the same time satisfying the 
Californians.  The President’s answer to this conundrum was to attempt to tackle 
the problem at its root by addressing the high level of Japanese labour immigration, 
the hope being that if this were significantly reduced it would spell an end to the 
mistreatment of those Japanese already living on the West Coast.  The U.S. 
Government thus began to pursue a treaty for the reciprocal exclusion of labourers, 
the rationale being that such an arrangement would be unobjectionable to Japan as 
it was not overtly discriminatory.14 
 Roosevelt wasted little time in setting out his take on the immigration 
question and his plan for reciprocal exclusion to the British, writing candidly about 
the issue to Foreign Secretary Edward Grey in December 1906.15  Late 1906 was 
something of a high-point for communication between the British and American 
Governments, as Roosevelt had at long last achieved his goal of displacing the 
unsatisfactory Ambassador Durand, largely through the efforts of a number of 
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influential British friends, including Conservative politician Arthur Lee.  It was in part 
by Lee’s orchestration also that Roosevelt was able to communicate directly with 
Grey, a vast improvement from the President’s point of view after his struggle to 
get his views across to Lord Lansdowne during the Russo-Japanese War.16  Though 
Roosevelt did observe, somewhat ambiguously, that the immigration issue was 
‘only one phase of the race question’, the burden of his letter to Grey was that 
reciprocal exclusion of labourers was necessary because although Japanese and 
American ‘gentlemen’ were able to meet on terms of equality it would be 
unreasonable to expect white workingmen to tolerate an influx of Japanese 
competitors, or vice versa.17   
Roosevelt would make similar arguments throughout the controversy, 
leading historian Michael Cullinane to conclude that Roosevelt was not himself 
swayed by the racial aspect of the immigration question but believed that the 
labouring classes of the two nations were yet to reach a stage of cultivation where 
they were able to overcome their colour prejudice and harmoniously co-exist, 
necessitating the exclusion of Japanese labourers essentially for reasons of ‘class’.18  
It is worth noting, however, that a number of the key examples of Roosevelt making 
this ‘class’-focused case are found in communications with Japanese statesmen, in 
which he obviously had a vested interest in taking a race-neutral line in order to 
minimise offence.19  Rather than simply offering an insight into Roosevelt’s personal 
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views, then, the ‘class’ argument appears to have been a deliberate tactic to 
understate the racial aspect of the question so as to present exclusion as a practical 
rather than a discriminatory measure.  A similar, though slightly less nuanced, 
argument was regularly employed by a variety of key figures in the U.S. and Canada, 
who would claim that the immigration crisis was a matter of simple economics 
rather than race; labourers on the Pacific Coast resented the influx of competition 
rather than the presence of Japanese immigrants per se.20 
By utilising this argument of ‘class’ in his letter to Grey, Roosevelt appears to 
have been trying to downplay the racial side of his proposed reciprocal exclusion 
policy.  Though his immediate purpose for doing so is not entirely clear, further 
comments – both in this letter to Grey and in another to Spectator editor John St 
Loe Strachey – regarding the similarity of his Californian predicament with the 
British position in Canada and Australia suggest that Roosevelt hoped to win British 
sympathy for his approach to the immigration problem, perhaps foreseeing that 
their influence with Tokyo might prove useful in future.21 
It soon became apparent that American hopes for a treaty of reciprocal 
exclusion were decidedly optimistic.  The Japanese had serious objections to such a 
proposal, including the rather obvious point that with no corresponding influx of 
American labour to Japan the proposal was hardly reciprocal in practice.  The State 
Department grasped for additional quid pro quos to offer, such as the allowance for 
naturalisation already mooted by the President, but Japanese leaders were simply 
not prepared to countenance a formal agreement of the kind the Americans 
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wanted.22  Instead, Japanese and American statesmen came to a tentative 
understanding in February 1907 which became known as the Gentlemen’s 
Agreement.  This arrangement would evolve somewhat over the course of the 
following year, but it initially entailed three major elements: an end to 
discriminatory treatment of the Japanese on the Pacific Coast, American legislation 
to restrict onward immigration from Hawaii and the voluntary limitation of 
emigration by the Japanese Government.  This solution, which was instigated by the 
Japanese themselves, required minimal action from Tokyo beyond denying passport 
requests to labourers wishing to travel to the United States.  The onus was rather 
on the American Government to ensure the reversal of the San Francisco school 
segregation order, a feat Roosevelt achieved largely by appealing to the egos of 
local politicians, and to reorder its relations with Hawaii in such a way as to close 
the loophole responsible for a significant proportion of the overall immigration.23 
 Though not especially gratifying, the Gentlemen’s Agreement was, from the 
point of view of the Japanese Government, a reasonable resolution of the situation.  
The arrangement dealt with the overt discrimination without publicly committing 
Tokyo to anything embarrassing or incompatible with the nation’s interests, 
especially considering that Japanese policymakers preferred for labourers to 
emigrate to mainland Asia rather than the U.S. anyway.24  American policymakers, 
on the other hand, though relieved that a workable solution had been found, saw 
the understanding merely as a temporary expedient and continued to hope that an 
agreement for reciprocal exclusion might be possible once the San Francisco furore 
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died down.25  The unrest on the Pacific Coast did not dissipate, however, and the 
Roosevelt administration found itself having to stave off offensive Californian 
legislation as well as violent anti-Asian outbursts and discrimination against 
Japanese business owners in San Francisco.26  These troubles dramatically 
illustrated that the immigration settlement was not only unfit for purpose, in that it 
quite evidently had not satisfied the residents of the Pacific Coast, but also 
inherently fragile.  The arrangement was entirely contingent on the good behaviour 
of the Californians and the patience of Japanese leaders, neither of which could be 
relied on with any great certainty given the strained circumstances. 
 It was against this backdrop that interaction between the American and 
British Governments in the first half of 1907 took place.  Though Roosevelt 
indicated to Grey that the February 1907 negotiations had addressed the ‘acute 
phase’ of the problem, he also somewhat ominously commented that they were 
‘not quite out of the woods yet’.27  The President’s communications with the British 
increasingly pressed the point of the similarity between the situation in California 
and that facing Canada and the other British Dominions on the Pacific.28  Opinion in 
Britain was, broadly speaking, not particularly sympathetic to the claims of the 
Californians or the desire of the United States Government to exclude Japanese 
labour, and Roosevelt’s repeated assertions that the British Empire was effectively 
in the same boat were evidently intended to counter these negative assessments of 
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the American position.29  Elihu Root, the U.S. Secretary of State, took a rather 
different approach to the same basic objective, seeking to justify to Esme Howard, 
the British Chargé d’Affaires in Washington, the extent of the anxiety and emotion 
which the issue of Japanese immigration aroused: ‘To the Californian workman the 
exclusion of Japanese labour was really a question of life or death.  An increase of 
Japanese immigration into that State would end in pacific conquest’.30  This was not 
the only occasion on which Root expressed this fear – drawn from writers such as 
Charles Pearson and Gustave Le Bon, and a mainstay of ‘white men’s country’ 
rhetoric – that immigrants from Asia would prove an irresistible force, swamping 
the coast, creating ‘colonies’ of their own and pushing out the white man before 
them.31  It is very unusual, however, to find such an example of an overtly 
ideological, and essentially racial, argument in official interaction between Britain 
and the United States.  One possible explanation, which is supported by references 
elsewhere in Howard’s report to the possibility of war, is that in warning of a 
‘peaceful invasion’, Root was attempting to communicate the extent of American 
apprehension without resorting to the alarmist rumours of actual conflict between 
Japan and the U.S. which, as the next chapter will explore, American policymakers 
were intent on playing down at this point in time. 
 It is clear that American policymakers wished to keep the problem of 
Japanese immigration at the forefront of British thinking, perhaps in the hope that 
this might facilitate some form of intervention should the situation deteriorate.  The 
extent to which these efforts succeeded in increasing British concern over the 
California situation is not clear, but there was certainly no decline in British 
attention to the issue.  Throughout 1907, British representatives in the U.S. and 
Japan provided detailed updates of events and discussed the possibilities for further 
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tension arising, and during the summer the question began to take on even greater 
significance as a result of rising anti-Japanese sentiment in British Columbia.32  
Ironically, this development may have been an indirect result of the Gentlemen’s 
Agreement, as the outcry was chiefly a response to a sudden influx of Japanese 
labourers from Hawaii which had occurred in the wake of the new American 
legislation.33  Mounting tensions came to a head in early September 1907, when an 
anti-Asian riot broke out in Vancouver. 
The Vancouver riot, in which a mob marched on the Chinese and Japanese 
areas of the city, was an offshoot of an ostensibly peaceful parade held to promote 
the cause of Asian exclusion.  This event is often cited as typical of the transnational 
nature of the exclusionist movement, with participants coming from Asiatic 
exclusion organisations across the Pacific Coast of the U.S., as well as from Australia 
and New Zealand.34  Canadian and British officials were quick to latch on to the 
international aspect of the proceedings, claiming that the violence had been 
inspired and organised by American agitators and was thus not at all reflective of 
Canadian sentiments.35  This was, as Patricia Roy has suggested, probably little more 
than a convenient fiction, but the American response to the Vancouver riot can only 
have served to cement the impression.  The British Ambassador at Washington, 
James Bryce, reported back to the Foreign Office that he could not absolutely 
confirm the rumours of American inspiration, but that there was certainly a degree 
of satisfaction in the U.S. that the British, having taken something of a 
condescending tone over the California situation, were now similarly 
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embarrassed.36  This sense of schadenfreude was very much shared by the 
American Ambassador in London, Whitelaw Reid, who wrote gleefully of the ‘most 
amusing revolution in the English point of view’ to Roosevelt’s wife, Edith: ‘This 
morning they are rubbing their eyes in a dazed sort of way, and discovering that 
they are themselves a good deal deeper in the mire than we are.’37   
Roosevelt did not need the encouragement of Andrew Carnegie – who urged 
the President to let the British take the initiative and ‘draw the enemy’s fire’ – to 
see the value of the British being sucked into the Japanese immigration problem.  
He wrote frankly to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of the good effect the outbreak 
would have in demonstrating to both the British and the Japanese that the rejection 
of Oriental labour immigration was unanimous between the West Coast of the 
United States and the British Pacific Dominions.38  As already noted, Roosevelt had 
been preparing the ground on this point for nearly a year, and indeed he heard of 
the Vancouver riot midway through writing yet another letter to Strachey 
discoursing on the similarity of the British and American situations.  Armed with 
knowledge of the new development, he ended his missive:  
It is idle to blind ourselves to the fact that the English-speaking 
commonwealths of the seacoasts on the Pacific will not submit to the 
unchecked immigration of Asiatics, that they ought not to be asked to 
submit to it, and that if asked they will refuse.39 
Though this comment does imply a degree of sympathy with the opposition of 
Pacific Coast residents to Japanese immigration, the thrust of Roosevelt’s 
comments was not so much that their opposition was justified but that it would be 
unreasonable and unproductive for the American and British Governments to 
attempt to force the issue.  This again is a largely race-neutral argument, centred on 
                                                           
36 J. Bryce to E. Grey, September 14th 1907, FO 410/50, TNA; Roy, A White Man’s Province, pp.195-
196. 
37 W. Reid to E.C. Roosevelt, September 10th 1907, Reel 103, Whitelaw Reid Papers, Reid Family 
Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. [hereafter Reid MS]; W. Reid to E. 
Root, September 10th 1907, Reel 103, Reid MS. 
38 A. Carnegie to T. Roosevelt, September 11th 1907, Reel 77, Roosevelt MS; T. Roosevelt to H.C. 
Lodge, September 11th 1907, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p.790; Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the 
Japanese-American Crises, p.254; Neu, An Uncertain Friendship, p.147; Tilchin, Theodore Roosevelt 
and the British Empire, pp.173-174. 
39 T. Roosevelt to J.S. Strachey, September 8th 1907, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, pp.786-788. 
138 
 
practical politics rather than the ideological side of the question, which Roosevelt 
presumably favoured on the assumption that this angle would appeal more to the 
British mind than an overtly racial line of reasoning.40 
If the British were, as Reid attested, waking up to the fact that they were 
now in the same boat as the United States, there is no evidence to suggest that they 
were at all gratified by American eagerness to face the problem of Japanese 
immigration in concert.  British policymakers approached the issue of immigration, 
much as they had the Russo-Japanese War, with the maintenance of Japanese 
goodwill and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a very clear priority.41  Though they 
therefore preferred to maintain as much distance between themselves and this 
delicate question as possible, the need to cultivate close links with the various parts 
of the Empire was also a pertinent consideration.  Prior to the violence in 
Vancouver, London had taken the characteristically passive approach of leaving 
Dominion Governments to handle the matter independently but encouraging them 
to opt for legislation which was not overtly discriminatory, such as the literary test 
which became known as the ‘Natal Act’.  They hoped in this way to be able to 
reconcile the somewhat conflicting goals of ensuring that the minimum of offence 
was caused to their allies and of appearing supportive of the needs and concerns of 
the Dominions.  The escalation of the situation in British Columbia exposed the 
inadequacy of this approach, but, initially at least, British policy retained a strong 
emphasis on staying aloof.42 
The Canadian Government was thus left mostly to its own devices to craft a 
response to the violence at Vancouver.  Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier and his 
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colleagues opted for an approach similar to that which the Roosevelt administration 
had adopted when faced with the San Francisco school crisis; rather than heeding 
the angry cries from British Columbia, Laurier instead prioritised placating Japan.   
To this end, he sent a representative, Deputy Minister for Labour William L. 
Mackenzie King, to British Columbia, ostensibly to assess compensation for 
Japanese losses but also to inquire into the broader problem of Asian immigration.43  
The next phase of the Canadian response to Vancouver also echoed the American 
approach, as they attempted to cut off the agitation at its source by stemming the 
flow of Japanese immigrants.  The Canadian Government was bound by the 1894 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which did not allow for the 
restriction of immigration, and Laurier had no intention of losing the commercial 
advantages which this agreement afforded, meaning that formal exclusion was 
never really an option.  It was decided instead that the Minister for Labour, 
Rodolphe Lemieux, should travel to Japan to negotiate a settlement along similar 
lines to the Gentlemen’s Agreement, whereby Japan would voluntarily restrict 
labour emigration to Canada.44   
Around the same time that Lemieux’s visit to Japan was being planned, the 
U.S. Government was engaging in some informal diplomacy of its own.  In 
September and October 1907, William Howard Taft, the Secretary of War and 
Roosevelt’s expected successor, went on a tour of East Asia and the Philippines, 
including a brief visit to Japan.  Though the visit had no official purpose, Taft was of 
one mind with the President that a treaty of reciprocal exclusion remained the most 
desirable solution to the immigration problem, and he therefore tested the water 
informally with the Japanese as to whether the moment had come to pursue 
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further negotiations to this end.45  The feeling had been growing within the State 
Department that the existing system was wholly inadequate, not least because the 
immigration of Japanese labourers had actually increased in the preceding months, 
and that some alternative arrangement would soon become essential.46  Taft’s 
various conversations with key figures in the Japanese Government served chiefly 
to confirm, however, that the Japanese remained entirely unwilling to consider a 
treaty of reciprocal exclusion.  The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hayashi 
Tadasu, assured Taft and the new American Ambassador, Thomas O’Brien, that 
every effort was being made to reduce immigration to both the Pacific Coast and 
Hawaii, and Taft reasoned that the U.S. must take them at their word.  During these 
conversations, Taft did suggest, however, that it might be necessary to do more 
than simply ‘tide over matters and maintain the status quo’.  This warning of the 
need for a more effective solution was the prelude to the next phase of the 
Gentlemen’s Agreement, which would take the form of a more rigorous delineation 
of the administrative measures Japan would adopt to prevent emigration of 
labourers to the Pacific Coast.47 
It was with this objective of tightening up the Gentlemen’s Agreement in 
mind that American policymakers began to think more seriously about the 
possibility of obtaining British support.  Third Assistant Secretary of State Francis M. 
Huntington Wilson, whose experience as a diplomat in Japan meant that he took a 
fairly prominent role in the State Department’s response to the immigration crisis, 
noted that, ‘this occasion, when the immigration question has become acute 
between Japan and Great Britain, is a most happy one for us to accomplish 
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something.’48  Huntington Wilson advised keeping in close touch with the British 
over immigration matters, and Lemieux’s mission specifically, in order to ‘gain their 
influence upon their ally and so their help to us in dealing with our own immigration 
question with Japan.’49  The Roosevelt administration was evidently determined to 
take advantage of the Canadian mission to this end, to the point that the State 
Department rushed through the compilation of suggestions for administrative 
changes in order that their receipt by Ambassador O’Brien would coincide with the 
arrival of Lemieux in Japan in mid-November 1907.50  Roosevelt and Root also 
encouraged O’Brien to make use in his discussions with the Japanese of the fact 
that, ‘their staunchest ally, England, is in precisely the same position; that her 
colonies British Columbia, New Zealand, and the Australian commonwealths take 
precisely the same position as our own Pacific Coast States take’.51  
It is worth noting that despite these efforts to make capital out of British 
involvement in the immigration question, American statesmen did not follow 
Huntington Wilson’s advice to its logical conclusion and communicate directly with 
the British.  Roosevelt did keep up his regular stream of letters casually highlighting 
the similarity of the British and American positions on the matter of Japanese 
immigration, but Ambassador Bryce noted that neither the President nor his 
Secretary of State raised the matter with him directly.52  The thinking behind this 
surprising omission is not entirely clear, but later interactions do suggest a degree 
of reluctance on the part of American policymakers to address the possibility of 
British-American cooperation over immigration head-on for fear of putting the 
British in a difficult position vis-à-vis their allies.  In this instance, it would also 
appear that despite American policymakers’ unabashed desire to reap the benefits 
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of British and Canadian involvement, the Roosevelt administration actually had 
certain reservations about a genuinely cooperative approach to negotiations with 
Japan.  For example, Roosevelt and Root were at pains to make sure Ambassador 
O’Brien understood that they would not be satisfied with a carbon copy of the 
Canadian agreement if such an arrangement did not entail the stringent restriction 
they required.53  In other words, American policymakers wanted the impression of a 
united front to make the Japanese more tractable, but were not prepared for the 
outcome of the negotiations to be determined or limited by Canadian needs.  
The questionable American commitment to cooperation in the cause of 
limiting immigration did not, however, detract from the expectations of 
policymakers in Washington that they would receive assistance from the Canadians 
on a practical level.  They were therefore nonplussed when O’Brien’s efforts to 
ingratiate himself with Lemieux and his party were rebuffed and the Canadian 
delegation refused even to share information with the U.S. Embassy.  When 
Roosevelt later discussed this matter with Mackenzie King, the Canadian politician 
attempted to explain away the lack of cooperation as a matter of 
miscommunication, Lemieux having had no instructions authorising him to work 
with the American Ambassador, rather than an intentional snub.54  The reality, 
however, is that Lemieux acted very deliberately in denying the Americans even the 
notional cooperation for which they were hoping.  The Canadian view appears to 
have been that being yoked to the United States would hinder rather than help 
their cause, and that even the impression of coordinated action might work to their 
disadvantage with the Japanese.55 
This attitude probably stemmed in part from the Canadian belief that their 
negotiating position was stronger than that of the United States as a result of earlier 
informal assurances regarding the restriction of labour emigration to British 
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Columbia.  Lemieux’s central objective was to convince the Japanese Government 
to openly endorse these assurances in the hope that this show of good faith would 
convince the Canadian Parliament and the people of British Columbia that the 
immigration issue could be satisfactorily dealt with by diplomatic means, without 
the need for further legislation.56  The Japanese, however, denied that the 
assurances cited by the Canadian mission were in any way binding, and although 
they were entirely content to maintain the policy of strictly limiting labour 
emigration to Canada they refused to risk a popular backlash by offering anything 
more than confidential guarantees.  This basic disconnect in the positions of the 
two sides, which effectively came down to their conflicting political needs, caused a 
certain amount of delay in the negotiations.  Though the basis of an arrangement 
was worked out in early December 1907, it was not until January 1908, after 
Lemieux had returned to Canada for consultation, that the matter was actually 
settled. 57  The Lemieux Agreement was, in practical terms, very similar to the 
Gentlemen’s Agreement, the one main difference being that the Japanese 
Government, in deference to Canadian pressure for a specific quota, offered a 
secret and informal assurance that it did not expect the annual immigration figure 
to rise above 400.58 
Though the Lemieux mission was very much a Canadian initiative, the British 
Government was keen for it to succeed, and supported Canadian efforts to broker a 
solution.  The British Ambassador at Tokyo, Claude MacDonald, had instructions to 
work with Lemieux in putting Canadian proposals before the Japanese Government, 
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and his efforts appear to have played an important part in the success of the 
undertaking.59  The desire to avoid offending the Japanese remained a major 
priority for the British, however, and MacDonald raised concerns that in working 
with the Canadians to secure the effective exclusion of Japanese labourers they 
were on somewhat dangerous ground.  The British Ambassador’s issue was less 
with the actual goal of the negotiations – indeed he had been the one to suggest 
that the British Government should support Lemieux’s efforts – than with the kind 
of language and ideas which the Canadians used in relation to the immigration 
question.  Specifically, he fretted that the Canadians were overly influenced by 
racist notions of a ‘peaceful invasion’, after this possibility was raised by Laurier and 
echoed by the British representative in Canada, Governor General Albert Grey.60  
MacDonald was frankly shocked at these expressions, warning the Foreign 
Secretary:  
Were the Japanese Government to know the expressed opinions of the 
Governor-General and Premier of Canada as to the conversion of British 
Columbia into a “yellow province” by quiet and systematic “invasion” by 
Japanese the relations between Canada and Japan would be the reverse of 
happy.61   
The British Ambassador’s almost panicked reaction to the Canadians’ use of racial 
ideology is telling, suggesting that the emotive language of ‘white men’s country’ 
rhetoric was both unexpected and unwelcome in the context of diplomatic 
interchange. 
Whereas MacDonald had reservations about risking Japanese goodwill by 
involving the British Government too heavily in the immigration controversy, in 
Washington, Bryce was actively seeking to insert himself into the question in some 
way.  In January 1908 he wrote both to Ottawa and to London implying that there 
might be potential for him to act as an intermediary between Canada and the 
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United States as each country sought to settle the matter with the Japanese.62  
Though Edward Grey did, in response to Bryce’s suggestion of facilitating 
cooperation, express the hope that the settlement between Canada and Japan 
would smooth the way for the United States, he was not amenable to any 
intervention on Bryce’s part, and it is evident that British policymakers retained a 
distinct aversion to becoming embroiled in the Japanese-American immigration 
dispute.63  Even Bryce’s alternative proposal that the Canadians might assist the 
Americans by sharing the confidential details of the Lemieux Agreement did not 
come to fruition, though in this case the issue was Canadian rather than British 
objections.  Policymakers in Ottawa remained dubious about any level of 
coordination with the United States, apparently fearing that this might sour 
relations with Japan and thus put the immigration settlement at risk.64 
Ambassador O’Brien was consequently left without external support in his 
attempt to negotiate a more rigorous system of emigration restriction with the 
Japanese Government.  The Roosevelt administration hoped that new 
administrative measures on the part of Japan would address the perceived 
deficiencies of the initial Gentlemen’s Agreement and quiet the calls on the Pacific 
Coast for unilateral exclusion legislation.65  Japanese policymakers were disinclined 
to acquiesce completely to American demands, however, fearing a popular backlash 
against concessions on the immigration issue.  Though O’Brien and the Japanese 
negotiators did arrive at a workable compromise in February 1908, policymakers in 
Washington were far from entirely convinced by the outcome.66  Root instructed 
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the Ambassador to thank the Japanese for their efforts in finding a solution, but 
cautioned that the proof of the pudding would be in the immigration statistics and, 
moreover, that the effectiveness of the arrangement was dependent, ‘solely upon a 
continued and sincere determination and constant circumspection by the Japanese 
Government’.67 
Root’s comments on the updated Gentlemen’s Agreement are indicative of 
the suspicion of the Japanese Government which characterised official American 
discussions of the immigration question throughout 1908.  Policymakers in 
Washington exhibited significant anxiety that the Japanese might fail to live up to 
their pledges and decline to enforce the regulations limiting emigration to the 
Pacific Coast.  There was a general lack of faith within the Roosevelt administration 
regarding the sincerity of the Japanese, perhaps influenced to some degree by the 
common stereotype of Orientals as inherently dishonest and untrustworthy, and 
the received wisdom was that Tokyo would need to be constantly badgered into 
following through on promises.68  American suspicion was fuelled by the slow 
decline of the immigration figures, and Roosevelt himself was assiduous in tracking 
the monthly statistics and appraising the State Department of his concerns as to the 
sluggishness with which the newly finalised Gentlemen’s Agreement was taking 
effect.69   
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Apprehension lest the Japanese might be, as Bryce put it, ‘playing fast and 
loose’, was not shared by British policymakers, who were confident that the 
Japanese Government could be relied upon to honour its pledges.70  Officials in 
Ottawa were considerably less optimistic, however, and Canadian policymakers fell 
victim to many of the same doubts and suspicions as the Americans.  Specifically, as 
immigration figures remained high in early 1908, the Canadian authorities felt that 
their hard-won ‘quota’ of 400 immigrants per-annum was being disregarded by the 
Japanese Government.  As the Japanese and Ambassador MacDonald laboured to 
explain, these immigrants fell outside the terms of the Lemieux Agreement, having 
obtained passports prior to its negotiation.  Nevertheless, Laurier and his colleagues 
took this oversight as a sign of bad faith.71   
The anxiety of Canadian and American policymakers over indications of 
apparent Japanese dilatoriness in holding up their end of the bargain was 
particularly acute because they feared being forced to take more drastic action in 
the direction of exclusion.  Popular feeling on the West Coast was still decidedly 
unsatisfied; in February 1908 the Canadian Government had to disallow 
discriminatory British Columbian immigration legislation, while the following month 
a bill was introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives calling for the 
extension of the Chinese Exclusion laws to the Japanese.72  The shared 
apprehension in Washington and Ottawa that the Japanese Government would fail 
to deliver a significant reduction in immigration prompted a venture in informal 
diplomacy centred on Mackenzie King, the young and ambitious Canadian politician 
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who had cut his teeth dealing with the situation on the ground in Vancouver.  At the 
instigation of a mutual friend, businessman John James McCook, Mackenzie King 
travelled to Washington to meet with Roosevelt in late January 1908.  The Canadian 
would then return for further talks on two occasions, before crossing the Atlantic to 
consult with key figures in the British Government on the immigration question.73  
While McCook’s involvement as an intermediary is well established, it is 
considerably less clear where the initial suggestion for a meeting between 
Mackenzie King and Roosevelt came from, chiefly because the recollections of the 
two protagonists are markedly conflicting.   
From the point of view of American policymakers, Mackenzie King’s visit to 
Washington represented a deliberate Canadian initiative for joint action on 
Japanese immigration.  Roosevelt gathered that the Canadians were dissatisfied 
with the laxity of the Japanese Government in knowingly issuing too many 
passports and hoped to secure American aid in convincing the British Government 
of the continuing seriousness of the situation on the Pacific Coast.74  Mackenzie 
King, on the other hand, claimed that he believed the immigration question to have 
been effectively settled by the Lemieux Agreement and that he had gone to 
Washington with no particular agenda in mind.75  He was adamant that Roosevelt 
had been the one to instigate the meeting, later telling Edward Grey that it had 
been, ‘due entirely to the President’s initiative, which had been so pressing as to be 
a little embarrassing.’76 
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Neither version of events is entirely trustworthy.  For example, Mackenzie 
King’s assertion that the Canadians were completely satisfied with the immigration 
settlement was distinctly disingenuous; if nothing else, his own experiences in 
Vancouver had convinced him that more would need to be done to address the 
issue.77  Roosevelt’s claim that the Canadian had come to Washington solely at 
Laurier’s behest and not in response to an American invitation is even more 
suspect, however, and it would seem that the President was at the very least the 
more active party in arranging the rendezvous.78  Roosevelt’s reasons for wishing to 
discuss the immigration question with Mackenzie King are fairly apparent in the 
latter’s account of the initial meeting.  Mackenzie King noted in his diary that 
Roosevelt had mooted the possibility of a Canadian mission to London with a view 
to convincing the British Government to intervene with the Japanese and encourage 
them to ensure that every effort was made to keep Pacific Coast immigration to a 
minimum.  He highlighted Roosevelt’s eagerness to communicate his views to 
Edward Grey and his proposition that Mackenzie King could pass on ‘some strong 
messages’ as to what was required from Japan if he were to visit England: ‘Britain is 
her ally, a word thro’ her ambassador, spoken in a friendly way to an ally, assuring 
her of the feeling might go far.’79 
Roosevelt’s suggestion that the British Government might intervene with 
Japan on behalf of both Canada and the United States was the logical culmination of 
his long-running campaign to convince policymakers in London that Japanese 
immigration was a shared problem.  What is interesting is that he chose to pursue 
this project indirectly through an informal channel rather than being upfront with 
the British about his wishes.  Roosevelt was insistent that Mackenzie King’s visit to 
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Britain had not been an American initiative, but had actually been suggested by the 
Canadians.  Though he freely admitted in a letter to Arthur Lee that he had spoken 
of the desirability of cooperation between Washington and London to hold the 
Japanese to their pledges, Roosevelt plainly implied that the initial idea for the 
mission had been Laurier’s.80  Indeed, this would become a point of some sensitivity 
for the Americans, who vehemently denied that Mackenzie King went anywhere at 
the behest of the White House.  In London, Whitelaw Reid was particularly zealous 
in correcting anyone, most notably Edward Grey, who thought of the Canadian 
politician as ‘another American Ambassador’.81 
There are two sides to Roosevelt’s preference for working through 
Mackenzie King and attempting to downplay his own involvement in the Canadian’s 
mission to Britain.  In the first place, it suited the President’s consistent narrative – 
that the British Dominions felt at least as strongly about Japanese immigration as 
Americans on the West Coast did – to give the impression that the whole enterprise 
was driven by Canadian anxieties.  He evidently believed that British policymakers 
would be more receptive to apprehensions of the Japanese reneging on their 
engagements if such concerns were raised by the Canadians rather than by 
himself.82  There is also, however, evidence that Roosevelt had some reservations 
about directly broaching the possibility of intervention at Tokyo with the British.  On 
more than one occasion, Ambassador Bryce noted that the President was very 
careful, even though what he hoped for was quite evident, to avoid explicitly asking 
for British assistance.83  Roosevelt also mentioned his hesitance about addressing 
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the subject openly with the British to Mackenzie King: ‘I cannot write, he added, for 
that would be misunderstood.  You know why we cannot write on these things.’84 
In seeking to explain why Roosevelt was so reluctant to approach the British 
directly on matters of immigration, historians Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds 
have suggested that the President did not have a particularly good relationship with 
Bryce and did not believe that he could accomplish anything by working through 
him.85   This seems unlikely given the long-standing and close personal friendship 
between the two men, but Bryce’s correspondence does indicate that he found the 
whole Mackenzie King episode rather difficult to navigate because of the great 
irregularity of the proceedings, and Roosevelt may have steered clear of the subject 
of immigration as requiring a much more off-the-record approach than Bryce was 
comfortable with.86  Probably more significant than Bryce’s character, however, was 
the President’s experience of seeking British assistance during the Russo-Japanese 
War.  Roosevelt’s forthright requests for the British to urge moderation on Japan 
had been consistently rebuffed, injecting an element of tension into otherwise 
friendly relations, and it is likely that he was keen to avoid a repeat of this.  Working 
informally through the Canadians allowed Roosevelt to avoid openly putting 
pressure on the British, thereby circumventing the risk of leaving them in a position 
where they would be forced to come down on the side either of American 
friendship or the Japanese Alliance. 
Even with Roosevelt’s reluctance to make a direct appeal, British 
policymakers were fully aware well before Mackenzie King set foot in London that 
the President desired them to use their influence with the Japanese Government to 
ensure the effective execution of the immigration settlement.  They were not 
prepared, however, to plead the American case to the Japanese, for fear of causing 
offence and risking damage to the relationship with their ally.  As Grey explained to 
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Bryce, the Japanese Government had not themselves raised the issue of 
immigration to the United States, and if the British Government were to do so it 
might be a cause for suspicion in Tokyo.  Moreover, calling on the Japanese to keep 
to their agreement would imply that British policymakers doubted the sincerity of 
Japan’s promises, an impression which Grey was determined to avoid conveying.87  
When Bryce explained British reluctance to get involved in the situation to Root, the 
Secretary of State, far from exhibiting disappointment, strongly concurred that the 
time was not right for Britain to intercede with Japan.  Bryce reflected that Root’s 
response gave the impression that he very much regretted that the question of 
British intervention with the Japanese had been raised at all.88  This response would 
tend to lend credence to the theory that American policymakers, chastened by their 
experience during the late war, preferred to avoid a direct exchange on the subject 
so as to minimise any possible friction if the British declined to offer their 
assistance. 
Roosevelt’s apparent confidence that conveying his message to the British 
through Mackenzie King would be more effective than utilising direct channels was, 
as it turned out, somewhat misplaced.  The Canadians had an agenda of their own 
in the mission to London and were suspicious of Roosevelt’s intrigues, which Laurier 
derided as a ‘smart Yankee trick’.89  Mackenzie King’s main purpose in his 
conversations with British policymakers was to get across how vital it was from the 
point of view of the Canadian Government that the Japanese keep to their 
assurances over the restriction of emigration and that, should they fail to do so, the 
British Government did not stand in the way of Canadian legislation to stop the 
influx of labourers.  The Canadian sought to emphasise the strength of feeling on 
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the immigration question in British Columbia, which was, he warned Grey, 
‘impossible to exaggerate’.90    
 Though Mackenzie King did not make any effort to promote Roosevelt’s 
project for British intervention with Japan, he did not neglect to make capital out of 
his meetings at the White House in order to bolster his own position.  Just as 
Roosevelt had sought to downplay his own concerns and exaggerate those of the 
Canadians, so Mackenzie King portrayed his American host as far more anxious and 
outspoken on the immigration question than the President’s own recollections 
would attest.  An interesting example of this is the Canadian’s treatment of the 
possibility, which he and Roosevelt had discussed in Washington, of the secession of 
British Columbia and the West Coast states to form ‘a new republic between the 
mountains and the Pacific’ in defence of their common interests should Japanese 
immigration be allowed to continue.91  In Roosevelt’s account, this notion was a 
Canadian invention, and in fact he claimed to have found it such a laughable idea 
that he had needed Mackenzie King to explain it multiple times before he was able 
to grasp it.92  There is definitely some substance to Roosevelt’s claim of Canadian 
origin, as the idea of Pacific Coast separatism had originally been mooted amongst 
officials at Ottawa some months earlier and even proposed as a means by which 
Lemieux might convince the Japanese of the delicacy of Canada’s position while he 
was in Tokyo.93  Mackenzie King, however, portrayed the notion as the President’s 
own, very genuine, apprehension, thus cloaking Canadian concerns in the guise of 
American anxiety.  The other purpose of this sleight of hand was to imply that the 
United States might be looking on the immigration issue as an opportunity to 
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emphasise the common interests and perspective of the U.S. and Canada in an 
attempt to draw the Dominion away from Britain.94 
In his meeting with Grey, Mackenzie King was quite open about this latter 
possibility, playing on British policymakers’ anxieties by insinuating that those 
Americans who were in favour of the annexation of Canada might wish to utilise the 
immigration crisis to advance their aims, ‘by teaching the West to look to the United 
States for protection in the matter’.95  This message apparently hit home with the 
British, as Edward Grey explained to Mackenzie King that the British Government 
had absolutely no desire ‘to defeat the wishes of the West with regard to Japanese 
immigration’.  Moreover, Grey assured the Canadian emissary that if the Japanese 
Government did not prove true to its word he would immediately raise the matter 
with Tokyo, even to the point of threatening exclusion legislation if the Japanese did 
not rectify matters.96  Grey explained the reason for this uncharacteristically strong 
stance to Bryce in these terms:  
What I fear is that a suspicion may arise among the people there that, when 
the pinch comes, we shall not support them in resisting Japanese 
immigration.  Should such a suspicion get hold of them, there would be no 
limit to the untoward political consequences which might ensue.97 
The concerns of British policymakers on this point did not relate simply to the risk of 
alienating the Canadians through lack of sympathy but, as Grey revealed in a later 
letter to Ambassador MacDonald, were also influenced by the fear of British 
Columbia making ‘common cause’ with the exclusionists of the West Coast states.98   
Grey was true to his word, and in July 1908 he approached Ambassador 
Komura Jutaro, who was about to leave the London Embassy to take up the role of 
Foreign Minister, highlighting some unsatisfactory aspects of the immigration 
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statistics and pressing the point that a breach of the agreement with Canada would 
have very undesirable consequences.99  From a Canadian point of view, then, the 
Mackenzie King mission had been a resounding success, eliciting substantive 
assurances of British backing over the immigration issue.100  For the Americans, the 
outcome of the mission was a little less clear cut.  There was certainly no concrete 
gain, but Roosevelt appears to have taken British guarantees to Mackenzie King as 
tacit backing for the American position, telling Arthur Lee, ‘the visit has achieved 
just what I hoped’.101 
The President’s optimistic interpretation of the denouement of the 
Mackenzie King mission probably owes a lot to the gushing, and somewhat 
misleading, account of the affair which he received from Lee, who assured him that 
British policymakers were thoroughly in agreement with his policy and anxious to 
cooperate.102  Roosevelt’s willingness to settle for assurances at one remove is 
perhaps also indicative of his desire to avoid risking friction with London by 
confronting the immigration issue head-on.  As soon as British reservations about 
approaching Japan over the immigration question became apparent, Roosevelt 
altered the terms in which he expressed his hopes for cooperation.  Backpedalling 
on the suggestion of immediate intervention at Tokyo to ensure that the Japanese 
honoured their agreements, he shifted the emphasis to the desirability of a 
‘complete understanding’ between Britain and the United States on the issue of 
Japanese immigration.  Roosevelt’s revised approach was premised on harmonising 
the two governments’ attitudes towards the whole question of immigration, so as 
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to ensure that when and if the time came that the Japanese Government had to be 
approached their positions would be identical.103   
British policymakers, in spite of their general preference for this kind of 
comprehensive cooperation, do not seem to have been any more enamoured with 
Roosevelt’s scheme for a broad understanding on immigration than they had been 
with the idea of specifically pressing Japan to tighten their restrictions.  Their 
confidence that Japan would be faithful to her pledges had not been in any way 
shaken, and MacDonald’s advice from Tokyo was that the appearance of a common 
front with the United States would be badly received in Japan.104  The advantage of 
Roosevelt’s new tack, however, was that it did not require the British to take action 
or offer any definite answer.  The President was thus able to conclude that the 
desired understanding had been achieved through Mackenzie King’s endeavours in 
London, regardless of the fact that the British Government remained decidedly 
averse to cooperation over the immigration issue. 
The Mackenzie King affair, in addition to representing yet another example 
of British-American interaction falling short of actual cooperation, offers an 
interesting insight into the role of context in determining the kind of language 
policymakers employed and the extent to which they were willing to engage with 
ideology to make their case.  There is a marked difference between Roosevelt’s 
interactions with Canadian figures and his discussion of the immigration question 
with his British correspondents.  With the latter, the President tended to stick to the 
line of reasoning, discussed above, which focused on the economic and ‘class’ 
aspects of the problem.  In letters to Lee and King Edward VII in early 1908, 
Roosevelt relied heavily on terms such as ‘labourers’ and ‘wageworkers’ in 
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explaining his belief in the need for restrictions on immigration.105  Though the 
racial aspect of the issue was not entirely absent from these communications, 
Roosevelt referred to it chiefly by way of illustrating his persistent assertion that 
Japanese immigration was a matter in which the interests of the United States and 
the British Empire were one and the same.  For example, in his letter to Lee he 
made use of a note he had received from Wilfrid Laurier, including a quotation to 
the effect that antagonism was bound to result whenever Asian and Caucasian 
peoples came into contact and competition, to hammer home his broader point 
that the English-speaking countries would ultimately have to adopt a common 
approach to dealing with the problem.106 
In interactions with the Canadians, on the other hand, Roosevelt appears to 
have significantly relaxed his restraint with regard to the language he used.  In 
particular, he showed a much greater willingness to utilise the rhetoric of ‘white 
men’s countries’ than he had in any interactions with the British.  A striking example 
of this alternative approach appears in the record of a meeting between Roosevelt 
and a group of British Columbian politicians who were visiting Washington: 
“Gentlemen”, he said, “we have got to protect our working men.  We have 
got to build up a western country with our white civilization, and (very 
vehemently) we must retain the power to say who shall or shall not come to 
our country.107 
Roosevelt appears to have expressed a similar view, in perhaps even stronger 
terms, to Mackenzie King in one of their conversations, as Governor General Grey 
related back to the Colonial Office: 
Mr King reports that the President took up the position, with characteristic 
vehemence, that the brown and the white races cannot assimilate; that they 
must keep to their respective areas; and that this is a question on which all 
the white races must stand together.108 
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It is likely that Roosevelt, who was hardly a paragon of tact and self-control at the 
best of times, was somewhat freer in his expression in conversation than in written 
communication, but the major factor which explains the much more racial character 
of his language appears to have been his audience.  While sticking to the less 
overtly ideological ‘class’ argument with the British, Roosevelt evidently felt that 
much stronger phraseology would find a receptive audience with Canadians, 
especially those with Pacific Coast sympathies.  His willingness to employ the tropes 
of ‘white men’s countries’ rhetoric in these instances appears, therefore, to have 
been a conscious, tactical decision. 
During the course of 1908 the immigration statistics gradually fell into line 
with expectations, and both the American and Canadian Governments more or less 
came to terms with their respective immigration settlements.109  The diligence of 
the Japanese Government in preventing further labour emigration notwithstanding, 
however, the problem was far from over.  Anti-Japanese feeling remained prevalent 
throughout the Pacific Coast and many in the U.S. and Canada maintained the 
fundamental grievance that the immigration settlements left the power to 
determine whether or not immigrants would come to their country in the hands of 
the Japanese Government.110  The first major flare-up to occur after the agreements 
with Japan had been finalised was in January 1909, when a string of anti-Japanese 
bills, including a measure resurrecting the school segregation question, appeared in 
the California State Legislature.  Roosevelt weighed in almost immediately, calling 
on Governor James N. Gillett to veto the offensive legislation on the basis that such 
discriminatory measures would invalidate the Gentlemen’s Agreement, thereby 
increasing Japanese immigration rather than contributing to its cessation.111   
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Though this incident died down relatively quickly, it prompted Roosevelt to 
lay the groundwork for the continuation of his policy towards Japanese immigration 
following his departure from the White House in March 1909.  In early February, he 
reached out once again to the British through Arthur Lee, reiterating his conviction 
that a British-American united front was the optimal way to ensure the lasting 
success of the immigration settlements.  Interestingly, Roosevelt appears to have 
latched on to the strategy, so successfully employed by Mackenzie King, of raising 
the spectre of a breakdown in imperial unity if Japanese immigration was not held 
in check.  Though a year earlier he had dismissed the notion as absurdly far-fetched, 
Roosevelt now alluded, apparently in earnest, to the possibility of Pacific Coast 
separatism: 
If London and Washington should tomorrow unite in saying that the 
Japanese should be admitted wholesale to all countries under the British 
and American flags, we should the following week see our Pacific States and 
British Columbia declare their independence as a separate republic, in close 
alliance with Australia.112 
Though Roosevelt’s comments certainly have a distinct tinge of alarmism to them, 
his letter to Lee did not otherwise stray into ideological territory.  The burden of the 
argument was simply that pressure for immigration restriction on the Pacific Coast 
was so strong that it would be politically impossible for the United States or Britain 
to resist it.  This line of reasoning is in stark contrast with the justification for 
immigration restriction which Roosevelt was at this point, and to even greater 
extent after the close of his presidency, using at home.  This alternative case for 
exclusion was based on the open identification of the immigration issue as a ‘race 
question’, on the grounds that the difference between the Japanese and white 
Americans was so fundamental that racial antagonism would be the inevitable 
result of continued immigration.113  Roosevelt thus appears to have preferred to 
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maintain a broadly race-neutral approach in his interactions with the British even 
after he had ceased to do so more generally, implying a recognition on his part that 
British policymakers were less likely to be swayed by overtly ideological arguments. 
The other side of Roosevelt’s endeavour to ensure continuity in the handling 
of the Japanese immigration issue was with his successor, William Howard Taft, and 
the incoming Secretary of State, Philander Knox, to whom he also wrote at length in 
February 1908.  He urged Knox to maintain the Gentlemen’s Agreement as the best 
possible vehicle for keeping the immigration question in check, whilst also making 
quite clear his belief that it would be necessary to hold the Japanese accountable 
for their side of the bargain.  If things were allowed to drift, Roosevelt warned, the 
Japanese would slacken their enforcement of the regulations with potentially 
disastrous results.114  The outgoing President’s comments indicate that despite the 
apparent success of the immigration settlement there remained an inherent 
fragility to it which, as the next chapter will detail, held the potential for the 
development of further friction between the United States and Japan. 
The Japanese immigration question appeared to hold a high degree of 
potential for joint action between Britain and the United States owing to the strong 
parallels in the situations in which policymakers in London and Washington found 
themselves.  Their interests were unquestionably very similar – to calm and appease 
those regions which objected to Japanese immigration and to avoid a rupture in 
relations with Japan – and the solutions they ultimately adopted, the British 
admittedly at one remove, were almost identical.  Nevertheless, no significant 
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cooperation came about despite the sustained, if somewhat indirect, efforts of 
President Roosevelt to arrange a united front with Britain and Canada. 
The main reason behind the lack of cooperation over the immigration 
question was the key British priority of maintaining the friendliest possible relations 
with Japan.  Though British policymakers were willing to compromise this goal to a 
certain extent to ensure that ties with Canada were not weakened, they were not 
prepared to take the same risk merely to remain in the good graces of the United 
States, and they therefore rejected the possibility of joint action.  Even a broad 
understanding was declined by the Foreign Office in this instance for fear of 
appearing to side with the United States against Japan.  The involvement of Canada, 
which American policymakers firmly believed would pave the way for a cooperative 
approach, actually seems to have complicated rather than facilitated joint action.  
This was because the Canadians themselves were hesitant about working with the 
U.S., apparently for fear of compromising their own bargaining position with Japan, 
and the British deferred to Ottawa’s wishes even at points, such as during the 
Lemieux mission, when they would otherwise have been relatively open to some 
degree of collaboration.  This trend continued even after Roosevelt took leave of 
the White House, as the Canadians maintained their refusal to work with the U.S. or 
even to share the full details of the Lemieux Agreement.115  
Unlike during the Russo-Japanese War, British reluctance to make common 
cause with the Unites States did not cause any significant friction between the two 
powers.  British determination to avoid putting strain on the relationship with Japan 
does appear to have been better understood in Washington after 1905, and 
Roosevelt in particular seems to have absorbed the lessons of his earlier 
unsuccessful quest for British pressure on Japan.  He consequently more or less 
abandoned direct requests for assistance in favour of more unconventional 
approaches, such as working through Mackenzie King to bring about an 
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understanding between Britain and the United States, the failure of which was less 
immediately apparent and therefore less likely to result in mutual irritation. 
Roosevelt also appears to have taken considerable care in the way he went 
about framing his arguments regarding the need for immigration restriction, 
generally eschewing ideologically-grounded reasoning in favour of the economic 
and political aspects of the question, at least in interactions with the British.  More 
generally, despite the obvious pertinence of racial ideology to the issue of 
immigration, and evidence of significant engagement with the racial aspect of the 
question on a personal level, policymakers and statesmen on both sides of the 
Atlantic consistently erred on the side of more neutral language which could not be 
considered offensive to the Japanese.  Though there are a few exceptions to this 
rule, most notably Roosevelt’s comments to visiting Canadian politicians on the 
maintenance of ‘white men’s countries’, these are generally reflective of tactical 
engagement with ideology.  In certain contexts, with audiences likely to be 
receptive to such ideas, policymakers were willing to employ ideological rhetoric 
which in other situations they would have deemed unwise and thus avoided. 
This chapter has necessarily given only a partial picture of British-American 
interaction during the years of the immigration crises, as a crucial aspect, the 
intersection of the immigration debate with fears of a possible Japanese-American 
war, has been deliberately omitted.  The next chapter addresses this facet of the 
issue, exploring the impact of the hovering spectre of conflict on the interaction 








Though hindsight understandably draws the focus of historians of the years prior to 
1914 to the various omens of conflict in Europe, at the time it was the Pacific which 
appeared to many observers to be the more likely arena for the next major clash of 
world powers.  Numerous authors from the 1890s onwards proclaimed that the 
defining struggle of the twentieth century would be fought between East and West 
for ‘the mastery of the Pacific’, and as immigration crises rendered relations 
between Japan and the United States ever more fragile it seemed that such 
predictions might be realised in the immediate future.1  This chapter will address 
the Japanese-American war scares which accompanied flare-ups in the immigration 
question, principally while Theodore Roosevelt was President but also under 
William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson, as well as some of the major American 
and British responses to the fraught situation, including the world cruise of the U.S. 
fleet, the Root-Takahira Agreement and the renegotiation of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance in 1911.  It will build on the conclusions of the previous chapter to argue 
that the lack of British-American cooperation over the immigration question 
extended to the war scares; though both nations were intent on averting a clash 
between Japan and the United States they did not, for the most part, coordinate 
their action to this end. 
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 As the previous chapter has shown, the British tendency to prioritise global 
needs, specifically the maintenance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, meant that 
American efforts to secure support from London in putting pressure on Japan 
consistently met with polite refusals.  British policymakers proved no more 
amenable to American suggestions that they might be able to safeguard peace in 
the Pacific by discouraging the Japanese from a warlike response to the immigration 
crisis.  This chapter will contend that this did not reflect any lack of concern on the 
part of the British Government, who had a significant vested interest in the 
prevention of a conflict, but rather a combination of British resolve to avoid 
alienating the Japanese and concerns that the Americans were actually the party 
more likely to instigate hostilities.  With one significant exception, the modification 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1911, the British were more inclined to work with 
the Japanese with a view to averting a conflict than they were with the Americans, a 
tendency suggestive of British policymakers’ recognition that the concrete 
guarantees of the Alliance must take precedence over the vague goodwill of 
transatlantic friendship. 
 The depiction of a Japanese-American conflict as the unfolding of the 
inevitable struggle for ‘the mastery of the Pacific’ had some to potential to act as an 
ideological motivation for a united British-American response to a possible threat 
from Japan, not least because this idea had significant currency in the British 
Dominions.  Such notions and the language of Yellow Peril or a civilisational conflict 
are conspicuously absent from British-American interaction over the war scares, 
however, and were even overtly dismissed on a number of occasions.  The rejection 
of an ideological interpretation of possible conflict and alarmist racial ideas by the 
Americans in particular can be attributed to the desire to avoid exacerbating an 
already volatile situation, but this chapter will make the case that U.S. policymakers 
were not always so careful in the terms in which they discussed the war scare.  Not 
only did they take a somewhat different tone in conversations with representatives 
of the British Dominions, they also employed stereotypes of Japanese character in 
an attempt to encourage the British to take the situation seriously.  Another key 
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theme which will emerge in this chapter, however, is the tendency of British 
policymakers to lend more credence to negative images of the Americans than to 
these stereotypes of the Japanese, a significant contributing factor to British fears 
of the U.S. being responsible for initiating a conflict. 
Rumours and predictions of conflict between Japan and the United States 
began to circulate in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War.  The ease of Japanese 
victory raised concerns throughout the world that the regional, and indeed global, 
supremacy of the Western powers might soon be threatened by this ambitious and 
powerful Eastern nation.  Stories and forecasts of Japanese schemes for conquest in 
the Pacific and beyond were increasingly ubiquitous in the years following the 
Portsmouth peace, and such anxieties were by no means reserved to sensationalist 
popular culture.2  American policymakers had begun to express concerns as early as 
1904 regarding the future conduct of the Japanese, and a common fear in the 
United States and elsewhere in the aftermath of the war was that Japan would 
suffer from the ‘swelled head’ of an unexpected victory which would fuel an 
aggressive foreign policy and bring the nation into conflict with its erstwhile 
friends.3  President Roosevelt expressed the essence of this concern to the British 
Ambassador, Mortimer Durand, prior to the beginning of the immigration crisis in 
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1906: ‘They are a wonderful people and have done wonderful things.  What one 
cannot help feeling is at whose expense will they next do wonderful things?’4 
With this question in mind, the U.S. Government had sought in the closing 
stages of the Russo-Japanese War to ensure that there would be no clash of 
interests with Japan which might occasion a breakdown in relations.  The vehicle for 
this endeavour was the Taft-Katsura Agreement, an agreed memorandum of 
conversations between U.S. Secretary of War William Howard Taft, who was visiting 
Tokyo in an informal capacity, and Japanese Premier Katsura Taro.  The basis of the 
Taft-Katsura Agreement was a commitment on the part of both powers to the 
status quo in East Asia and, more specifically, a Japanese disavowal of any 
aggressive designs on the Philippines and American assurances of support for 
Japanese predominance in Korea.5  Roosevelt was adamant that this exchange was 
simply a reassertion of the existing policies of the two powers and not, as many 
historians have since characterised it, a deal whereby the U.S. betrayed the 
principle of the Open Door in return for a stay on Japanese expansion in the Pacific.6  
It is clear, however, that the Taft-Katsura Agreement represented, at least on some 
level, a compromise, with the United States tacitly assenting to the Japanese having 
an outlet for expansion in mainland East Asia on the basis that this would render a 
conflict of interests less likely.7  This aligned American policy very much with that of 
the British, who around the same time had similarly affirmed the paramount 
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position of Japan in Korea – thereby indicating a preference for Japanese expansion 
in mainland Asia rather than the Pacific – in the renewed Anglo-Japanese Alliance.8  
Indeed, the conversation between Taft and Katsura had explicitly, though not in a 
public or binding manner, associated the United States with the Alliance, 
highlighting the community of interests and common policy of Japan, the United 
States and Britain in East Asia.9 
 At the end of 1905, then, there was no reason, scare stories regarding future 
Japanese aggression notwithstanding, to suspect that relations between the U.S. 
and Japan would deteriorate to a point at which hostilities were conceivable.  
Within a year, however, the immigration crisis would dramatically alter the 
situation, injecting an unprecedented level of tension and mutual suspicion into the 
Japanese-American relationship.  In the early stages of the San Francisco school 
controversy there was little in the way of war talk, as the American Government 
made every effort at the diplomatic level to conciliate the Japanese Government.  
Nevertheless, by the beginning of 1907 the threat of conflict began to loom large, 
and the notion that Japan might respond with force to the continued outrages on 
the Pacific Coast came to seem increasingly less far-fetched.  Rising tensions were 
exacerbated by rumours of imminent Japanese-American hostilities which were rife 
in Europe; both the press and military authorities in Germany in particular predicted 
that war would break out at the slightest incident and that in ‘the contest for 
supremacy in the Pacific Ocean’ the United States would prove no match for 
Japanese naval might.10  Moreover, the link between the immigration issue and the 
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possibility of Japanese aggression lent credence to Yellow Peril scare stories, which 
often warned that Japanese immigrants represented a fifth column, primed to rise 
up with military discipline against their adopted homeland in the event of a war.11   
How credible American policymakers judged such predictions of coming 
conflict to be is not entirely clear, but they consistently asserted that war with 
Japan was highly improbable because hostilities were not in the interests of either 
power.12  Roosevelt in particular appears to have recognised, however, that forces 
beyond the control of the two governments, principally popular outrage in both 
nations, had the potential to force the pace and perhaps create a situation where 
there was no option but to fight.13  With this in mind, American policymakers 
sought as far as possible to minimise talk of war and avoid fuelling rumours which 
had the potential to further inflame the situation, deliberately distancing 
themselves from anything that smacked of Yellow Peril hysteria.14  Roosevelt, for 
example, became embroiled in a public spat with Yellow Peril propagandist 
Richmond P. Hobson, after the latter made claims that the President had privately 
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declared war to be imminent.15  Though they categorically rejected the more 
alarmist strain of popular ideas about Japan, American policymakers do appear to 
have been influenced by a number of key stereotypes of Japanese character, such 
as oversensitivity, arrogance and unpredictability.  Root and Roosevelt both 
employed the descriptive trio of ‘proud, sensitive and warlike’ in internal 
discussions of the tensions with Japan, indicating a belief that the Japanese had to 
be handled carefully, and the possibility of a breakdown in relations taken very 
seriously, in light of their particular national characteristics.16 
British policymakers and officials took a similar view of the overall situation 
to the Americans.  They saw no reason why war should break out, given that neither 
power had anything to gain from such a clash, but they were also conscious of the 
danger that popular indignation might precipitate a breakdown in relations, 
regardless of calculations of national interest.17  British policymakers and officials 
had greater confidence than their American counterparts in the good intentions and 
level-headedness of Japanese leaders, however, and were therefore apt to heed 
reports emphasising the calm response of Japanese leaders and the effectiveness of 
their efforts to keep a lid on popular unrest.18  Indeed, what concerned the British 
Government more than the possibility of the Japanese Government losing control 
was that the United States might, through recklessness and provocation, turn an 
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entirely manageable situation into a powder keg.  British officials spoke with some 
bitterness of the anti-Japanese campaigns of American newspapers – Ambassador 
James Bryce accused the press of attempting ‘to burn down homes for the sake of 
having paragraphs describing the fire’ – and feared that their wild and irresponsible 
predictions of war would become self-fulfilling prophecies.19  Moreover, they 
detected significant potential for trouble in the propensity of American statesmen 
to stir up their already excitable constituents with bluster and careless words.  This 
tendency appeared to be worryingly exemplified in President Roosevelt, who was 
often portrayed in the reports of the Washington Embassy as impulsive, 
unpredictable and prone to combativeness.20 
These sorts of images of the Americans as volatile and irresponsible 
informed British concerns about the possibility of war between Japan and the U.S. 
to a much greater extent than stereotypes regarding the Japanese.  The notion of 
excessive Japanese sensitivity to offence did influence British thinking on some 
level, but not to anything like the same degree as it did the Americans.21  Thus, 
although British and American policymakers were almost unanimous in disregarding 
Yellow Peril theories of Japanese schemes for conquest and espionage by 
immigrants, they were susceptible to stereotyped ideas of national characteristics in 
dealing with the Japanese-American war scares.  The crucial difference was that 
American anxieties centred on images of the Japanese, while the British set greater 
store by beliefs about American character. 
 In addition to sharing the same basic view of the war scare – that conflict 
was unlikely but could not be ruled out – Britain and the United States had a 
fundamental shared interest in the avoidance of hostilities between the U.S. and 
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Japan.  From the American point of view, the basis of this interest is fairly self-
evident.  Policymakers in Washington saw absolutely no benefit in clashing with 
Japan, a power which up until this point had been considered a particular friend of 
the United States, but much potential loss.  Regardless of the extent of American 
military prowess, in which policymakers were not overly confident at this point, war 
with Japan would have been very costly and entailed the forfeiture, at least in the 
interim, of the Philippines, the American ‘heel of Achilles’.22  Though Britain would, 
of course, be less directly impacted by a Japanese-American conflict, such an 
eventuality was still unthinkable from the point of view of British global policy.  Two 
essential pillars of the British response to the dilemma of limited resources and 
almost unlimited commitments were the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on one hand and 
friendly relations with the United States, which allowed for the exclusion of the 
latter power from the two-power standard principle in naval planning, on the other.  
Even in the best case scenario of Britain remaining neutral in a Japanese-American 
war, the conflict would rob these relationships of much of their utility, and, in the 
much more likely situation that the British would be forced to choose a side, they 
risked losing one of these pillars entirely.23 
 The response of the United States to the war scare of 1907-1908 was 
premised on an inextricable link between strained relations with Japan and the 
immigration question; policymakers believed that there could be no end to the 
tensions and war rumours without a solid and lasting resolution to this problem.  
The insistence on an effective end to Japanese immigration as a prerequisite to the 
restoration of cordial relations with Japan, which appears slightly counterintuitive, 
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is indicative of the recognition amongst American policymakers that feeling on the 
Pacific Coast was simply too strong to be ignored and that the consequences of 
failing to address the immigration question would put Japanese-American relations 
under even greater strain.  Roosevelt in particular was convinced that as long as the 
flow of immigration from Japan continued there would be the potential for 
outrages which could endanger Japanese-American relations to such an extent that 
conflict would be hard to avoid.24  The American response to the war scare was thus 
to insist on strict adherence by Japan to the immigration settlement enshrined in 
the Gentleman’s Agreement, while at the same time maintaining the utmost 
‘courtesy’ towards Japan by quashing demonstrations of anti-Japanese sentiment.  
Roosevelt would later refer to this balancing act as the policy of combining ‘the 
maximum of efficiency with the minimum of offensiveness’.25 
As the previous chapter has discussed, Roosevelt was confident that the 
most effective route to securing and maintaining the desired immigration 
settlement would be to obtain British assistance in some form.  In addition to its 
benefits with regard to the immigration question itself, American policymakers 
were also hopeful that a united front with the British, or at least the appearance of 
one, would be a strong guarantee of peace, quickly dispelling any bellicose 
intentions which the Japanese might have been harbouring.26  In two respects, 
therefore, getting the British on side with regard to the Japanese immigration issue 
formed an important part of the American response to the war scare.   
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The British were, as the previous chapter has established, unwilling to risk 
straining their own relations with Japan by pleading the American case or joining in 
a united front on the immigration issue, and even the threat of a Japanese-
American war was not sufficient to alter this stance.  Grey was very firm in his 
insistence that anything even resembling mediation with the Japanese was to be 
avoided, perhaps recognising that interceding in the cause of peace on behalf of the 
United States could be interpreted as implying a degree of suspicion regarding 
Japan’s intentions.27  Though their reliance on good relations with both Japan and 
the United States put British policymakers entirely in sympathy with the U.S. in 
seeking to avoid a conflict, it also necessitated very careful handling of the war 
scare on their part.  They recognised that the disruption in relations between the 
U.S. and Japan provided a prime opportunity for Britain’s enemies, whether 
international rivals or Anglophobes within the United States, to attempt to 
undermine the Alliance or drive a wedge between the English-speaking powers.28  
The British Government therefore needed to strike a careful balance in order to 
avoid appearing overly sympathetic towards or overly critical of either power. 
There is, however, some evidence to suggest that this balance which British 
policymakers sought to maintain tipped somewhat in the favour of the Japanese, 
reflecting the concreteness of the Alliance as compared with the less well-defined 
nature of friendship with the United States.  In contrast with the reluctance to take 
any action at Washington’s behest, when the Japanese suggested in early 1908 that 
Britain’s influence might be used to ensure that Japanese-American relations 
remained friendly, Bryce offered assurances to the new Japanese Ambassador at 
Washington, Takahira Kogoro, ‘that what His Majesty’s Government could do for 
that purpose would be willingly done’.29  This promise did not mean that the British 
would in any sense warn the United States off following a course that might lead to 
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conflict, any more than they would do so with the Japanese, but British 
policymakers throughout the crisis made efforts towards defusing the war scare by 
trying to dispel American anxieties about the Japanese.  For example, in a letter of 
February 1907, Grey expressed to Roosevelt his certainty that there would be no 
trouble between Japan and the United States, emphasising that he was ‘sure the 
Japanese want to pursue a quiet policy for some time to come’.30 
This particular letter is interesting because of the contrast it presents with 
Grey’s most recent prior letter to Roosevelt, from December 1906.  In the earlier 
communication, a general discussion of British policy in which the possibility of 
conflict between Japan and the U.S. was not broached, Grey had commented:  
I can give you no forecast of Japanese policy.  They have been quite 
satisfactory allies: cautious and not exacting.  But they are very reserved, 
and I do not feel that I know the working of their minds on questions outside 
the alliance itself.31 
This line of thinking, with its hint of ideas of Japanese inscrutability and 
unpredictability, was entirely jettisoned in the second letter and replaced with a 
sense of assurance regarding Japanese motives and intentions.  This shift suggests 
that, faced with the context of the war scare, Grey made a conscious choice to 
avoid alluding to such stereotypes or any line of thinking which had the potential to 
heighten American anxiety and suspicion. 
 American policymakers were somewhat less cautious in drawing on 
stereotyped images of the Japanese when discussing the war scare with the British.  
Root, for example, while maintaining that matters were being dealt with calmly on 
all sides, reverted frequently to phrases such as ‘Japanese susceptibilities’ and 
‘amour propre’ to hone in on the supposed oversensitivity and pride of the 
Japanese which lent explosive potential even to very minor incidents.32  American 
policymakers were careful, however, to avoid giving the British the impression that 
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they had succumbed to war hysteria or gave any credit to Yellow Peril alarmism.  
Roosevelt was emphatic in his denials that he suspected the Japanese of designs on 
the Philippines or Hawaii, and in conversation with Bryce he laughingly dismissed 
Kaiser Wilhelm’s anxieties about a racial threat from Japan as ‘pipe dreams’.33  The 
willingness of American statesmen to dwell on Japanese characteristics which made 
the situation dangerous while simultaneously rejecting claims that Japan 
represented a viable threat is indicative of the delicate balance which the Roosevelt 
administration was attempting to strike in interaction with the British.  The 
American aim was to convince British policymakers of the urgency of addressing the 
immigration issue at the root of the war scare, hence the emphasis on Japanese 
pride and sensitivity, without appearing to be overly concerned about the possibility 
of war or responding irrationally to the situation. 
 This endeavour, much like Roosevelt’s policy of combining ‘courtesy’ with an 
insistence on an end to Japanese immigration, required a steady hand and careful 
navigation from American policymakers.  Unfortunately, both of these balancing 
acts were undermined somewhat by the final prong of the President’s response to 
the war scare: naval expansion and preparedness.34  Arguably, Roosevelt’s advocacy 
of a navalist policy actually had very little to do with the war scare, the need for a 
larger navy and a posture of readiness for conflict having been an article of faith for 
the President for many years prior to any tension with Japan.35  The war scare did 
serve to reinforce Roosevelt’s beliefs, however, and he judged a policy of naval 
expansion and preparedness to be an essential part of the American response both 
because it represented necessary preparation for the eventuality of conflict 
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breaking out and, more fundamentally, because the building up of a formidable 
American navy would discourage the Japanese from resorting to force in the first 
place.36  The war scare also provided an opportunity for the President to promote 
his navalist agenda, and this he grasped with both hands, making use of the fraught 
state of relations with Japan to press for a significant increase in Congressional 
appropriations for building up the navy.37  Not only was Roosevelt’s emphasis on 
naval expansion and readiness somewhat at odds with his objectives of minimising 
talk of war and keeping on the best possible terms with Japan, but his apparent 
manipulation of the war scare in pursuit of navalist goals also caused a degree of 
unease to the British.  Bryce reflected on more than one occasion that the 
President’s frequent comments regarding the possibility of war in the context of the 
campaign for naval expansion were apt to further inflame the situation.38 
British concerns on this point were aroused to an even greater extent by the 
culmination of Roosevelt’s naval response to the war scare: the world cruise of the 
U.S. battleship fleet.  The cruise had much to recommend itself from the American 
point of view and appealed to Roosevelt in particular on just about every 
conceivable level.  Not only did it have practical utility as a training exercise, it was 
also advantageous from a domestic political point of view, both in boosting popular 
enthusiasm for naval expansion and in counteracting criticism of the Government’s 
handling of the immigration question.  Moreover, the spectacle of the ‘Great White 
Fleet’ circumnavigating the globe promised to pay dividends in terms of prestige for 
the United States as a world power and for Roosevelt personally.39  Whatever the 
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original rationale behind the project, the sailing of the fleet into the Pacific in late 
1907 took on the cast of a display of American power and resolve, designed to 
chasten or perhaps even threaten the Japanese.  Roosevelt, contrary to his 
emphasis on ‘courtesy’, certainly appears to have intended for the movement of 
American battleships to have a sobering effect on Japanese policymakers, from 
whom he later claimed to have detected ‘a very, very slight undertone of veiled 
truculence’ which he felt needed to be challenged.40 
This aspect of the fleet cruise comes out most clearly in a series of 
exchanges between Roosevelt and visiting Canadian politicians, in which the 
President characterised the undertaking in terms suggestive of a very deliberate 
objective of browbeating the Japanese into toeing the line with regard to the 
immigration question.  According to William L. Mackenzie King, when they met in 
late January 1908 Roosevelt did not mince his words on the matter:  
We have allowed these people to go too far thro’ being too polite to them.  I 
made up my mind that they were simply taking advantage of our politeness.  
I thought they had done this and I decided to send the fleet into the Pacific, 
it may help them to understand that we want a definite arrangement.41 
Given the strength of Roosevelt’s language, it is hardly surprising that Mackenzie 
King came away from his time in the U.S. convinced that Japanese prevarication on 
the immigration question had the potential to bring about a resort to arms on the 
part of the United States, noting in his diary: ‘The whole tone of the President’s talk 
with me today was we must have absolutely what we are demanding or war.’42 
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Mackenzie King’s report that Roosevelt viewed the cruise of the fleet as 
primarily a ‘big stick’ was supported by the account of the group of British 
Columbian politicians who visited Washington the following month.  Bryce met with 
the leader of this delegation, Ralph Smith, following their encounter with Roosevelt 
and found that the Canadians had been ‘speechless with surprise at the frankness 
with which the President spoke to them of the risk of war with Japan and of his 
motives in sending the fleet to the Pacific.’43  Smith’s own record of the meeting 
with Roosevelt is even more explicit, recounting the latter’s explanation of the 
cruise as making the U.S. ‘ready to maintain our rights’, and quoting him as saying:  
I don’t make threats, but I was once a frontiersman, and we had a saying 
there, ‘don’t draw unless you mean to shoot’, so I felt that in the 
consideration of the interests involved I had to send the fleet around to the 
Pacific.44 
 Even allowing for a certain amount of exaggeration on the part of the 
Canadians – which Mackenzie King was certainly guilty of at times – Roosevelt’s 
discussion of the cruise of the fleet in these meetings presents a marked contrast to 
direct interactions with the British in the early months of 1908.  Ambassador Reid, 
partly in response to Mackenzie King’s visit to London, was busy downplaying 
American anxiety over the possibility of war, while Roosevelt himself emphasised 
the remoteness of such a prospect and barely mentioned the sailing of the fleet in 
his communications.45  Indeed, on the two occasions the President did touch upon 
the cruise, in a letter to Arthur Lee and a conversation with Bryce, it was to imply, in 
entire contradiction with their own accounts, that the Canadians he had met with 
feared imminent Japanese aggression and therefore viewed the arrival of the fleet 
as a welcome deterrent.46  There is thus clear evidence that Roosevelt and his 
colleagues carefully tailored their handling of the war scare and the cruise of the 
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fleet according to context.  With the Canadians, Roosevelt apparently felt 
comfortable to use much stronger language and throw caution to the wind by 
utilising the possibility of a Japanese-American conflict to advance his agenda with 
regard to the immigration question.  With the British, on the other hand, American 
statesmen and officials consistently maintained the approach of minimising the 
significance of the friction with the Japanese and sought to avoid giving the 
impression that they bought into stories of Japanese schemes for conquest or were 
themselves stoking the controversy. 
Inevitably, though, Roosevelt’s unguarded comments to the Canadians 
filtered back to policymakers in London and generated a certain amount of 
apprehension.  The British were, admittedly, in the habit of taking the President’s 
words with a generous pinch of salt, as suggested by the rather dry comments of 
Francis Hopwood, Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, on Mackenzie King’s 
report: 
We must not take too seriously what is said by American politicians, not 
even by the President himself.  The flamboyant expressions may simply have 
been intended to take away Sir W. Laurier’s breath and induce him to 
impress on Japan ‘what devils of fellows the Yankees are’.47 
Nevertheless, Roosevelt’s ominous portrayal of the cruise to his Canadian guests 
served to deepen British anxieties about the American, and the President’s 
personal, propensity for brinkmanship.  Looking back on Roosevelt’s time in office in 
April 1909, Bryce highlighted the President’s use of ‘menacing language’ in 
reference to the fleet cruise as the defining example of the ‘more dangerous sort of 
impulsiveness’ in his character.48   
Roosevelt’s apparent willingness to risk further inflaming matters by his 
bellicose remarks certainly did nothing to dispel the sense of unease in London over 
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the movement of the fleet.  British misgivings about the decision to send the fleet 
to the Pacific had been in evidence from the beginning, with both policymakers and 
the press expressing scepticism about the wisdom of the American move.  Troubled 
by its apparent provocativeness and poor timing, British officials saw potential for 
the cruise to complicate rather than facilitate the resolution of the immigration 
question.49  Claude MacDonald, the Ambassador at Tokyo, was adamant that the 
Japanese needed no prompting as to the seriousness of the situation and would not 
be bullied into bending to American wishes: ‘a menace such as the sending of a 
fleet, leaves them absolutely cold’.50  Some British officials took the view that the 
cruise was in large part a political manoeuvre designed to address discontent with 
the U.S. Government’s handling of the immigration crisis, and even concluded that 
it was the prelude to another presidential campaign for Roosevelt which would be 
marked by exclusionism and hostility towards Japan.51  Grey and Bryce dismissed 
such suspicions of the President’s intentions but did exhibit some anxiety that 
Roosevelt might not have fully considered the possible consequences of the cruise, 
in particular its potential to reinvigorate yellow press speculation of Japanese-
American conflict and exacerbate an already fraught situation.52 
 The British Government was given further reason to regret Roosevelt’s 
decision to sail the fleet in early 1908, when the involvement of the Dominions 
appeared to put British goals of preserving strong imperial links and maintaining the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance into conflict.  As the fleet made its way towards the Pacific 
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at the beginning of 1908, Australian Prime Minister Alfred Deakin began to lobby for 
a visit from the American battleships.  The Australians hoped that such a visit would 
serve to highlight their vulnerable position in the Pacific and to draw Australia and 
the United States – who, according to Deakin, were ‘kinsmen’ – closer together in 
sentiment.53  By the time officials in London became aware of Deakin’s scheme, he 
had already made some rather unconventional overtures through the American 
Consul-General at Canberra and Whitelaw Reid, much to the disgruntlement of the 
Colonial and Foreign Offices.54  Deakin’s circumvention of protocol put the British 
Government in a very difficult position.  They did not wish to appear complicit in the 
cruise, which they judged to be at best a very heavy-handed piece of diplomacy and 
at worst an open affront to the Japanese.  Equally, however, they could not afford 
to be seen to be interposing a barrier to Australian-American friendship; to oppose 
the visit would have been a snub to the U.S. and a denial of the wishes of the 
Australian people at a time when Britain and her Dominions were already in less 
than entire harmony over the Japanese immigration question.  British officials thus 
reluctantly facilitated Australian communication with the United States, hoping that 
the invitation would be turned down.55 
 They were to be disappointed in these hopes, as American policymakers, 
having also recognised that an Australian reception for the battleship fleet would 
imply a British seal of approval on the enterprise, gladly accepted the request.  
Indeed, in light of the Australian invitation, Roosevelt began to conceptualise the 
cruise of the fleet as a means of drawing together the ‘white men’s countries’ of the 
Pacific, which would inexorably pull the British into alignment with the U.S. over the 
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issue of Japanese immigration.56   In his meeting with the British Columbian 
politicians, the President explained that the presence of the fleet in Pacific waters 
was for the benefit not only of the West Coast States but also of British Columbia 
and Australia.  He even went so far as to claim that the Monroe Doctrine applied to 
the whole of the Pacific Coast and to Australia as well, apparently assuring his 
guests, ‘if it doesn’t, I’ll make it apply’.57  This kind of thinking was deeply 
objectionable from a British point of view, not only because it implied a degree of 
hostility and suspicion towards the Japanese, but also because it tapped into a 
growing fear amongst British officials that the United States might assume the role 
of protector over the Dominions to the diminution of British influence.58    
The sailing of the U.S. fleet very tangibly symbolised American presence and 
strength in the Pacific, and British policymakers were particularly concerned about 
the effect that this might have on the already volatile situation in British Columbia.  
Fortunately for the British, the Canadian Government was in agreement with 
London that a visit of the fleet to Vancouver was undesirable, both from the point 
of view of the domestic situation and because, as the previous chapter has 
suggested, they wished to maintain a certain distance from the U.S. with regard to 
the Japanese immigration question.  Thus, despite a strong lobby in British 
Columbia for the invitation of the fleet, no such action was taken.59  The game 
changed in March 1908, however, when an invitation from the Japanese for the 
fleet to visit Tokyo was accepted by the U.S. Government.  British and Canadian 
policymakers thereafter took a less serious view of the matter and acquiesced in the 
British Columbian invitation.  As with the Australian visit, British policymakers were 
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keen to avoid any suggestion that they disapproved or were creating obstacles, but 
they shared the quiet relief of Canadian officials when Vancouver’s request was 
turned down by the United States for logistical reasons.60   
The fact that the U.S. fleet was to pay a visit to Japan transformed the whole 
aspect of the cruise; British policymakers generally felt much less anxiety about the 
possible consequences of American action, with some even daring to hope that the 
cruise might prove to be a boon to British-American friendship rather than a 
stumbling block.61  For the Americans too, the Japanese invitation changed the way 
the cruise was thought about and discussed.  The notion of white solidarity in the 
Pacific faded into the background as the fleet’s presence there came to be valued 
chiefly as a means of reconciliation with Japan.62  The visit of the U.S. fleet to 
Yokohama in October 1908 was judged by observers on all sides to have been a 
successful demonstration of the good feeling which persisted between the two 
nations in spite of the immigration dispute and war rumours.  It would prove to be 
an important preliminary to negotiations for a more concrete expression of stable 
and friendly Japanese-American relations, the outcome of which was the Root-
Takahira Agreement.63 
The official exchange of notes between the U.S. Secretary of State and the 
Japanese Ambassador at Washington which constituted the Root-Takahira 
Agreement took place in late November 1908.  The notes set out in five key points 
the ‘common aim, policy and intention’ of the two powers in the Pacific region, 
which amounted to both governments working for, ‘the free and peaceful 
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development of their commerce in the Pacific Ocean’, through the maintenance of 
the status quo with regard to the Open Door in China and each nation’s territorial 
possessions.64  Like the Taft-Katsura Agreement before it, the Root-Takahira 
Agreement has often been portrayed by historians as a straightforward trade-off 
whereby the United States attempted to mitigate tension with Japan by 
compromising its commitment to the Open Door in East Asia, in this case by 
allowing the Japanese a ‘free hand’ in Manchuria.65  In reality, however, the notes 
had very little to do with settling substantive issues, and were instead intended 
simply to clear the air between the two powers and bring an end to the persistent 
rumours of impending conflict.66  As the correspondence of John Callan O’Laughlin, 
an American journalist who helped lay the groundwork for the exchange, amply 
demonstrates, the Root-Takahira Agreement was conceptualised both in 
Washington and Tokyo primarily as a means by which, ‘to give striking proof to the 
American people, to the Japanese people, indeed to the whole world, that our 
relations were friendly and agreeable’.67 
Though it should not, therefore, be understood as a direct bargain, the Root-
Takahira Agreement did represent a tacit acknowledgement of the conclusion 
American policymakers had already reached that if the Japanese were to continue 
to voluntarily restrict immigration to North America it would be wise to allow them 
some leeway for commercial expansion in North-East Asia.  American involvement 
in Manchuria had, if anything, been declining in the preceding years and so 
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refraining from challenging Japan’s push for predominance in the region was a small 
price to pay if it would help to direct Japanese energies and immigration away from 
the Pacific.68  As Roosevelt later explained to his successor, William Howard Taft:  
Our vital interest is to keep the Japanese out of our country, and at the same 
time to preserve the good will of Japan.  The vital interest of the Japanese, 
on the other hand, is in Manchuria and Korea.  It is therefore peculiarly in 
our interest not to take any steps as regards Manchuria which will give the 
Japanese cause to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to them, 
or a menace – in however slight degree – to their interests.69 
The Root-Takahira Agreement thus formed part of a ‘structure of accommodation’, 
along with the Taft-Katsura Agreement and the Gentlemen’s Agreement, through 
which the Roosevelt administration sought to ensure the maintenance of peace 
with Japan while guaranteeing the nation’s most important interests.70 
This ‘structure of accommodation’, and the Root-Takahira Agreement 
specifically, aligned the American attitude towards Japanese predominance in 
North-East Asia fairly closely with that of policymakers in London.  The British had 
maintained throughout the 1907-1908 war scare that Japan’s gaze was directed 
firmly towards Korea and Manchuria, rather than the Pacific Coast of North 
America, and that provided this was recognised and accommodated there were no 
grounds for a serious conflict.71  The consonance in British and American attitudes 
on this point was acknowledged, and indeed emphasised, by American 
policymakers when it came to communicating the details of the Root-Takahira 
Agreement.  Root instructed Ambassador Reid to present the forthcoming 
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understanding as, ‘in entire accord with the corresponding purposes of the English-
Japanese Agreement of August 1905’, and as reflecting the shared interests and 
policy of the two powers in China.72  In private, Roosevelt went even further, 
commenting to Arthur Lee in reference to the Root-Takahira Agreement: ‘It is a 
good thing as keeping England and America closer together too; which, as you 
know, is something I always have peculiarly at heart.’73  The President’s comments 
suggest that the Root-Takahira Agreement fitted into his scheme of bringing about 
a common front between the U.S. and Britain with regard to the question of 
immigration and relations with Japan. 
Though British policymakers were, as the previous chapter has shown, 
reluctant to openly align themselves with the United States in the way that 
Roosevelt hoped for, there is no doubt that they greeted the Root-Takahira 
Agreement with approval, and indeed relief.  They were gratified both by the 
similarity between the American position and their own and by the reassurance the 
exchange of notes offered of the remoteness of Japanese-American conflict, and 
Grey did not hesitate to signal British pleasure at the apparent normalisation of 
Japanese-American relations.74  Alongside the positive reaction there was also a 
note of wariness, however, as British officials were quick to identify the limitations 
of the agreement, which pertained not only to its content but also to its form.  In 
the first place, the notes had not referred directly either to the immigration 
question or to the issue of Manchuria, and although these omissions were 
expedient from the point of view of agreeing mutually acceptable wording they also 
lent the agreement an opacity which effectively disqualified it as a useful basis for 
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future relations.75  On a more basic level, the Root-Takahira Agreement offered no 
real guarantee for the future because U.S. policymakers had opted for a non-
binding executive agreement in order to bypass the need for Congressional 
approval, which would have required at the very least a more concrete statement 
on immigration.  In consequence, the American note was merely a statement of the 
policy of the Roosevelt administration, which would come to an end in a matter of 
months, and in no way obliged future administrations to follow the principles of the 
agreement.76 
Roosevelt was reasonably confident that Taft would follow the same line 
with regard to relations with Japan, especially since the incoming President was 
himself on good terms with Japanese leaders, so the Root-Takahira Agreement 
might conceivably have been expected to last for at least four years beyond the 
expiry of Roosevelt’s term in March 1909.77  In reality, however, the exchange 
represented merely a brief remission in the friction and rumours of war between 
Japan and the United States.  Not only did unrest over immigration in California 
flare up again in January 1909, but Taft and his Secretary of State, Philander Knox, 
took a rather different view of the situation from Roosevelt.  They denied that there 
was any ‘essential connection’ between the immigration issue and Japanese 
expansion in Manchuria, and Knox was particularly critical of the suggestion that the 
United States should be willing to sacrifice its rights and interests in East Asia in 
order to ensure that the Japanese followed through on their pledges under the 
Gentlemen’s Agreement.78  The Taft administration had, as the next chapter will 
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detail, grand and ambitious plans for increasing the American commercial stake in 
China and would not countenance a hands-off policy in Manchuria, the most 
promising arena for the future expansion of American investment and trade. 
Aside from a greater interest in American commerce in China, what 
distinguished Taft’s approach from that of his predecessor was not greater hostility 
towards Japan, but actually a greater confidence that the Japanese would hold up 
their end of the bargain on immigration.  Whereas Roosevelt was insistent that 
some consideration needed to be offered to the Japanese in East Asia in order to 
secure their compliance, Taft worked from the premise that they would deal in 
good faith and required no further incentive.  Indeed, such was their confidence in 
the sufficiency of Japanese guarantees in the Gentlemen’s Agreement that when 
the Japanese-American commercial treaty came up for renewal in 1911, Taft and 
Knox concluded that the existing reservation in the treaty as to the right to legislate 
to exclude immigration was unnecessary and could be removed in accordance with 
Japanese wishes, a decision which met with bitter criticism from an incredulous 
Roosevelt.79  The Taft administration was also quick to quash anti-Japanese 
legislation when it arose in California, following the blueprint set out by Roosevelt in 
forcefully prevailing upon local leaders to abandon offensive bills before a serious 
controversy developed.80  Thus, despite the Taft administration’s more 
confrontational stance in China and Manchuria, relations between the U.S. and 
Japan from 1909 to 1913 were, for the most part, not nearly as fraught as they had 
been during the preceding years. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1973), p.222; LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, p.232; Neu, The Troubled Encounter, 
p.75; Thomson, Stanley and Perry, Sentimental Imperialists, p.150. 
79 R. Miller Memo, October 26th 1910, Box 11, Philander C. Knox Papers, Library of Congress 
Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. [hereafter Knox MS]; W.H. Taft to T. Roosevelt, December 9th 
1910, Reel 95, Roosevelt MS; P. Knox to W.H. Taft, December 19th 1910, Box 12, Knox MS; T. 
Roosevelt to W.H. Taft, December 22nd 1910, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 7, pp.189-192; P. Knox to S. 
Cullom, January 10th 1911, Box 12, Knox MS; Coletta, The Presidency of William Howard Taft, pp.199-
200; Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt, p.395. 
80 P. Knox to P.H. McCarthy, January 19th 1911, Box 13, Knox MS; H. Johnson to F.M. Huntington 
Wilson, March 24th 1911, Box 91, John Bassett Moore Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript 
Division, Washington, D.C. [hereafter Moore MS]; Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice, pp.50, 52-53; 
Neu, The Troubled Encounter, p.75; W.C. Nicholson, ‘Anglo-Saxonism at the Crossroads: U.S.-
Canadian Response to Japanese Immigration to North America, 1905-1914’ (PhD Thesis, Georgia 
State University, 2004), pp.294-295, 350. 
189 
 
The one major exception to the general lull in war rumours during Taft’s 
presidency was the Magdalena Bay incident, which was initiated by the abortive 
attempt of a Japanese commercial syndicate to purchase a strategically significant 
tract of land in Mexico.  This controversy generated a spate of alarmist rumours – 
owing in part to the influence of Yellow Peril suspicions and Asian invasion 
literature, which often predicted that the Japanese would utilise Mexico in an 
attempt to conquer the United States – and ultimately resulted in the Lodge 
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, an effective prohibition on such transactions 
anywhere in the Western Hemisphere.81  The Magdalena Bay issue did not cause 
any significant tension between the U.S. and Japan, however, in part because of the 
efforts of American policymakers to minimise the significance of the matter so as to 
avoid it spiralling into a more serious dispute.82  This response to the possibility of 
friction with Japan is characteristic of Taft’s approach, reflecting his unwillingness to 
be drawn into such controversies and his scepticism as to predictions of conflict 
with Japan.  Throughout the war scare under Roosevelt, Taft, as Secretary of War no 
less, had maintained a much greater degree of serenity than his colleagues.  His visit 
to Japan in 1907 had served to confirm his predisposition to think of the Japanese 
Government as moderate, sensible and, above all, thoroughly averse to war with 
the United States.83  During his presidency, Taft’s conviction that the Japanese had 
absolutely no reason nor desire to fight with the U.S. became even stronger, and he 
therefore deprived scare stories of traction and kept things on an even keel with 
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Tokyo by his calm insistence that war between two such friends was all but 
impossible.84 
British policymakers broadly shared Taft’s confidence that the Japanese 
Government remained entirely opposed to conflict with the United States.  They 
lacked, however, a corresponding faith in the ability of the Taft administration to 
maintain control of the situation and ensure the continuation of peace between the 
two countries.  In addition to fretting over the potential for rupture created by 
mishandling of the perennial issue of immigration, policymakers in London were 
concerned at the more combative approach to the Manchurian question which Taft 
and Knox were apparently intent on pursuing, judging it to be ill-conceived and 
provocative.85  For example, Charles Hardinge, Under-Secretary at the Foreign 
Office, complained of the Secretary of State’s ‘blundering’ diplomacy in China, and 
worried that his bruised ego at the failure of American schemes there might drive 
him to ‘cut up rough’ over the Japanese annexation of Korea in August 1910 and 
possibly even precipitate a conflict.86  Such anxiety reflects the continued influence 
on British thinking of images of the Americans as impulsive and heavy-handed in 
their approach to foreign affairs which, though perhaps more significant while 
Roosevelt was in power, transferred easily from one statesman to another with 
changes in administration. 
British policymakers were not overly concerned about the possibility of a 
Japanese-American War during the years of Taft’s presidency, but they did have to 
field questions, both domestically and from within the Empire, regarding Britain’s 
position under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the event of such a conflict.  
Opposition to the Alliance had been gradually building in Britain as a result of 
Japan’s expansionist policy in Korea and Manchuria, but the more significant 
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objections came from the Dominions.  The governments of Canada and Australia, 
who remained distinctly suspicious of Japan over the immigration question and 
disapproved of British reliance on Japanese power in the Pacific, were reluctant to 
remain tied to Japan, especially while the possibility of a rupture with the United 
States persisted.87  British policymakers were still very much committed to the 
Alliance despite its growing unpopularity, however, concluding that it remained 
essential from a global strategic point of view.  British resources were thinly-
stretched around the world and the loss of Japan as an ally in East Asia and the 
Pacific would necessitate a significant investment in that region, not least because it 
would become essential to plan for the contingency of hostilities with Japan due to 
the vulnerable position of Australia and New Zealand.88  The British Government 
was consequently on the look-out for a way to make the Alliance more palatable to 
its detractors and reconcile the Dominions, with whom policymakers were 
determined to retain the strongest possible ties so as to ensure the integrity of the 
Empire, to the unpleasant necessity of dependence on a power which they 
considered a likely future threat.89 
Meanwhile, the possibility of a comprehensive arbitration treaty between 
Britain and the United States was mooted in July 1910 by Andrew Carnegie, a long-
time crusader for Anglo-Saxon unity, on the basis that the time had come for the 
two branches of the ‘race that abolished duelling’ to come together in an effort to 
likewise abolish war.90  Similar suggestions had been swiftly discounted in the past 
due to the unpopularity of such an agreement in the United States, but Taft had 
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declared himself open to the possibility of unlimited arbitration treaties, and so the 
ground appeared much more favourable than ever before.91  British policymakers 
thus took up Carnegie’s suggestion with a degree of enthusiasm, not only because 
the arbitration treaty – which would signify the closeness of British-American 
relations even if its practical effect was limited – was desirable in itself but also 
because of the impact such an agreement would have on the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance.  The Foreign Office immediately recognised that an unlimited arbitration 
treaty with the United States might come into conflict with the Alliance in the event 
of a Japanese-American war, but rather than be discouraged by this potential 
obstacle British policymakers saw in it an opportunity to effectively exempt the 
United States from the provisions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, thereby 
addressing one of the major concerns of its opponents.92 
The British Government consequently entered into parallel discussions for a 
British-American arbitration treaty and the renegotiation of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance.  This endeavour was only possible because the Japanese Government were 
themselves keen for an early renewal of the Alliance, which was not due to expire 
until 1915, and accepted the need for the British to address mounting opposition to 
the arrangement in order to make it sustainable.93  British policymakers had initially 
hoped to exempt the United States specifically by name in the revised Alliance, but 
the Japanese objected and a more neutral alternative was therefore agreed upon 
whereby neither signatory would be compelled to enter into hostilities with any 
power with whom they had an unlimited arbitration treaty.94  For this modification 
                                                           
91 J.P. Campbell, ‘Taft, Roosevelt and the Arbitration Treaties of 1911’, Journal of American History 53 
(1966), p.279. 
92 C.S. Spicer and C. Hardinge Minutes on A. Carnegie to E. Grey, July 11th 1910, FO 371/1023/26234, 
TNA; E. Grey to C. MacDonald, September 26th 1910, FO 410/56, TNA; J. Bryce to A. Nicolson, April 
15th 1911, FO 800/348, TNA; Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States, pp.167-168; 
Hotta-Lister, The Japan-British Exhibition of 1910, pp.176-177; Perkins, The Great Rapprochement, 
pp.234-236. 
93 E. Grey to C. MacDonald, January 20th 1911, FO 410/58, TNA; C. MacDonald to E. Grey, March 16th 
1911, FO 410/58, TNA; E. Grey to C. MacDonald, March 20th 1911, FO 410/58, TNA; E. Grey to C. 
MacDonald, April 7th 1911, FO 410/58, TNA; C. MacDonald to E. Grey, April 8th 1911, FO 410/58, TNA; 
E. Grey to H. Rumbold, May 8th 1911, FO 410/58, TNA; Nish, Alliance in Decline, pp.44, 48. 
94 E. Grey to C. MacDonald, March 27th 1911, FO 410/58, TNA; C. MacDonald to E. Grey, April 24th 
1911, FO 410/58, TNA; E. Grey to H. Rumbold, June 26th 1911, FO 410/58, TNA; E. Grey to H. 
193 
 
to achieve the desired result, it obviously required that Britain and the United 
States successfully concluded a treaty of arbitration, and British policymakers thus 
redoubled their efforts to bring this project to fruition.  Though he did not feel that 
he could openly discuss the modification to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with the 
Americans, Grey made certain that Washington was left in no doubt that the 
Alliance would not prove a stumbling block or qualification to an arbitration treaty.  
The Foreign Secretary explained the progress which had been made with Japan to 
Reid, and although Grey asked him to keep this knowledge to himself initially, he 
presumably realised that the gossip-loving Ambassador would waste no time in 
passing the message back to his superiors, a task Reid undertook with aplomb.95 
The extent to which the knowledge that the successful negotiation of an 
arbitration treaty would finally put to bed any uncertainty regarding the British 
position in a Japanese-American conflict acted as an incentive for American 
policymakers is not entirely clear.  Akira Iriye has suggested that from the beginning 
of the war scare both British and American policymakers recognised that if war 
were to break out between the U.S. and Japan the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would 
fall by the wayside anyway, but it can only have helped the case for arbitration 
within the Taft administration that a treaty would place this assumption on a solid 
basis.96  A British-American treaty of unlimited arbitration was eventually signed in 
August 1911, alongside a similar treaty between the U.S. and France, following on 
from the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance the previous month.  Ultimately, 
however, the arbitration treaty did not survive the ratification process in the U.S. 
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Senate intact, meaning that the alteration in the Alliance did not become 
operational as British policymakers had hoped.97 
In spite of the ostensible failure of the British scheme to exempt the United 
States from the scope of the Alliance with Japan, the episode was still significant for 
the relations of the three powers.  It confirmed the existence of what had been an 
unspoken limitation on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance arguably from its inception: 
Britain would not go to war with the United States.98  In attempting to have this 
caveat made formal and explicit by pressing for a modification, and indeed a 
weakening, of the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, British policymakers had 
veered from the blueprint of the previous decade.  During the Russo-Japanese War 
and in relation to the immigration question, not to mention Taft’s ‘Dollar 
Diplomacy’ projects with which the next chapter will deal, the British Government 
had opted to weather the irritation and rebukes of Washington rather than risk 
undermining relations with Japan by appearing to throw their lot in with the United 
States.  There are a number of possible explanations for the apparent decision of 
British policymakers to put relations with the United States ahead of the Alliance 
with Japan in this instance, such as the primary motivation actually being the global 
policy imperative of keeping the Dominions on-side.  What really sets this case 
apart, however, is that an arbitration treaty would have represented concrete 
progress in British-American relations – a step in the direction of the broad, 
comprehensive cooperation and partnership which British policymakers so 
earnestly desired – rather than simply the intangible goodwill which the British 
elected to sacrifice in other instances in the cause of maintaining the full strength of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 
                                                           
97 H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1952 
(London, 1954), p.627; Campbell, ‘Taft, Roosevelt and the Arbitration Treaties of 1911’, p.287; B. 
Collier, The Lion and the Eagle: British and Anglo-American Strategy, 1900-1950 (New York, 1972), 
p.4; J.M. Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, 
MA, 1983), p.154. 
98 H. Rumbold to E. Grey, July 17th 1911, FO 410/59, TNA; H. Rumbold to E. Grey, July 29th 1911, FO 
410/59, TNA; J. Chapman, ‘The Secret Dimensions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1900-1905’, in P.P. 
O’Brien (ed.), The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922 (London, 2004), p.95; Griswold, The Far 
Eastern Policy of the United States, p.168; Nish, Alliance in Decline, pp.27, 72, 78. 
195 
 
This contention, and the fact that the renegotiation of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance in 1911 represents the exception rather than the rule, is illustrated by 
British-American interaction over the renewed war scare of 1913-14, which fell back 
into the established pattern of British partiality towards Japan in spite of shared 
interests.  California was once again at the centre of this later flare-up of tension 
between the U.S. and Japan, as a result of legislation put forward in the spring of 
1913 which was designed to deprive Japanese immigrants of the right to own land.  
The Alien Land Law controversy was rooted in growing fears across the West Coast 
that the Japanese were becoming increasingly dominant in agriculture, out-
competing whites and buying up the land of those they had forced out.  For those 
preoccupied with the preservation of ‘white men’s countries’, this development 
was particularly alarming, appearing to confirm dire predictions of a ‘peaceful 
invasion’ and Japanese colonisation of the Pacific Coast.99  The proposed Californian 
law was offensive from the point of view of the Japanese not only because it related 
to the fundamental issue of landownership, but because of the barely concealed 
racial discrimination inherent in it.  Though the legislation did not single out the 
Japanese specifically, the use of the phrase ‘aliens ineligible for citizenship’ was 
effectively the same thing, as the naturalisation laws of the U.S. to which this 
referred only excluded Asians from becoming citizens.  In early April 1913, Tokyo 
thus called on the newly-installed Wilson administration to block the legislation for 
the sake of Japanese-American amity.100 
Whereas Roosevelt and Taft had been quick to quash similar discrimination 
when it arose and threatened relations with Japan, President Woodrow Wilson 
faced an impressive list of ideological and political handicaps in dealing with the 
situation in California, and was therefore considerably less resolute on the issue.  In 
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the first place, Wilson viewed the Japanese immigration question primarily through 
the lens of Southern race relations, and had come out publicly during his election 
campaign in favour of the principle of Asian exclusion on the basis that the nation 
already had one ‘race problem’ to deal with.101  Worse still, California’s Democrats 
were the faction most strongly committed to exclusion, while Governor Hiram 
Johnson – a Roosevelt Progressive with no love for the new administration – was 
disinclined to cooperate.102  Finally, Wilson and his Secretary of State, William 
Jennings Bryan, were strong advocates of the principle of states’ rights and 
therefore very reluctant to involve themselves in California’s business, in spite of its 
significance for the international relations of the nation.103   
The best response Wilson was able to muster to the situation was to send 
Bryan to California to attempt to arrange a compromise, in the hope that this 
gesture would be sufficient to appease the Japanese. Bryan’s mission to the West 
Coast was not particularly successful; the Secretary of State was unwilling to offer 
anything more than vague advice about finding a less offensive way of wording the 
bill, and Californian legislators were in no mood to concede the major point of 
contention, the disqualification of ‘aliens ineligible for citizenship’ from the right to 
own land.104  The lack of any sort of resolution was deeply frustrating to the 
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Japanese, and the controversy dragged on well into the following year, with the 
Wilson administration merely attempting to placate Tokyo with repeated assertions 
that the discrimination was not essentially racial but merely a matter of economic 
competition.105 
The failure of the American Government to offer anything more than token 
friendliness and bland excuses in response to the discrimination in California 
revived popular resentment in Japan and with it speculations in Europe and the 
United States of impending conflict.106  American military and naval leaders stoked 
the hysteria by calling for readiness on the part of American forces in the Pacific and 
leaking their recommendations for the reinforcement of naval defences at Manila 
and Hawaii.  Wilson, furious at this blatant attempt to force his hand, rejected the 
proposals as needless and deeply provocative.107  Indeed, he took a similar 
approach to Taft with regard to rumours of war, staunchly refusing to give them the 
slightest credit or do anything which might encourage jingoes in either country.  
Nevertheless, the Wilson administration’s inability to deal with the root issue of the 
tension meant that the possibility of war continued to loom over Japanese-
American relations into 1914.108 
The British Government took a particularly keen interest in the controversy 
over California’s land legislation because of the knock-on effect it was having in 
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British Columbia, where similar anxieties also manifested themselves in pressure for 
restrictions on Japanese ownership of land.109  British officials also kept a close 
watch on developments with an eye to the possibility that the situation might at 
some point spiral into conflict between the U.S. and Japan, apparently with a 
greater degree of apprehension than they had evidenced in earlier war scares.  The 
modification of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance meant there was no longer any real 
danger of Britain being called upon to intervene, but a Japanese-American war 
would still have been disastrous from a British point of view, not least because of 
the steadily deteriorating situation in Europe which made close relations with those 
two powers ever more essential.  Though policymakers in London retained the 
fundamental belief that the Japanese Government had no design or desire for war 
with the United States, there was a heightened sense of anxiety that Japanese 
public opinion would become so aroused over the discrimination in California that 
Tokyo would be left with no choice but to embark on a course which would lead to 
hostilities.110 
British concerns on this point may have been influenced to some degree by 
the greater credence which the new Ambassador to Tokyo, Conyngham Greene, 
appears to have given to stereotyped notions of Japanese sensitivity and 
volatility.111  More significant than such ideas, however, were British doubts about 
the ability of the American foreign policy establishment to handle the delicate 
matter of relations with the Japanese.  Anxiety over this question had, as suggested 
above, persisted in the transition from Roosevelt to Taft, and with Wilson in the 
White House it only seems to have intensified.  The British Ambassador at 
Washington, Cecil Spring Rice, was particularly sceptical of the capacity of Wilson 
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and, to an even greater extent, Bryan to understand and effectively handle the 
delicate situation.  In July 1913, he explained his anxieties to Grey:  
Bryan is an excellent man but he thinks he has settled a question when he 
has talked about it and that a good speech which goes down well with a 
country audience makes further action unnecessary.112 
Spring Rice’s estimation of the Wilson administration only decreased as the 
controversy with Japan dragged on.  This was largely in consequence of friction 
between London and Washington in relation to Mexican affairs, which drove the 
Ambassador to describe Wilson’s as ‘the most incompetent government which 
America has ever had’ and shook any remaining faith the British had in the ability of 
American policymakers to summon up the necessary tact and ingenuity to keep 
relations with Japan on an even keel.113 
Part of the British issue with the Wilson administration was the lack of 
insight they received into the official mind as a result of the President’s very 
unilateral and secretive approach to foreign policy.  This factor, perhaps coupled 
with the greater Democratic tendency towards Anglophobia, meant that British-
American interaction to a large extent lost the candid and informal approach to 
communication which had prevailed under Roosevelt and continued, at least to 
some degree, while Taft was President.114  Nevertheless, there is evidence to 
suggest that American policymakers continued to hope for British assistance in 
resolving the tension with Japan over immigration.  The American Ambassador in 
London, Walter Hines Page, certainly followed the line that Britain and the United 
States were in the same boat with regard to Japanese immigration and that the 
issue would fade into insignificance altogether as soon as the British took decisive 
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action to bring it to an end in Canada and Australia, though he only expressed this 
view to the British in a casual manner as his own opinion.115  More substantially, 
Spring Rice reported fairly early on in the Alien Land Law controversy that Bryan had 
conveyed to him, very much off the record, that British intervention of some 
description with the Japanese would be appreciated.  Spring Rice was himself, 
however, a consistent advocate of British mediation to avert a breakdown in 
Japanese-American relations, so it is possible that he misrepresented or 
exaggerated this informal overture from the Secretary of State.116 
Whether or not the Wilson administration actually requested it, British 
intervention with Japan on behalf of the Americans was again rejected by Edward 
Grey for the usual reasons dictating British inaction on this issue.  Not only had the 
Japanese not invited British involvement, meaning that intervention of any sort 
risked causing offence, but the whole question remained a ‘delicate one’ from the 
British point of view, not least because Canada’s immigration settlement still hinged 
on Japanese goodwill.117  Spring Rice nevertheless assumed a sort of personal 
mediatory role between the Japanese Ambassador at Washington and the Wilson 
administration in an attempt to compensate for deficiencies in communication 
between the two nations and offer reassurances of mutual good intentions.118  The 
Japanese Government, far from regretting this unwarranted interposition, 
expressed their appreciation for Spring Rice’s involvement and requested that he 
continue to use his good offices to keep Japanese-American communication in 
Washington as frank and cordial as possible.119   
Apparently spurred on by this Japanese encouragement, the British seem to 
have ventured even further during the war scare of 1913-14 than they had 
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previously in intervening with the U.S. on behalf of Japan.  Beyond simply 
emphasising the desire of the Japanese to remain on good terms with the United 
States, Spring Rice – with support from James Bryce, his predecessor as Ambassador 
– began to offer the Americans advice as to the importance of avoiding inflaming 
Japanese public opinion.  In May and June 1913, Spring Rice urged on the Wilson 
administration a course entailing the ‘extreme of courtesy’, a phrase straight out of 
Roosevelt’s handbook for dealing with the Japanese, and stressed the necessity of 
taking the pride and sensitivity of the Japanese into consideration.120  Such 
entreaties represent something of a shift in the British approach; previously British 
officials had tended to avoid engaging with stereotypes of the Japanese, whereas 
Spring Rice consciously utilised them in an attempt to guide the United States 
towards a more conciliatory stance.  Though such employment of racial stereotypes 
would seem to reflect a negative British image of the Japanese, in actual fact these 
warnings about the volatility of Japanese public opinion came straight from the 
mouths of Japanese statesmen, who pleaded their helplessness in the face of 
popular anger and sensitivity.121  The British use of stereotypes in this instance is 
thus an interesting example of the tactical deployment of such ideas, as Spring Rice 
appears to have opted to talk in these terms at least partly because such a line of 
argument came with Japanese approval.  Overall, there would seem to have been a 
good deal of continuity in the British approach to handling Japanese-American war 
scares, even with the renegotiation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the interim.  
British policymakers remained reluctant to do anything resembling leaning on the 
Japanese on behalf of the Americans, but were considerably more open to Japanese 
requests for assistance. 
The tension between Japan and the United States over the immigration 
question did not simply come to an end in 1914, but with the onset of the First 
World War the prospect of actual conflict between the two nations ceased to have 
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any real significance for the time being.  At various times during the period covered 
by this chapter, however, a Japanese-American war appeared to British and 
American policymakers as a very real, if not particularly likely, possibility.  
Throughout, the two powers proceeded from the same basic premise that war in 
the Pacific was a deeply undesirable outcome, and yet there was very little in the 
way of cooperation between them in the cause of averting conflict.   
The nearest that Britain and the United States came to a collaborative 
approach to the war scares was the simultaneous negotiations for a British-
American arbitration treaty and the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which, 
if successful, would have ruled out the possibility of the British siding with the 
Japanese in conflict with the United States.  Though American domestic politics 
once again proved a stumbling block in this endeavour, the bigger point is that 
British willingness to subordinate relations with Japan to relations with the United 
States in this instance was very much the exception.  Throughout the rest of the war 
scares the major obstacle to British-American cooperation was London’s consistent 
deferral to global policy needs in the prioritisation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.  
Though Roosevelt, and to a lesser extent the Taft and Wilson administrations, 
sought British assistance in ensuring that Japanese-American relations did not break 
down and that immigration was removed as a potential source of conflict, British 
policymakers resolutely resisted American overtures.  Moreover, they actually 
exhibited something of a preference for working with the Japanese in the cause of 
peace by attempting to calm the transpacific tensions in Washington rather than in 
Tokyo. 
This approach reflected not only the desire to remain on good terms with 
Japan, but also concerns in London that the United States, rather than the Japanese, 
would be the responsible party in the event of a conflict.  Such fears were 
unquestionably influenced by images of the Americans as impulsive and brash in 
their approach to foreign policy, and it was these stereotypes, rather than images of 
the Japanese as oversensitive and belligerent, which had the greater influence on 
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British-American interaction over the war scares, in spite of the susceptibility of the 
Americans to the latter.  More broadly, though, it is the relative absence of 
ideological content in British-American interaction which is once again the most 
striking trend.  Notions of an inevitable, epoch-defining clash between East and 
West for ‘the mastery of the Pacific’ and Yellow Peril ideas regarding the threat of a 
Japanese invasion are nowhere to be found in communication over the possibility of 
conflict, despite providing the basic framework through which many people in the 
United States in particular viewed the war scares.  Such inflammatory ideas were 
entirely at odds with the desire of British policymakers to keep a lid on tensions, 
and although they might in theory have served Roosevelt’s case for British 
intervention he appears to have realised that they could ultimately have proved 
counterproductive, implying that the Americans were in a state of irrationality and 
paranoia, hence his active efforts to distance himself from this kind of thinking. 
Though American efforts to garner British support in averting a conflict with 
Japan were ultimately unavailing, the lack of cooperation between the two 
governments over the war scares did not cause any great decline in cordiality and 
goodwill.  As the next chapter will demonstrate, however, the same cannot be said 
of interaction with regard to affairs in China during the same period.  After Taft and 
then Wilson took the helm of American China policy, East Asia would once again 
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Following the resolution of the Boxer Rising, China moved somewhat into the 
background in British and American thinking regarding East Asia; even as the Russo-
Japanese War was playing out on Chinese soil the powers treated China as little 
more than a passive bystander.  It was not until 1909, with the re-entry of the 
United States into the contest for investment in Chinese railways, that China began 
to assume a significant place in British and American foreign policy calculations 
again, a trend which was further accelerated by the outbreak of the Xinhai 
Revolution in 1911.  This chapter will address these two key developments and 
make the case that these years were characterised by a series of extremes in 
British-American interaction over East Asia.  American intervention into the railway 
question under President William Howard Taft generated the most pronounced 
friction and mutual irritation of the period as a whole, while by contrast the initial 
stages of the Revolution witnessed the only real example of significant British-
American cooperation which this study has documented.  Finally, the arrival of 
Woodrow Wilson at the White House in 1913 worked a complete reversal both in 
American China policy and in British-American relations in East Asia, with an abrupt 
end to cooperation and a return to the complete rejection of joint action on the 
part of the United States. 
 In consequence of the dramatic shifts which took place in British-American 
interaction over East Asia in these years, the period covered by this chapter is 
representative of the full range of the trends which the study as a whole has 
identified.  At certain points cooperation between the two powers was ruled out by 
the British need to prioritise global policy commitments, while at others the limiting 
factor was the domestic political situation in the United States.  Furthermore, 
shared passivity, the mismatch in British and American concepts of desirable 
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cooperation and the disparity in the extent of the two powers’ respective 
investment in East Asia all played a role in interaction between Britain and the 
United States during these years. 
 The period with which this chapter is concerned is similarly representative 
with regard to ideology, as the most salient point is that ideas which were 
significant at the popular level – whether stereotyped notions of Chinese 
characteristics, Yellow Peril theories about Japanese dominance in East Asia or 
Anglo-Saxonist notions of a shared destiny to uplift and develop China in the cause 
of civilisation – were decidedly rare in official interaction.  There are a few isolated 
examples of ideas relating to race and civilisation making an appearance, however, 
and these are illustrative of several key contentions which this study has put 
forward.  There are further indications, for example, that the racial or civilisational 
case for British-American cooperation was discussed almost exclusively in abstract 
terms rather than in relation to concrete opportunities for joint action.  Moreover, 
there is striking evidence that policymakers consciously employed or avoided 
ideological arguments on a tactical basis.  Finally, as with a number of the other 
events and issues which this study has addressed, the most prominent ideological 
influence on British and American statesmen and officials was not the kinds of ideas 
mentioned above, but rather broadly negative images of the character and 
behaviour of the other power.  These preconceived notions had a marked effect on 
the attitudes of policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic and were firmly 
reinforced by the events which unfolded in China during these years. 
American policy in China in the years prior to Taft’s arrival at the White 
House in March 1909 had been reasonably passive and hands-off, even by American 
standards, as the Roosevelt administration pursued other more pressing projects 
and concerns.  Policymakers had not, however, forsaken the broad principles of 
equality of opportunity for trade and the territorial integrity of China, and, contrary 
to the claims of some historians, nor had they entirely abandoned the Open Door in 
Manchuria in the hope of relieving the tension with Japan which had been caused 
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by disputes over immigration.1  Though it would be fair to say that Roosevelt 
personally prioritised mitigating the immigration crisis over the nation’s rather 
meagre commercial interests in China, Secretary of State Elihu Root did not simply 
acquiesce in the closing of the Open Door in Manchuria, chasing up complaints from 
American businessmen and urging the Japanese and Russians to refrain from 
unfairly monopolising trade or infringing treaty rights.2  Crucially though, American 
China policy differed under Roosevelt and Taft in one major respect.  Whereas 
Roosevelt and Root largely accepted the limited nature of American commerce and 
interests in China and accordingly restricted their involvement, Taft and his 
Secretary of State, Philander Knox, sought to address this lack of interests by 
expanding the American financial and political stake throughout the Chinese 
Empire.3 
Taft’s personal interest in East Asia was well established prior to his arrival at 
the White House, following his spell as Governor-General of the Philippines and 
several visits to the region as Roosevelt’s Secretary of War.  He gave clear 
indications both on the latter of these trips in 1907 and during his 1908 election 
campaign of his conviction that the United States should take an active part in East 
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Asian affairs with a view to upholding the Open Door, boosting American trade and 
guiding China along the path of modern civilisation.4  On becoming President, Taft 
articulated a new approach to foreign policy, built around what he later described 
as ‘substituting dollars for bullets’: using private investment to solidify American 
influence in the political arena and promote development, which would in turn be 
beneficial to trade.5  Though this ‘Dollar Diplomacy’ has been pilloried by some 
historians as an instrument of financial ‘special interests’, in the conception of the 
Taft administration, investment in China was not so much an end in itself as a 
means of ‘giving new life and practical application to the open-door policy’.6  As it 
unfolded, however, the policy of Taft and Knox became not just a reiteration but a 
significant expansion of the Open Door, entailing a duty to actively uplift and 
protect China, and recognising few of the caveats and limitations inherent in Hay’s 
original policy.7 
In his Inaugural Address, Taft spoke of the need for the United States to 
begin backing up the defence of her interests in China and the principles of the 
Open Door with more than ‘mere verbal protest and diplomatic note’, and from the 
outset the administration was on the lookout for an opportunity to put American 
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money where its mouth was.8  Such an opportunity arose in an arrangement 
between China and banking groups representing Britain, France and Germany for 
the financing and construction of railways in southern China.  This project, labelled 
collectively as the Hukuang Loan, had a complex history, including an earlier 
incarnation in which the United States had originally been guaranteed participation.  
In the spring of 1909, officials in the State Department highlighted this all-but-
forgotten guarantee as a justification for the inclusion of American capital in the 
scheme.9  Knox and Taft concluded that participation in the Hukuang Loan would be 
an essential first step in the new activist policy, providing the necessary stake to 
ensure that the United States had a voice along with the other powers in all future 
dealings with China.  They therefore arranged for the formation of an American 
banking group to make the investment on their behalf.10   
In late May and early June 1909, the State Department informed the Chinese 
and the three European powers of the American desire to participate in the 
Hukuang Loan on the basis of their claim to preference in the earlier project and the 
principles of the Open Door.11  This American intervention came as a complete 
shock to the European powers, not least because by the beginning of June 1909 the 
loan agreement had, after an extended and rather fraught process of negotiation, 
been effectively concluded and was awaiting only the final Chinese seal of approval.  
Consequently, all parties involved in the Hukuang project, the British perhaps most 
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strongly of all, declared that it was simply too late to provide for American 
participation.12  Undeterred, Knox began to lobby the European powers to change 
their stance, meanwhile putting pressure on the Chinese Government to halt the 
project until the claims of the United States had been met.13 
The Secretary of State, while maintaining that the U.S. had the right to 
participate in any case, sought to win the support of the British Government by 
arguing that American participation in the Hukuang Loan represented an 
opportunity to give substance to the Open Door by means of international 
cooperation.14  Ambassador Whitelaw Reid took this argument in a slightly different 
direction, suggesting to Foreign Secretary Edward Grey that the collaboration of the 
four powers would be advantageous as it would powerfully ‘impress the Oriental 
imagination’ and avoid a situation where the Chinese were tempted to play the 
powers off against one another.15  The significance of this suggestion that the 
impressionable Chinese might become easier to manage – less inclined to engage in 
their customary intrigue and evasion – in the face of the combined power of the 
Western nations is demonstrated in the subsequent instructions Reid received from 
his chief in Washington.  Knox specifically highlighted this aspect of Reid’s 
communication and encouraged the Ambassador to make full use of such ideas 
informally, ‘if their influence would be effective in securing the arrangement 
desired’.  He warned him, however, to avoid in official communications reference to 
‘the Oriental imagination or any other phraseology which if allowed to become 
generally known would create an unfortunate impression regarding the views of 
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this Government.’16  This example of explicit discussion of the tactical deployment 
and avoidance of racial ideology in British-American interaction is rare, but it 
indicates quite clearly that statesmen understood such language to hold a great 
deal of power, both in its potential to influence and in the damage it might do if 
used too freely and openly. 
Whether the projected impact of four-power cooperation on the ‘Oriental 
imagination’ had any influence on British thinking is not entirely clear, but American 
persistence in blocking the project certainly seems to have held greater weight with 
policymakers in London than any of Reid’s arguments.  In July 1909, Taft upped the 
pressure on the Chinese Government by writing personally to the Regent and 
demanding that American participation be arranged before the loan went ahead.  
The message to the beleaguered Chinese was uncompromising: refusal would be 
taken as a rejection of American friendliness, a possible consequence of which 
might even be the cessation of the programme under which the U.S. was remitting 
the remainder of the Boxer indemnity.17  In light of Taft’s ultimatum, British 
policymakers concluded that the United States intended to block the Hukuang Loan 
indefinitely if excluded, and they therefore reluctantly acquiesced in the 
participation of the American banking group.18 
This British ‘capitulation’ was met with a triumphant response from the 
Americans, but it marked only the beginning of an extensive process of negotiation 
between the four groups as to how American participation was to be arranged.19  
Knox, who had initially implied that the U.S. was unconcerned with the details of 
the arrangement, now insisted on absolute equality in every particular, a demand 
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which even the American bankers considered unreasonable.20  The State 
Department’s intransigence on this point created a serious obstacle to the 
renegotiation of the arrangement and condemned the whole project to 
interminable haggling over minutiae.  Indeed, it was not until mid-1910 that a final 
agreement between the powers was reached, at which point Chinese objections 
delayed the project still further.21  American intervention in the Hukuang Loan thus 
represented more of a stumbling block than a launch pad for international 
cooperation in China, and the slow demise of the project certainly did not draw 
Britain and the United States into closer relations.  On the contrary, the whole affair 
generated a marked feeling of irritation in both London and Washington.   
American policymakers had expected that their initiative would be well 
received in London, and were consequently nonplussed when the British expressed 
reservations and even sought to prevent U.S. participation.  This disappointment 
bred a sense of frustration and suspicion in Washington, and during the long 
negotiations over the details of the Hukuang agreement American officials were 
very quick to place the blame for any given hold-up or impasse at the door of the 
British Government.22  Such recriminations were resented by British policymakers 
and officials, for whom the deferral of the railway project was a bitter enough pill in 
itself after the tortuous process of negotiations they had already been through.  
British objections to U.S. participation had been based from the outset on well-
grounded anxiety that an attempt to integrate American finance into the already 
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fragile arrangement would prove disastrous, and if the postponement of the 
scheme thus came as no surprise, it was no less frustrating from the point of view of 
the Foreign Office.23  Whereas the Americans approached the Hukuang loan as a 
path to future commercial expansion, not to mention an exercise in claiming their 
technical rights, the British stood to lose out substantially from the failure of the 
project, as the proposed railways would have offered much-needed sustenance to 
their existing commercial interests.24  The difference in the extent of British and 
American investment in East Asia thus acted as a hindrance to cooperation and a 
cause of friction, as the disparity between the hypothetical American stake and the 
concrete and significant British one left the two powers working somewhat at cross 
purposes. 
Mutual irritation over the Hukuang Loan issue, though fairly short-lived, 
reflected and reinforced certain images and preconceptions which British and 
American policymakers held of each other.  There was a pronounced tendency 
within the Taft administration to associate Britain with the ‘old world’, imperialist 
powers – or, worse still, with Japan and Russia – and their selfish and exploitative 
approach to China, in contrast to the disinterested and altruistic policy of the United 
States.25  This image of the British came to the surface during the negotiations for 
the Hukuang Loan – with Assistant Secretary of State Francis M. Huntington Wilson 
in particular railing against perceived British insincerity and self-interest – and the 
Foreign Office’s unwillingness to compromise on British interests amplified pre-
existing American doubts as to the genuineness of London’s commitment to the 
Open Door and the welfare of China.26  The prevailing British view of U.S. policy in 
China was similarly disparaging, however, and policymakers and officials regularly 
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accused the Americans of approaching diplomacy not as statesmen but as lawyers 
or businessmen, prone to disregard formalities and conventions and engage in 
sharp practice wherever it served their aims.27  The forthright approach which Taft 
and Knox adopted in order to secure American participation in the Hukuang Loan 
substantiated British misgivings about American methods, cementing the image of 
U.S. foreign policy as brash and crudely legalistic.28 
British frustrations over the Taft administration’s railroading of the Hukuang 
Loan were not sufficient to dampen the desire of policymakers in London for 
British-American cooperation more generally.  In their attempts to explain the 
British position regarding the project, Grey and Ambassador James Bryce 
consistently dwelt on the long-standing British desire to work with the United States 
in China.  The problem, as they repeatedly explained to American policymakers, was 
simply one of timing; at any other point the British Government would have heartily 
welcomed American collaboration, but the eleventh-hour intervention into the 
Hukuang Loan held little prospect of success and put an otherwise viable project at 
risk.29  Though such British protestations as to their desire for joint action in East 
Asia must have rung hollow in Washington, the incident does illustrate the 
continued significance of the mismatch between British hopes for a broad 
cooperative approach in the region and the American preference for joint action 
only on a very specific and limited basis. 
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American participation in the Hukuang Loan was only the initial step in the 
Taft administration’s programme of Dollar Diplomacy in China, a prelude to the 
more significant intervention into the realm of Manchurian railways.  Manchuria 
became the major focal point of Dollar Diplomacy because it was the region with 
the best prospects for expanding American commerce and also the primary place 
where the Open Door and Chinese territorial integrity appeared to be under 
threat.30  Influential voices both within and outside of the State Department had for 
some years been calling for the United States to assist the Chinese in actively 
challenging the ‘sinister designs’ of the Japanese, who stood accused of pursuing a 
‘policy of aggression and penetration’ in Manchuria.31  Some – most prominently 
Thomas Millard, an author and correspondent of Taft’s – even suggested that the 
outcome of Japanese-American rivalry in the region would decide not only the 
future of China but, ultimately, the fate of civilisation across the globe.32 
Such ideas do not appear to have held much appeal for Taft and Knox, who, 
though rejecting the notion that it was necessary to curb American ambition in East 
Asia in order to appease the Japanese, had no wish to antagonise Tokyo.  Their 
preference was rather for the maintenance of a position of impartiality between 
China and Japan, with Knox observing in August 1909 that it was not the 
responsibility of the United States to ‘undertake a Quixotically altruistic task for 
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China’s benefit’.33  Nevertheless, coaxed along by his more activist subordinates, 
the Secretary of State embarked on a programme of railway development in 
Manchuria which fitted this description to a tee.  The basis of the scheme was a 
proposal for a new line between Jinzhou (Chinchow) in southern Manchuria and 
Aihui (Aigun) on the border with Russia, sometimes referred to as the Chin-Ai 
project.  This railway was to be funded and built jointly by American and British 
businessmen with a view to eventual Chinese ownership, and the project thus 
seemed an ideal fit for Dollar Diplomacy; not only would it provide an outlet for 
American capital, it was also premised on international cooperation and assisting 
the Chinese towards modernisation.34  What Knox and Taft appear to have 
inadequately grasped, however, was that the Chin-Ai project had originally been 
conceived primarily as a means of undermining the Japanese regional monopoly on 
railways, an important detail which would ultimately be the undoing of the whole 
enterprise.35 
Before any great progress had been made towards getting the Chin-Ai 
project off the ground, Knox came to the conclusion that the bilateral scheme was 
neither wholly in line with the principle of the Open Door nor sufficiently ambitious.  
He thus developed a more eye-catching and genuinely international proposition: 
the neutralisation of all railways in Manchuria.  The premise of the neutralisation 
scheme was that an international financial grouping, including any power wishing to 
participate, would loan the Chinese Government funds not only to build new 
railways in Manchuria but to purchase the existing lines from Russia and Japan.  Any 
element of competition would thus be eliminated and the powers could 
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cooperatively oversee the construction and running of a unified rail system in a 
‘scientific’ and efficient manner.36  As Ambassador Reid explained the project to the 
British Government in a memo of November 1909, neutralisation would be the 
‘practical application’ of the Open Door and should therefore appeal to any power 
that was in favour of the principles of equality and Chinese integrity.37 
Reid’s initial overture implied, and later communications made explicit, that 
American policymakers expected the British Government to support the scheme 
and lend their influence to convincing the other powers, Japan in particular, to get 
behind the plan for neutralisation.38  This put British policymakers in a difficult 
position, as although they were favourable in principle to railway development in 
Manchuria, and broadly desirous of cooperation with the United States, they had 
significant reservations about the American proposal, not least its apparent 
disregard for the interests of Japan and Russia.39  The Foreign Office had for several 
years taken the view that Japan’s predominant position in Manchuria, though 
somewhat regrettable from a commercial point of view, was justified, and that it 
would be unwise to attempt to challenge it given the desirability of Japanese 
immigration being directed towards mainland Asia rather than the English-speaking 
countries of the Pacific.40  Moreover, as anxiety in London grew over German naval 
expansion, the necessity of remaining on friendly terms with Japan – not to mention 
Russia, with whom Britain had entered into an understanding in 1907 – increasingly 
outweighed economic interests in China in the calculations of policymakers.41  The 
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American initiative had the potential to cause significant friction with Tokyo, 
especially considering the perceived ‘anti-Japanese proclivities’ of certain key 
figures in Washington, and so British policymakers wished to avoid being drawn into 
supporting it, and in fact sought to discourage the Taft administration from 
pursuing the scheme altogether.42 
The British response to American proposals regarding neutralisation was 
therefore thoroughly lukewarm and non-committal; Grey offered little more than a 
suggestion that the timing might not be right for such a venture.43  In spite of the 
lack of encouragement he received from London, Knox consistently cited British 
backing in pitching the neutralisation scheme to the other powers.44  It is not 
entirely clear whether Knox had received unduly optimistic reports of the British 
reaction or deliberately misrepresented the British position in the hope of pushing 
the project forward and dragging them along with him.  In any case, American 
policymakers firmly believed that their interests and those of Britain were identical 
in the matter of Manchurian railways, and that cooperation in the neutralisation 
venture could be all but taken for granted.45  Such inflated expectations of British 
willingness to cooperate in the American scheme are reminiscent of Roosevelt’s 
assumption that he would have British support for his peace schemes during the 
Russo-Japanese War.  There was some basis, at least in terms of commercial 
interests, for expecting British backing for the neutralisation scheme but, just as 
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Roosevelt had done, Knox failed to grasp that there were other factors influencing 
British policy. 
As British policymakers had predicted, Japan and Russia both had serious 
objections to the neutralisation scheme and would not entertain the notion of 
selling off their Manchurian railroads, which in the Japanese case had been gained 
‘at the cost of much treasure and many lives’.46  This did not put the matter to rest, 
however, as Knox, undeterred by the miscarriage of his grander plan, continued to 
pursue the original Chin-Ai project in the early months of 1910.  The Japanese and 
Russians each objected to this more limited version of the scheme almost as 
strongly as they did to the neutralisation proposal, and this again placed British 
policymakers in an awkward position.47  Russian objections, which were ostensibly 
on strategic rather than simply economic grounds, were substantial enough to force 
British policymakers to abandon their equivocal position of neither actively 
supporting nor obstructing the American railway initiatives and come out in 
opposition to the Chin-Ai project.  In addition to bringing up the all-but-forgotten 
Scott-Muraviev Agreement of 1899, in which the British Government had pledged 
not to undertake railway projects north of the Great Wall, the Russian Foreign 
Minister implied that British support for the line was sufficiently serious to threaten 
the relatively recent entente between the two powers.48  Chastened, Grey 
instructed the British representative in China to make clear to the Chinese that the 
Chin-Ai project could not be pursued without the acquiescence of Russia and Japan, 
effectively stopping the whole enterprise in its tracks. 49 
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The decision of British policymakers to put the brakes on the Chin-Ai project 
and refrain from backing the neutralisation scheme in light of Japanese and Russian 
protests was not a reflection of a lack of desire for cooperation with the United 
States.  It is, however, suggestive of a recognition on their part that joint action in 
this instance would not have brought about the broader regional, and indeed 
global, partnership for which they hoped.  Siding with the United States over the 
Manchurian railway projects would not have gained Britain anything concrete, but it 
would have risked the integrity of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the entente with 
Russia.50  Though he was unwilling to pay this price in order to remain in the good 
graces of the Taft administration, Grey did make an effort to mitigate American 
displeasure, attempting to sugar-coat the British demurral by consistent emphasis 
on his long-standing desire for British-American cooperation in China.51 
Such sentiments were little consolation to the Americans, and for Knox in 
particular the refusal of the British to support the Manchurian railway projects was 
a source of acute frustration.52  Some in Washington even appear to have singled 
out Britain’s action, or indeed lack of action, as the decisive factor in the failure of 
the enterprise, though there is admittedly more than a slight whiff of scapegoating 
about such claims.53  American policymakers denigrated British conduct with regard 
to Manchurian railways, especially the warning to China over the Chin-Ai project, as 
a repudiation not only of Britain’s own interests in China but of their professed 
commitment to the Open Door and Chinese sovereignty.  Though they understood 
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on some level the reasons behind it, key figures such as Huntington Wilson 
dismissed the British refusal to support the railway project as needless kowtowing 
to the Russians and Japanese stemming from ‘chronic invertebracy’.54  These kinds 
of criticisms indicate the continued influence on American policymakers of an image 
of the British as irresolute and prone to equivocation, especially when it came to 
choosing between the path of altruism and that of immediate self-interest. 
Confronted with these American reproaches, British officials and 
policymakers vented, albeit privately, their own irritation over the Taft 
administration’s policy in China.  Not only had the Manchurian railway schemes 
been poorly conceived and executed but, they felt, the British had as much reason 
for frustration as the Americans given the lack of consideration the latter had 
shown for the delicacy of Britain’s position.55  The impetuous manner in which Knox 
and the State Department had pushed their initiative forward, with minimal regard 
for the realities of the diplomatic situation, further solidified the British image of 
American policymakers as jumped-up lawyers rather than serious diplomats.56  
Moreover, the abject failure of Dollar Diplomacy in Manchuria served to reinforce 
British preconceptions about the amateurish and half-baked nature of American 
diplomacy.  British Minister to China John Jordan, for example, ridiculed the 
neutralisation scheme as an ‘international will-o’-the-wisp’, among other things, 
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and such comments are characteristic of the common attitude among British 
officials that the United States could not yet be taken seriously on the world stage.57 
British policymakers and officials, having identified a definite ‘touchiness’ on 
the part of the Taft administration over the issue, were careful to keep such 
disparaging assessments of the American foray into the Manchurian question to 
themselves, seeking instead to find ways to counteract the potential ill effects of 
American resentment of their uncooperative stance.58  American policymakers do 
appear to have nursed their grievances over the British refusal to support the 
Manchurian railway projects for an impressive length of time, probably in part 
because the venture did not merely fail but ultimately backfired quite spectacularly.  
The intervention of the United States into Manchurian affairs had been intended to 
prevent a situation where Japan and Russia came together to further exploit the 
region and diminish Chinese sovereignty.  Knox’s schemes actually ended up 
hastening the rapprochement between these two powers, however, as they found 
common ground in resisting American interference.59  That the British Government 
approved of this unwelcome consequence of American miscalculation appears to 
have kept the sting of Britain’s perceived backsliding fresh in the minds of 
policymakers in Washington.60  
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In November 1910, Knox, apparently unable to contain his frustration any 
longer, vented his feelings on the British role in the failure of the Manchurian 
railway projects in two interviews with British Chargé d’Affaires Alfred Mitchell 
Innes.  His main gripe remained the British warning to China over the Chin-Ai 
project, which he described as ‘tantamount to a prohibition’, and he made quite 
plain his belief that blame for any friction which existed between Britain and the 
United States lay entirely in London.61  What is most noteworthy about Knox’s 
comments, however, is the language in which he explained his expectation that 
Britain and the United States should have been in harmony in their policies in China.  
He dwelt, fairly emphatically according to Mitchell Innes, on the notion that ‘the 
destinies of the two countries lay side by side’ and that they were bound together 
by ‘indissoluble ties’.62  None of the earlier exchanges over the Manchurian railway 
question contain any of this Anglo-Saxonist-influenced language, and so Knox’s 
repeated use of such ideas with Mitchell Innes at this point is interesting.  It is worth 
noting that Knox’s diatribes of November 1910, though evidently intended to elicit a 
degree of contrition from British policymakers, did not have a concrete, practical 
purpose in mind, the railway schemes being long since defunct.  His employment of 
Anglo-Saxonist tropes in this instance is thus consistent with the broad pattern of 
ideological language being largely restricted to abstract observations rather than 
serious discussion of policy and cooperation. 
American Dollar Diplomacy, as expressed in the Hukuang Loan and the 
Manchurian railway schemes, has generally been judged by historians to have been 
unrealistic and inept, driven by a legalistic view of the questions at stake rather than 
a sound understanding of the real issues.63  American policymakers apparently 
failed to grasp the importance which the various interested powers attached to 
their interests in East Asia, an error which reflected the speculative nature of the 
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American stake in the region in contrast to the more concrete investment of Britain 
and the other nations.64  Furthermore, they neglected to account for the extent to 
which great power politics in China was driven by the balance of power in Europe.  
In spite of the consistent tendency of British policy in East Asia to defer to global 
needs, Taft and Knox wrongly assumed that the British Government would place 
greater value on their own commercial interests than they did on their agreements 
with Russia and Japan.65  American policymakers were forced to face up more fully 
to the reality of the situation in the Far East in the aftermath of the Manchurian 
railways debacle.  In consequence, they retreated somewhat from the combative 
and uncompromising stance which had characterised Dollar Diplomacy and began 
to reconcile themselves, albeit gradually, to a more genuinely cooperative 
approach.66  This shift would become increasingly important as simmering regional 
unrest in China deteriorated into full-blown revolution.   
The story of the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 is a complex one, with various 
contradictory currents – provincialism and nationalism, radicalism and conservatism 
– contributing to the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of the 
Republic of China.67  The uprising cannot be entirely separated from the Dollar 
Diplomacy schemes with which the first part of this chapter has been concerned, as 
one of the main sparks which ignited the revolt in China was provincial opposition 
to international railway projects such as the Hukuang Loan.  Though they do appear 
to have grasped this connection, British and American policymakers struggled to 
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make sense of the rapidly developing crisis, especially as the unfolding of the 
Revolution did not fit all that comfortably with preconceived Western impressions 
of the Chinese.68   
The most striking way in which the Revolution diverged from the expected 
pattern was in the conspicuous lack of anti-foreign rhetoric and violence.69  This 
went against the well-established belief in Britain and the U.S. that the Chinese, if 
not all Orientals, were inherently predisposed towards xenophobic viciousness, a 
stereotype which had been firmly cemented by the events of the Boxer Rising a 
decade earlier.70  The eschewal of anti-foreignism was a deliberate strategy on the 
part of the revolutionaries, who took a good deal of care to ensure that foreign lives 
and property were not endangered in the hope of garnering Western sympathy.  
This endeavour to a large extent paid off, as the powers did not feel compelled to 
immediately intervene, enabling the anti-government forces to gain some 
momentum in their offensive against the Manchu dynasty unhindered by foreign 
interference.71 
The flipside of the revolutionaries’ abstention from jeopardising foreign 
interests was that they were in a position to discourage the various powers from 
interfering by dangling the threat of targeted reprisals against their nationals.  The 
fundamental goal of British and American policy was to ensure the protection of 
foreign lives and property, and so the approach taken by the revolutionaries 
strongly reinforced the natural tendency of policymakers in London and 
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Washington towards passivity, encouraging them to maintain a posture of non-
intervention and strict neutrality even as the Revolution spread and seriously 
imperilled the Imperial Government.  The British were especially circumspect with 
regard to their actions in China, wishing to avoid appearing to prop up the Manchu 
dynasty in light of the concentration of their extensive interests in the rebel-
dominated Yangtze Valley.72  Britain and the United States both took the position 
that the policy of non-intervention should entail not only military and political 
neutrality, but financial neutrality as well.  The Chinese Government, with support 
from American representatives in China, pleaded for a loan to avoid a complete 
collapse, but the Foreign Office and State Department were in agreement that any 
kind of financial aid prior to a settlement would represent a breach of neutrality and 
was therefore too much of a risk.73 
In order for the policy of non-intervention and financial neutrality to be 
effective it was vital that all of the major powers were in accord and that none were 
tempted to pursue an independent course.  British and American policymakers 
were thus committed to maintaining the highest possible degree of international 
cooperation in response to the Revolution.  They were particularly anxious to 
secure the adherence of Russia and Japan, the powers most likely to intervene 
unilaterally, to the international concert and were even prepared to acquiesce in 
the compromise of the Open Door in Manchuria and Mongolia in order to achieve 
this.74  Beyond the immediate priority of ensuring the safety of foreign lives and 
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property, Britain and the United States had the shared longer-term goals of an 
eventual return to stability and the maintenance, as far as possible given the 
circumstances, of Chinese territorial integrity.  Comprehensive international 
cooperation appeared to be the best means of pursuing these aims as well, the 
theory being that it would avoid a descent into ‘unprofitable competition’ amongst 
the powers and minimise the risk of the more aggressive nations making use of the 
upheaval for their own self-aggrandisement.75 
 With the two powers adopting almost identical positions on all major issues 
and working together within the context of broad international cooperation, the 
initial stages of the Xinhai Revolution represented a high watermark for harmony 
between Britain and the United States in East Asia.  British and American 
policymakers actually went even further in the direction of fully-fledged joint action, 
however, agreeing to consult with one another over the various issues thrown up by 
the Revolution prior to addressing them with the other powers.76  In contrast to 
their approach during the Boxer Rising, where freedom of action was the 
watchword, it was the Americans who led the way in orchestrating this coordinated 
British-American approach in China.  The State Department set out from the very 
beginning of the crisis the desirability of working closely with the British 
Government, not only because of the community of interest between the two 
powers but also because of the perceived influence of the British with other 
powers, Japan and Russia specifically, which might prove useful in securing 
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American objectives.77  This degree of cooperation between Britain and the United 
States in East Asia was almost unprecedented, but it would prove a significant 
challenge to maintain as the Revolution made the transition from ousting the old 
regime to attempting to establish a new one. 
Negotiations between the revolutionaries and the Manchu Government 
during the winter of 1911-1912 resulted in a settlement which provided for the 
abdication of the Emperor and the establishment of a republic, with Yuan Shih-Kai, 
who had taken charge of the Chinese Government after the outbreak of the 
Revolution, as provisional president.  British and American policymakers were 
supportive of this outcome, seeing in Yuan the ‘strong man’ who would be 
necessary for the establishment of any kind of stability in China.78  Though they 
continued to share the same basic interests and view of the situation in China, 
cracks did begin to show in relations between Britain and the United States as 
policymakers’ attitudes gradually diverged on the two key issues of financial aid and 
recognition.  This did not mean an end to cooperation, which continued both 
amongst the various interested powers and on a bilateral level between London and 
Washington, but it did engender the development of mutual suspicions, influenced 
to some extent by negative images of one another. 
 The first order of business for the Republic of China was the question of 
funding; the new Government was in desperate need of a financial injection in 
order to consolidate itself.  The vehicle for this assistance, which would become 
known as the Reorganisation Loan, was an international consortium of banking 
groups formed by the four signatories of the Hukuang Loan with the addition of 
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Russia and Japan.  British and American policymakers, as they had throughout the 
early months of the crisis, consulted together closely with respect to the 
Reorganisation Loan, openly demonstrating what Ambassador Bryce described as 
‘reciprocal confidence in one another’s disinterestedness’.79  They found 
themselves in agreement, initially at least, on the contentious issues of exclusivity 
and supervision of the loan, both supporting the recommendations of the banking 
groups that the Chinese Government should not be permitted to borrow outside of 
the consortium and that there should be adequate oversight of the expenditure of 
the funds.  The thinking behind this shared position was that external loans had the 
potential to undermine international cooperation, which British and American 
policymakers still deemed absolutely vital, while unrestricted spending of the loan 
was likely to lead to bankruptcy and default, paving the way for infringements of 
Chinese sovereignty.80 
Despite broad agreement amongst the powers on both exclusivity and 
supervision, these two questions became significant stumbling blocks in the 
negotiations for the Reorganisation Loan.  In light of strong popular opposition to 
even the slightest measure of foreign interference or control, the leaders of the 
new Republic of China baulked at the notion of supervision and sought loans with 
more palatable terms from alternative sources while lobbying the consortium to 
relax its conditions.81  The negotiations thus stalled, and would make very little 
progress for the rest of the year, a situation which brought to light a divergence in 
the positions of Britain and the United States. 
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As the negotiations dragged on into the latter months of 1912, the British 
became increasingly disillusioned with the six-power loan; John Jordan complained 
in December 1912 that the consortium had ‘done little but swell our telegraph 
bill’.82  The Foreign Office chafed at the limitations on new British investments 
imposed by the consortium’s effective monopoly on lending to the Republic of 
China and, moreover, was mindful of the impact of prolonged instability on Britain’s 
existing commercial interests.  Though they were loath to abandon the consortium 
entirely, British policymakers’ frustration led them to push for an end to the 
insistence on complete exclusivity and a significant relaxation of the conditions 
regarding supervision in the hope that this would enable the Chinese to agree terms 
and thus hasten the restoration of order.83 
British policymakers’ loss of faith in the consortium and willingness to 
sacrifice previously agreed principles to bring the loan to a speedy conclusion 
reflected the fact that Britain remained the paramount commercial power in China 
and was thus hardest hit by the loan impasse.  The concerns of British policymakers 
were not shared by the Americans, whose commercial stake in China remained 
relatively insignificant, and the British reversal on the issue of supervision was 
particularly unwelcome in Washington.  Knox and his advisers were adamant, and 
remained so to the very end of the administration in March 1913, that thorough 
oversight was essential to guard against ‘improvident extravagances’.84  The State 
Department thus declined to consider suggestions for lending to the Chinese on 
more lenient terms and reproached the British for breaking rank and putting 
international cooperation at risk.85  Ultimately, British policymakers put their 
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commitment to the maintenance of international cooperation ahead of commercial 
considerations and swallowed their objections to the consortium for the sake of 
unity, but interaction over the Reorganisation Loan does indicate the continued 
potential for the disparity in British and American investment in East Asia to open 
up divisions between the powers even when their broader interests were aligned.86 
A similar dynamic is discernible with regard to the question of recognition 
for the newly-established Republic of China, though in this instance it was the 
Americans who became impatient with the position adopted by the rest of the 
powers.  As with the loan issue, Britain and the U.S. were entirely in step to begin 
with: both agreed that the Chinese Government would need to establish itself 
sufficiently to provide guarantees of the observance of treaty rights and 
international obligations before recognition could be considered.87  Before long, 
however, the U.S. Government began to push for the concert of powers to consider 
recognition prior to such guarantees.  In July 1912, Knox put the case to the British, 
along with the rest of the consortium powers, that conditions in China had 
improved sufficiently to make recognition viable and that stability and the security 
of foreign interests would actually be realised sooner by early recognition.88 
The Taft administration’s conversion to support for early recognition came in 
part because of sympathy with the cause of the Chinese, whose welfare the U.S. 
was supposed to have always had peculiarly at heart.  Less altruistically, 
policymakers and officials also identified in the recognition question an opportunity 
to boost future American commercial prospects in China by coming out clearly on 
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the side of the aspiring Republic.89  The primary motivation behind the American 
reversal on recognition, however, was the usual suspect of domestic political 
expediency.  Popular feeling in the United States was very taken with the apparent 
conversion of the Chinese to the gospel of democracy, and it did not take long 
before the Taft administration began to face calls for immediate recognition of the 
Republic of China as a gesture to acknowledge and assist the Chinese people as 
inheritors of the American legacy of republican revolution.90  Popular pressure was 
particularly acute because it was an election year and, as influential advocate of 
recognition Bishop James Bashford was quick to point out, ignoring the demands of 
the American people on this point might have serious consequences for Taft and his 
party.91 
The potential political fallout of failing to recognise the Republic of China 
evidently weighed on the minds of American policymakers, who made every effort 
to deflect criticism for the delay and accusations that they were pandering to the 
more aggressive, imperialist powers.92  Knox also warned the consortium powers 
that collectively withholding recognition was putting the international accord at 
risk, as domestic pressure was significant enough that it might force the hand of the 
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American Government.93  This line of argument did not go down well in London, 
and Grey was quick to caution the American Ambassador that unilateral recognition 
on the part of the United States was likely to have deeply undesirable consequences 
in China.94 
British opposition to early recognition had a number of sources, not least 
the basic principle that it was unnecessary and unwise to recognise a government 
which had yet to make the transition from provisional to permanent and could 
therefore offer none of the requisite guarantees regarding its future conduct.95  
British policymakers and officials were also far more sceptical than the Americans of 
claims that conditions in China were improving or that recognition would have a 
positive impact in terms of stability and foreign interests.96  Though this was 
perhaps the more realistic outlook, it also reflected a strain of ingrained pessimism 
in British assessments of the Revolution.  From the earliest rumblings of unrest 
through to the establishment of the Republic of China and beyond, the British had 
shown a distinct wariness regarding the ‘constitutional wave’ in which the Chinese 
had been swept up, and, though neutral in practice, the Foreign Office appears to 
have maintained a preference for the retention of the monarchy over the ‘risky 
experiment’ of republicanism.97  Jordan, in particular, had major reservations as to 
the capacity and ‘fitness’ of the Chinese for self-government, questioning the 
durability of republicanism given that it was ‘so unsuited to the genius and habits of 
the people’.98  Such negative racial stereotypes of the Chinese, which echoed the 
assessments of influential British author J.O.P. Bland, evidently had some influence 
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on official British thinking with regard to the Chinese Revolution.99  These ideas 
were at no point, however, a feature of British-American interaction, and 
policymakers may have deliberately avoided them in this context because this 
image of the Chinese would have jarred with the much more positive American 
view of the Revolution. 
With the other major powers unequivocally averse to early recognition of 
the Republic of China, the Taft administration ultimately declined to heed popular 
calls for unilateral action, prioritising instead the maintenance of international 
cooperation in China in much the same way as the British put aside their misgivings 
regarding the loan consortium in the name of a united front.100  There was thus, in 
practical terms, very little to divide the policies of Britain and the United States on 
the key issues of recognition and the Reorganisation Loan.  The divergence in their 
preferred approaches to the situation, reflecting the continued influence of 
American domestic politics and the much more substantial British commercial stake 
in China, did, however, arouse and reinforce mutual suspicions between the two 
powers. 
British policymakers and officials had a long history of characterising 
American policy in China as one of ‘ostentatious bluster’, often accusing them of 
portraying the United States as the righteous defender and friend of the Chinese 
even while seeking the same concessions and advantages as the more aggressive 
powers.101  This image appears to have influenced British assessments of American 
policy during 1912, with officials inclined to suspect that the United States sought to 
shift any odium arising from the international concert’s treatment of the Chinese 
onto the other powers.  In particular, the Taft administration’s preference for early 
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recognition generated a degree of resentment, and Jordan dismissed it as a thinly-
veiled attempt to curry Chinese favour and steal a march on the other powers.102  
On the other hand, British opposition to early recognition was interpreted by some 
in Washington as evidence of a deficiency of altruism, reflecting a tendency of the 
British to look out only for their own interests regardless of the impact on Chinese 
welfare.  William Calhoun, the American Minister to China, drew on a recurrent 
image of Britain as simply one among the aggressive, imperialist powers in his 
critique of British policy, accusing London of seeking to secure special privileges in 
Tibet and undermining the international concert by engaging in ‘a big diplomatic 
game’ of European power politics.103  The mutual suspicions which the issues of 
recognition and the Reorganisation Loan aroused amongst British and American 
policymakers and officials did not have a serious impact on relations between the 
powers, chiefly because no actual split developed while Taft was in the White 
House.  They did, however, presage the return to friction and division which was to 
come in the wake of the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson, especially since neither 
question had been resolved by the beginning of Wilson’s presidency in March 1913.   
As his predecessor had done, Wilson took hold of American policy in China 
with both hands and sought to significantly alter the course which the U.S. was 
following in East Asia.  Within a matter of months, the new President reversed the 
whole thrust of the Taft administration’s China policy by abandoning the key 
principles of government-sponsored investment and international cooperation.  The 
transition from Taft to Wilson did not in itself mark a major change in British-
American relations; Wilson was personally positive about cordial relations and his 
right-hand man, Colonel House, and the American Ambassador in London, Walter 
Hines Page, were both committed advocates of close friendship between the two 
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nations.104  With regard to China, however, Wilson’s sudden change of direction 
drew the United States and Britain apart and brought to an abrupt end the 
cooperation which had characterised their interaction during the earlier stages of 
the Chinese Revolution. 
Wilson and his Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, did not greatly 
differ from their predecessors in terms of attitude towards East Asia, sharing the 
same solicitude for China, belief in a special Chinese-American friendship and 
sympathy for the revolutionary Republic.105  They did, however, thoroughly reject 
Taft’s modus operandi, condemning Dollar Diplomacy and international cooperation 
as cynical pandering to ‘special interests’ at home and abroad.106  Wilson and Bryan 
also brought to the White House a more intense conviction that it was the sacred 
duty of the United States to foster democracy and Christianity across the globe.  
China appeared to them to be a prime mission field for both, as they eagerly put 
their faith in reports that the revolutionary movement was not only deeply rooted 
in the American republican model but also predominantly Christian in character.107  
The Wilson administration thus resolved to adopt a more overtly supportive and 
‘moral’ line with regard to the Republic of China, in the hope that by disinterested 
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aid and encouragement the United States might take a leading role in bringing the 
Chinese into the light.108 
An early opportunity to demonstrate the new direction in American China 
policy arose just a few days after Wilson’s inauguration in March 1913, when the 
American banking group requested a statement of the new President’s position on 
the Reorganisation Loan.  The consortium was by this point in a very fragile state as 
a result of the almost complete lack of progress in agreeing terms with the Chinese, 
and the American financiers were loath to continue with the enterprise without the 
express backing of the incoming administration.109  Wilson’s response was 
unequivocal and somewhat unorthodox: without reference to the other five powers 
in the consortium, he gave a statement to the press declaring that he could not 
sanction further American participation in the international loan.  The new 
President explained that his objection was fundamentally one of conscience, as the 
consortium made the U.S. Government party to an arrangement which, by its 
conditions for supervision, risked infringing the sovereignty and independence of 
China.  Participation in the Reorganisation Loan would thus be ‘obnoxious to the 
principles upon which the government of our people rests’, and so the United 
States would instead seek to aid China through friendship and by upholding the 
Open Door.110 
In addition to the ‘moral’ motivation for withdrawing the United States from 
the consortium, there were a number of other factors which made the decision a 
fairly straightforward one for the new President.  Historians such as William 
Appleman Williams have suggested that American policymakers calculated that 
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ending the association between the United States and the imperialist consortium 
powers would pay dividends in Chinese goodwill, ultimately benefitting American 
commercial interests in China more than involvement in the loan and continued 
cooperation.111   Probably far more significant from the point of view of the Wilson 
administration, however, was the domestic political rationale for curtailing 
American involvement in the consortium.  Financial collaboration with the other 
powers, and indeed the whole principle of Dollar Diplomacy in China, had fallen 
almost entirely out of favour with public opinion.  Pulling out of the Reorganisation 
Loan was thus a politically savvy move on Wilson’s part, and a useful demonstration 
of the legitimacy of his campaign claims that he would pursue a policy based on 
ideals rather than profits for ‘special interests’.112 
Though the decision on withdrawal from the consortium was an obvious one 
from the perspective of the Wilson administration, it came as an unwelcome 
surprise to British policymakers.  Their displeasure at the American ‘bombshell’ was 
not merely a result of the withdrawal itself, but also arose from the President’s 
sudden and unilateral announcement of the move.  Not only had the Americans 
neglected to consult with or offer any warning to the other consortium powers, but 
Wilson’s statement to the press implicitly cast aspersions on the motives of those 
powers which remained in the consortium.113  Bryan can only have added to the 
British sense of insult when he further explained the American decision as a matter 
of following the policy of ‘democracy’ rather than that of ‘aristocracy’.114  Their own 
reservations about the consortium notwithstanding, British policymakers and 
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officials struggled to contain their exasperation and annoyance over American 
conduct.  Though the loss of the U.S. banking group did not represent much of a 
material set-back, they feared that American renunciation of the consortium would 
undermine the cooperative enterprise and make the already challenging task of 
arranging satisfactory terms for the Reorganisation Loan that much more 
difficult.115 
This prediction was not wholly accurate, as it turned out, and the practical 
impact of American withdrawal from the consortium was ultimately negligible.  The 
determination of the British and the other remaining powers to hold the 
consortium together combined with the desperate need of the Chinese 
Government for funds meant that, against the odds, the Reorganisation Loan was 
signed in April 1913, less than a month after Wilson’s public disavowal of the 
enterprise.116  Nevertheless, the American policy reversal did bring the broader 
strategy of international cooperation in China into question, raising concerns among 
the remaining consortium powers that Wilson would follow up his abrupt 
announcement of American withdrawal with unilateral recognition of the Republic 
of China.  Grey, hoping to head off such an eventuality, instructed Bryce to make a 
pointed request that the new administration would not neglect to consult with the 
other powers prior to any moves in this direction.117   
British words of caution fell on deaf ears, however, as the Wilson 
administration was already well on its way towards extending recognition to the 
Republic of China.  Recognition, much like withdrawal from the consortium, 
appeared to the Wilson administration to be primarily a moral question; the United 
States was in a position either to support or to inhibit a nation ‘trying to get re-born, 
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as a republic’.118  Wilson and Bryan were not deterred by the evidence of continued 
unrest and uncertainty in China, apparently taking solace in claims that recognition 
would bring stability and establish the Republic more firmly among the masses.  
They may also have been swayed by the predictions of the American Chargé 
d’Affaires at Beijing, E.T. Williams, that the United States would materially benefit 
from being the first power to offer recognition.119  Once again, however, probably 
the most important factor in the Wilson administration’s eagerness for recognition 
was the domestic political situation.  The pressure for immediate recognition had 
passed from Taft to Wilson almost the moment the latter had been elected in 
November 1912, and, with his greater commitment to spreading democracy and 
mistrust of the concert of powers, the new President was considerably more 
receptive to it than his predecessor.120 
That Wilson’s approach to the recognition question was influenced by 
political considerations is further suggested by his attitude towards broaching the 
matter with the other interested powers.  He was adamant that the United States 
should not under any circumstances be seen to hesitate over recognition on 
account of the reservations of other powers, and he was reluctant to give even the 
impression of consultation lest it seem that foreign governments were in a position 
to influence American policy.121  The State Department did, in the end, offer a nod 
towards the principle of international cooperation by way of an aide-mémoire to 
the representatives of various foreign powers.  This note did not, however, in any 
sense request the opinions of the powers, merely informing them of the intention 
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of the United States to recognise the Republic of China and inviting them to join in 
doing the same.122  The British Government’s response to this American ‘overture’ 
was to emphasise once again that international cooperation was the most 
important principle in dealing with China.  Indeed, Bryce gently chided Bryan for 
failing to allow a reasonable length of time for consultation among the powers, as 
this made quite clear the Wilson administration’s lack of interest in actually 
cooperating.123  As if to illustrate this point, before the British response even 
reached the U.S. Government, the State Department had given instructions to 
Williams to recognise the Republic of China upon the meeting of the Assembly, 
which eventually took place on May 2nd 1913.124   
Though U.S. recognition cannot be said to have had much practical impact 
on the situation in China, there is no question that it was a source of significant 
frustration to those powers which had been intent on maintaining international 
unity on the issue.125  British policymakers and officials were particularly irked by 
the move, complaining of Wilson’s ‘indecent haste’ and ‘headlong eagerness’ to 
show solidarity with the Republic of China in spite of the delicacy of the situation.  
Not only were American assessments of conditions in China and the likely impact of 
recognition, in their view, overly optimistic, but the British position remained that 
assurances regarding foreign treaty rights and China’s international obligations 
constituted an essential prerequisite for recognition.126  Thus, while American 
recognition policy under Wilson was driven, at least in part, by domestic political 
concerns, British policy continued to be influenced by the significant commercial 
stake which the nation had in China. 
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The arrival of Woodrow Wilson in the White House brought a definitive end 
to British-American cooperation in the Chinese Revolution, but the shift in approach 
which the new President inaugurated was in some ways not as dramatic as it 
seemed, and going forward the China policies of the two powers were by no means 
radically different.  As tensions between Yuan Shih-Kai’s Government in Beijing and 
Sun Yat Sen’s southern radicals descended into civil war in the summer of 1913, 
Britain and the United States were to be found very much on the same side.  
Policymakers in London and Washington, sharing the same essential goal of the 
reestablishment of order and stability throughout China, gave their tacit backing to 
Yuan and stuck with him even as it became increasingly apparent that his regime 
fell a long way short of the democratic ideals of the Revolution.127  The new 
American policy in China was thus defined not so much by the substitution of 
moralism for self-interest, as Wilson and Bryan liked to claim, but rather by the 
rejection of cooperation in favour of a unilateral approach.  The Wilson 
administration’s major priority in overhauling Taft’s policy was to chart an 
independent course which would disassociate the United States from the 
imperialist powers, an approach at least in part designed to tap into popular 
enthusiasm for a return to the ‘traditional’ American policy of eschewing foreign 
entanglements.128  
With the revival of a fiercely individualist American policy in China came 
also, perhaps inevitably, a retreat into the passivity which had characterised U.S. 
involvement in East Asia prior to the turn of the twentieth century.  The Wilson 
administration, in spite of the activist tendencies of Ambassador to China Paul 
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Reinsch, took the line that the U.S. Government should not take an active role in 
supporting American interests in China, or indeed in Chinese affairs more 
generally.129  British policymakers were unimpressed by this return on the part of 
the United States to a posture of aloofness and inactivity in East Asia, and the new 
policy direction served to reinforce negative British images of American diplomacy.  
For example, the haste of the Wilson administration in reversing Taft’s policies with 
regard to both the consortium and recognition smacked, in British eyes, of a desire 
to attain a privileged position by posing as a friend of the Chinese.  Jordan in 
particular poured scorn on what he saw as a reversion by the U.S. to its ‘traditional 
policy of letting others do all the spade work and trying to reap a share of the 
results’.130  The abrupt abandonment of the cooperative policy in China also 
appeared to offer explicit confirmation of the preconception that American 
statecraft was inconsistent, unreliable and not to be taken seriously.131 
 British frustration over American conduct in 1913 reflected the fact that 
Wilson’s policy shift had effectively inaugurated a return to the broad aversion to 
collaboration which had characterised U.S. policy in the late nineteenth century.  
British-American interaction over East Asia thus came full circle after a brief 
flirtation with genuine collaboration in the earlier stages of the Xinhai Revolution.  
This cooperation had itself been a fairly dramatic departure after the travails of 
Dollar Diplomacy, which had not only failed to bring about joint action but had 
actually engendered a great deal of tension and mutual resentment.  These various 
swings in British-American interaction over China between 1909 and 1913 illustrate 
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the key trends which this study had identified by way of accounting for the rule of 
noncollaboration, to which joint action during the Revolution was the one major 
exception. 
 In the first place, the overarching concerns of British global policy needs and 
American domestic political needs were central to the failed attempts at joint 
action.  The British did not lend their support to the Taft administration’s attempt to 
preserve the Open Door in Manchuria because such cooperation would have been 
detrimental to Britain’s relations with Japan, while the Wilson administration 
abandoned joint action over the Reorganisation Loan and the recognition question 
largely in deference to popular support for an independent American course.  
Events in China during these years also showcased other trends at work, such as the 
mismatch in the powers’ hopes for cooperation during the wrangling over Dollar 
Diplomacy.  Probably the more significant trend during this period, however, was 
the difference in British and American stakes in East Asia.  Both in the Hukuang Loan 
negotiations and to a lesser extent during the Revolution, the British baulked at the 
sacrifices to their commercial interests which were expected by the comparatively 
uncommitted Americans, whose only concern was for principles. 
 The same recapitulation of earlier trends is in evidence during these years 
with regard to ideology, with the main theme undoubtedly being the distinct lack of 
ideas relating to race and civilisation in British-American interaction.  Such examples 
as there are, however, are particularly telling.  For example, Knox’s instructions to 
Whitelaw Reid regarding the care required in using the language of racial 
stereotypes in selling international cooperation in railway enterprises offers a rare 
insight into the tactical calculations policymakers made with regard to ideology.  
Similarly, Knox’s references to a shared British-American destiny and ‘indissoluble 
ties’ in post-mortem discussions of the Manchurian railway schemes is suggestive of 
the willingness of policymakers to speak in ideological terms in the abstract but not 
in relation to actual proposals of joint action.  Throughout this chapter, however, 
the most common recurrence has been the influence of stereotypes of one 
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another’s national character on British and American policymakers.  The tendency 
of the British to think of the Americans as either incompetent or guilty of cloaking 
opportunism in the guise of idealism was paralleled by the American habit of 
viewing the British as baldly self-interested and fundamentally imperialistic rather 
than altruistic.  Even when the powers were engaged in cooperation during the 
Revolution, their interaction served more to solidify than to dispel such negative 
images. 
 Though interaction over China between 1909 and 1913 finally witnessed the 
translation of rhetorical closeness into practical collaboration, this period by no 
means bucks the trend of shared interests and ideology proving insufficient to 
guarantee a cooperative approach to the East Asian situation.  If anything, these 
years were especially representative of the broader period, as a familiar cast of 
limitations and constraints continued to obstruct the path to harmonious joint 








At its most basic level, this study has sought to demonstrate that British-American 
interaction over East Asia between 1898 and 1914 did not live up to the ideal 
implied by the notion of the ‘great rapprochement’.  It has shown that cooperation 
between the two powers was not the norm and that, barring one or two exceptions, 
joint action did not materialise during these years to any significant degree.  The 
simplest explanation for the absence of cooperation would be that Britain and the 
United States lacked a real basis in shared interests or any ideological rationale for 
working together in East Asia, but on neither count was this the case.  This study 
has attempted, therefore, to explain why a community of both ideas and interests 
did not, for the most part, translate into practical collaboration.  It has established, 
on the one hand, that external concerns and priorities frequently trumped the 
interests which the two powers shared in determining their respective policies.  On 
the other, it has suggested that ideas relating to race and civilisation which might 
have served to encourage a united front were largely absent in British-American 
interaction, at least in part because policymakers deliberately avoided them, and 
that negative images of each other were more prominent as an influence on the 
thinking of the two governments.  Though these various contentions have been 
traced in some detail through the individual chapters, this brief conclusion draws 
together the key findings of the study. 
 The central, unifying theme of the study has been the failure of Britain and 
the United States to engage in a cooperative approach to East Asian affairs during 
the period under consideration.  The preceding chapters have clearly demonstrated 
that in dealing with issues of commercial expansion and internal upheaval in China, 
the Russo-Japanese War and the crises surrounding Japanese immigration to the 
Pacific Coast of North America, either one or both of the powers declined to engage 
in joint action or actively support the endeavours of the other.  The one significant 
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exception to this rule is the cooperative approach which Britain and the United 
States adopted during the early stages of Xinhai Revolution of 1911.  What set this 
instance apart from the general run of British-American interaction over East Asia 
was not simply the context of broader international cooperation – which was not in 
itself sufficient to prompt the same level of cooperation during the Boxer Rising a 
decade earlier – but rather the extent to which both powers prioritised their shared 
goals and interests over other concerns.  Virtually every other opportunity for joint 
action in East Asia was stymied by the interposition of external pressures and 
constraints which outweighed the community of interest. 
 On the American side, the major factor militating against cooperation with 
Britain was the domestic political scene; popular Anglophobia and suspicion of 
‘foreign entanglements’ presented a significant obstacle for American policymakers 
in pursuing cooperative policies.  During both the ‘scramble for concessions’ of 1898 
and the Russo-Japanese War, British overtures for an understanding geared 
towards the preservation of the status quo in East Asia were rejected by American 
policymakers, primarily for reasons of political expediency.  Moreover, even 
independent American policies which appeared to put the U.S. in line with Britain, 
such as John Hay’s Open Door notes, were politically suspect, encouraging 
policymakers to artificially distance their actions from the British.  Domestic political 
concerns were also responsible for the abrupt cessation of British-American 
cooperation in the Xinhai Revolution, as Woodrow Wilson responded to the popular 
pressure for an independent policy which William Howard Taft had been prepared 
to weather. 
 British hopes for cooperation in East Asia were thus regularly dashed by the 
vagaries of the American political scene, but policymakers in London were 
themselves responsible for obstructing collaboration between the powers due to 
the perceived need to prioritise global policy imperatives over interests in East Asia.  
Though concerns about ‘overstretch’ and limited resources on one level encouraged 
British policymakers to seek a partnership with the United States in East Asia, they 
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also led to an ever-increasing reliance on relationships with other powers, most 
notably Japan.  The Anglo-Japanese Alliance regularly became something of a point 
of tension between Britain and the United States, as British policymakers were loath 
to take any action which risked damaging their relations with Tokyo and therefore 
leaving them unable to maintain their global commitments.  Thus, during the Russo-
Japanese War, the immigration crisis and Taft’s attempts to bring Dollar Diplomacy 
to Manchuria, British cooperation and assistance were withheld for fear of causing 
offence to the Japanese or pursuing a course which was in conflict with their 
interests. 
 These two overarching concerns have, throughout the preceding chapters, 
provided the basic explanation for the failure of Britain and the United States to 
cooperate in East Asia.  There were also, however, three more or less 
interconnected trends which the study has highlighted to further elucidate the 
consistent lack of joint action between the two powers.  The first of these, a shared 
preference for passivity, was to a large extent an outworking of the powers’ 
respective concerns.  American policymakers were constrained by popular apathy 
towards East Asian affairs and hostility towards an activist foreign policy in a 
supposedly peripheral region, while the British were discouraged from playing an 
active role in East Asia by the need to conserve resources for more pressing 
concerns elsewhere in the world.  Though the common predilection for a minimal 
commitment in East Asia did serve to align British and American policies in the 
region, particularly in relation to upheavals such as the Boxer Rising, it also to some 
extent circumscribed opportunities for cooperation between the powers.  For 
example, had either power been prepared to take a strong independent stance in 
the Manchurian controversy prior to the Russo-Japanese War, they would most 
likely have received the backing of the other, significantly improving the prospects 
for joint action. 
 Probably even more significant to the failure of the two powers to work 
together in East Asia than the shared tendency towards passivity was the second 
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trend: a mismatch in British and American hopes and expectations for cooperation.  
The British, conscious of the necessity of forging partnerships with other powers in 
order to sustain their global position, sought longer-term, comprehensive joint 
action with the United States, ideally in the form of a commitment to the 
preservation of the regional status quo.  American policymakers, constrained by the 
political risks of any sort of ‘entanglement’ with a foreign power, favoured 
cooperation only on a much more limited scale and with very specific goals in mind.  
This mismatch was thus largely a function of the overarching concerns of the two 
powers, but it also had the effect of significantly increasing the potential for tension 
between London and Washington and thereby rendering any sort of cooperation 
more difficult to achieve.  The British regularly spoke of their desire for close 
cooperation between the two powers but were unwilling, absent some kind of 
concrete commitment from the United States, to offer their support in the specific 
instances the Americans sought it, for reasons already discussed.  American 
expectations of British backing were thus built up and repeatedly not met, 
generating resentment in Washington, for example during the Russo-Japanese War 
and in relation to the Manchurian railway schemes of 1909-1910. 
 The final trend which has recurred throughout the study is the disparity in 
the extent of British and American investment in East Asia.  Britain had significant 
commercial interests in China and therefore much to lose, whereas the United 
States, despite a widespread conviction amongst policymakers that commercial 
expansion in the region was essential to future prosperity, had only very modest 
tangible interests to consider.  The unevenness of the two powers’ respective stakes 
was mitigated somewhat by the tendency of British policymakers to put broader 
imperatives ahead of purely economic interests, but it still had the potential to 
complicate attempts to orchestrate joint action between London and Washington.  
For example, in the negotiations over the Boxer settlement, the Hukuang Loan and, 
albeit less significantly, the Reorganisation Loan, British policymakers proved 
reluctant to acquiesce in arrangements which would disproportionately prejudice 
their commercial interests for the sake of expediency.  American policymakers and 
251 
 
officials did not sympathise with British stubbornness on such points – in large part 
because they had little to lose themselves and thus minimal compunction about 
putting principles ahead of profit – which created further potential for friction 
between the two powers. 
 Given that the combined effect of these trends and the overarching 
concerns of the two powers was to preclude cooperation between Britain and the 
United States in East Asia by effectively negating their community of interests, it 
might reasonably be objected that this whole notion of shared interests is 
somewhat questionable.  There was, however, a reasonably solid basis of common 
interests – primarily the maintenance of the status quo and open trade in China and 
the balancing of immigration restriction with cordial relations with Japan – and 
policymakers do appear to have recognised that in declining to engage in joint 
action they were, on some level, acting against their interests.  For example, John 
Hay frequently expressed frustration that domestic political constraints prevented 
the U.S. from pursuing its objectives in East Asia by working with the British, while 
policymakers in London lamented the negative repercussions of prioritising the 
relationship with Japan with regard to the immigration issue and the Manchurian 
railway question.  It would perhaps be fair, however, to suggest that the extent of 
the British-American community of interests in East Asia was somewhat inflated in 
the minds of policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic owing to the ‘community of 
sentiment’, in other words the ideological basis for a united front in the region. 
 There was, as the study has documented, a range of shared ideas and 
images which had the potential to facilitate or encourage cooperation between 
Britain and the United States in East Asia.  Notions of Anglo-Saxon unity and Yellow 
Peril threat were pervasive in popular culture and relatively influential amongst 
policymakers.  Moreover, many East Asia events and issues, such as the Boxer Rising 
and the Japanese-American war scares, were understood at all levels in at least 
partially ideological and racial terms.  Throughout the study, however, it has been 
the absence of such ideological content in British-American interaction which has 
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been the most striking finding.  The surprising lack of ideas regarding race and 
civilisation in communication between the two powers does provide a basic 
explanation as to why the shared ideological framework proved inadequate to bring 
about cooperation, but, as the preceding chapters have indicated, there is a little 
more to the story than this. 
 Almost as persistent a theme throughout the study as the absence in 
interaction between Britain and the United States of ideological incentives for 
cooperation in East Asia has been the presence of negative images which 
policymakers held of the other power.  These images did not necessarily prevent a 
cooperative approach, but they did have the potential to increase friction between 
the powers and fuel mutual suspicions when cooperation was not immediately 
forthcoming.  For example, the criticisms which British policymakers and officials 
expressed regarding U.S. conduct during the Boxer negotiations and the Xinhai 
Revolution drew on an established image of American foreign policy as equal parts 
sanctimonious and unscrupulous.  Likewise, American policymakers and officials 
were quick to revert to an image of the British as vacillating and irresolute 
whenever they did not adequately support U.S. policy, such as in the build-up to the 
Portsmouth peace conference.  The prominence of these negative stereotypes of 
one another over shared ideas and images which might have promoted 
collaboration between Britain and the United States does offer further insight into 
the failure of the ‘community of sentiment’ to engender a united front in East Asia.  
It does not, however, satisfactorily account for the paucity of the latter ideas in 
interaction between the two powers. 
 The major contention which the study has put forward by way of explaining 
the absence of racial or civilisational ideology in British-American interaction over 
East Asia is grounded in the principle that policymakers opted to employ or reject 
ideological arguments and language in interactions with the other power based on 
tactical calculations.  On this basis, the study has argued that the surprising lack of 
ideological content was at least in part a consequence of policymakers’ conscious 
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decisions to avoid and downplay ideological lines of reasoning because they 
believed that these would prove ineffective or even counterproductive in securing 
their objectives.  For example, both during the Russo-Japanese War and the 
Japanese-American war scares, American policymakers appear to have gone out of 
their way to dismiss ideas of Japan as a Yellow Peril threat and to avoid language 
which was suggestive of this kind of thinking in their attempts to secure British 
assistance.  The reasoning behind this approach was presumably that British 
policymakers were not in sympathy with negative, racialised portrayals of their 
allies, and so the employment of such ideas and images would not have helped to 
win them over and might even have jeopardised the credibility of U.S. policymakers.  
A more explicit insight into tactical engagement with ideology is found in the 
instructions given by U.S. Secretary of State Philander Knox to the American 
Ambassador in London, Whitelaw Reid, in 1909 regarding his employment of a 
stereotyped image of the Chinese in discussions of railway projects.  Knox took the 
line that such ideas and language could be used informally if this promised to be 
effective, but also cautioned that they were to be handled carefully so as to avoid 
any risk of undermining the American position with the Chinese. 
 Knox’s warning to Reid also serves to illustrate the other main contention of 
the study with regard to the absence of ideological content in British-American 
interaction – that the use of ideology was generally restricted to unofficial and 
abstract contexts – as it implies that informal communication was the appropriate 
setting in which to employ ideological language.  The preceding chapters have 
demonstrated that the majority of examples of ideological content in British-
American interaction are to be found not in the official interaction of the two 
powers but in more unconventional and informal settings, such as the 
correspondence between Theodore Roosevelt and junior British diplomat Cecil 
Spring Rice.  Moreover, even in such instances it is very unusual for ideological 
discussion to be directly related to opportunities for joint action in East Asia.  
Rather, as in correspondence between Roosevelt and King Edward VII during the 
Russo-Japanese War, the tendency was for ideological observations and arguments 
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to be somewhat abstract and speculative rather than directed towards a specific, 
practical purpose.  The evidence that policymakers observed such a demarcation 
between official and practical contexts and informal and abstract contexts, and 
restricted ideological language and reasoning almost exclusively to the latter, offers 
further insight into the general absence of shared ideas regarding race and 
civilisation in British-American interaction over East Asia. 
 The broad picture which this study has painted of British-American 
interaction over East Asia between 1898 and 1914 represents a significant challenge 
to the standard narrative of the ‘great rapprochement’ establishing a period of 
harmony and a budding ‘special relationship’ in the years prior to the First World 
War.  Though relations between the two powers did, in certain respects, undergo a 
marked improvement and were undoubtedly relatively cordial during these years, 
British and American policymakers were also frequently left disappointed and 
frustrated by each other’s unwillingness or inability to pursue a cooperative solution 
to common problems in East Asia.  On paper, there was every reason to expect 
Britain and the United States to be able to work together in the region.  In practice, 
however, both the community of interests and the ‘community of sentiment’ which 
the two powers shared failed to pave the way for genuine collaboration.  A more 
fundamental change, it would seem, was required before the rhetoric of 
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